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Preface 
 
Abstract 
Long Term Evolution (LTE) is a major technology to be used in the 4th 
generation (4G) mobile network and the core network is evolving towards a converged 
packet based framework for all services. As a part of the evolved core network, 
Internet Protocol (IP) Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) provides multimedia services 
(data, voice, video and variations) over packet switched networks. LTE and IMS are 
both defined by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) group, and the 
specification identifies that a LTE user device has to carry out two authentication steps 
to access IP multimedia services. The first authentication step is used to gain LTE 
network admission and the second authentication step is the IMS authentication used 
to gain access to the multimedia services. It is observed that the 4G standardized 
authentication protocols include double execution of the Authentication and Key 
Agreement (AKA) which increases the system’s complexity, results in significant 
authentication delay and high terminal energy consumption. Authentication is very 
important for a terminal to gain access to a network and therefore considerable 
previous research into this topic has occurred. However a common limitation of 
previously proposed authentication systems is either a lack of security or significant 
system modification. 
This research proposes the Improved AKA (IAKA) authentication protocol 
which binds the two layer’s authentication procedures by using the unified IP 
Multimedia Private-user Identity (IMPI). The proposed IAKA only executes the AKA 
protocol once in the network layer and generates authentication credentials which 
would be used in the second IMS service layer authentication.  
This research work included providing IAKA authentication protocol, 
developing a LTE IMS integrated network by using OPNET Modeller, simulation of 
the IAKA and the legacy 3GPP defined 4G LTE AKA authentication protocol under 
different environments, and in-depth analysis of the system performance, security and 
terminal’s energy consumption. It is shown that the proposed IAKA carries out 
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terminal authentication correctly, improves security, reduces IMS layer authentication 
delay by up to 38%, and provides an 81.82% terminal energy consumption saving. 
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List of definitions 
4G LTE authentication in this paper, 4G LTE authentication denotes the current 
4G LTE IMS two-pass authentication protocol defined 
by 3GPP standardization group  
IAKA authentication in this paper, IAKA authentication denotes the proposed 
the improved 4G LTE IMS one-pass AKA 
authentication protocol 
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1 Introduction 
Driven by the rapid growth in mobile broadband networks and the insatiable 
bandwidth requirements of new applications, mobile networks are evolving towards 
converged Internet Protocol (IP) based 4th generation (4G) mobile broadband 
networks. As a major 4G technology, Long Term Evolution (LTE) aims to provide a 
high data rate, low latency and all IP mobile networks.  Correspondingly, the core 
network is evolving towards a converged packet-based framework for all services. As 
a part of the evolved core network the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) provides 
multimedia services (data, voice, video, and combinations) over Packet Switched 
Networks (PSN) for wired and wireless access networks. However, with the 
integration of different networks, the authentication procedure becomes more and 
more complex which raises performance concerns and affects IMS and LTE 
deployment scenarios. 
4G LTE and IMS are both defined by the 3rd Generation Partnership Projects 
(3GPP) group. The 3GPP specification requires that a LTE user terminal authenticate 
twice to access the multimedia service layer. The first authentication step is the LTE 
network layer authentication which enables the user to access the LTE network layer 
and packet data network by checking the user’s International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI); and the second authentication step is the IMS service layer 
authentication which authenticates the user by checking the user’s IP Multimedia 
Private-User Identity (IMPI) to enable the user to access the multimedia service layer. 
This authentication approach is also called the two-pass Authentication and Key 
Agreement (AKA) authentication protocol. However, it was observed that the two 
authentication steps use the same AKA protocol including requesting, generation and 
distribution of the Authentication Vectors (AV), and the mutual authentication by 
using the received AVs increases the system’s authentication delay and the terminal’s 
energy consumption. 
In order to reduce the overhead, delay and energy consumption, an Improved 
AKA (IAKA) authentication protocol is proposed which binds the two authentication 
steps by using the user’s IMPI number without double execution of the AKA protocol. 
In the proposed IAKA, the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) generates the AV by using 
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the IMPI number and distributes the AV to the User Equipment (UE), the Mobility 
Management Entity (MME), and the Proxy Call Session Control Function (PCSCF). 
In both of the network layer authentication and the service layer authentication, the 
terminal and the network entities authenticate each other by using the same AV 
generated by the HSS using the IMPI number. 
The security, performance and energy consumption of the proposed IAKA was 
analysed and the results are presented. The results demonstrate that the IAKA provides 
adequate authentication, and supports mutual authentication, confidential and integrity 
message protection. Furthermore, two possible security attacks are discussed: (1) 
replay attack; and (2) Denial of Service (DOS) attack. The proposed IAKA algorithm 
protects the system from the malicious replay attack and provides stronger protection 
against the DOS attack than the current 4G standardized approach. An OPNET 
Modeller simulation model was developed to simulate the proposed IAKA algorithm 
and the 4G LTE authentication protocols. The simulation results showed that the 
proposed IAKA algorithm could not only simplify the authentication protocol 
significantly, but also reduce the IMS layer authentication delay by up to 38%. The 
terminal energy consumption used in the authentication and security activities was 
calculated and the results showed the proposed IAKA algorithm could save up to 
81.82% in the IMS service layer authentication and save up to 39.13% in the 
combined two layer authentication process. 
1.1 Scope 
It was observed that the legacy 4G LTE authentication protocol has the following 
vulnerabilities: (1) duplicated AKA authentication procedures in use; (2) long 
authentication delay; and (3)  high terminal energy consumption. In order to improve 
the system’s efficiency and save terminal energy consumption, the research questions 
were framed: 
• How to avoid the double execution of the AKA protocol? 
• How to improve the system’s performance by simplifying the authentication 
process? 
• How to provide a safe message channel to protect the critical user identities? 
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• How to decrease terminal energy consumption?  
The research outcome is to design an authentication protocol which would be a 
good solution to the defined research questions. The scope of this research included: 
• A literature review of current research on the authentication protocols.  
• An initial investigation of LTE and IMS network concepts and technologies 
used. 
• Detailed research and investigation of IMS authentication in LTE network: 
o LTE network architecture and service procedures 
o LTE network layer AKA authentication 
o IMS network architecture and service procedures 
o IMS service layer AKA authentication 
o LTE and IMS user identity management 
o SIP protocol 
o Diameter protocol 
o IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) protocol 
o Security 
o Energy consumption 
• Network simulation by using OPNET Modeller Version 16  
o Developing LTE IMS integrated network 
o Developing the current 3GPP defined 4G LTE IMS registration 
procedure and the related AKA protocol 
o Developing proposed IAKA registration and the related AKA protocol 
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o Developing different network environment to run the 3GPP AKA 
authentication protocol and the IAKA authentication protocol 
o Choosing statistics and collecting results  
• An in-depth Performance analysis based on the comparison of the simulation 
results 
• An in-depth security analysis 
• An in-depth energy consumption analysis 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is described as followings: 
• To develop an improved authentication protocol which enables the LTE user to 
access the IP multimedia services with enhanced performance, security and 
low energy consumption.  
• To develop the simulator of the LTE IMS integrated network which would be 
used to validate the proposed IAKA protocol. 
• To simulate different authentication protocols under different environments to 
compare their performance.  
• To compare and analyse the security level of different authentication 
approaches. 
• To compare and analyse the energy consumption of different authentication 
approaches. 
1.3 Publications 
The research has been published in peer reviewed IEEE conferences and a 
journal publication has been submitted for review. The publications are shown below 
which will be included in the appendix. 
• Lili Gu and Mark A Gregory, “Improved One-Pass IP Multimedia Subsystem 
Authentication for UMTS”,  International Conference on Information Networking, 
Kuala Lumpur Malaysia, Jan 2011 
  5 
• Lili Gu and Mark A Gregory, “A Green and Secure Authentication for the 4Th 
Generation Mobile Network”, Australasian Telecommunication Networks And 
Applications Conference, Melbourne Australia, Nov. 2011, accepted 
• Lili Gu and Mark A Gregory, “Optimized Authentication and Key Agreement 
Protocol for 4G Long Term Evolution and IP Multimedia Subsystem”, IEEE 
Transactions on Wireless Communications, Dec. 2011, submitted 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a description 
of the evolution of the mobile network, the 3GPP defined 4G LTE AKA 
authentication protocol, and the current research work in this area; the research 
objectives, assumptions and limitations are provided in Chapter 3; Chapter 4 
introduces the proposed IAKA authentication protocol including the principles, the 
authentication procedures, and the detailed description of the system model; Chapter 5 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the system performance, system security and 
terminal’s energy consumption; Chapter 6 provides the conclusion; and possible future 
research opportunities are identified in Chapter 7. 
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2 Background 
This chapter provides a brief introduction of the mobile network evolution which 
starts from first generation (1G) to fourth generation (4G). With the focus on 4G LTE 
and IMS technology, the chapter provides an in-depth description of the LTE and IMS 
network architecture, and the system’s interfaces. A detailed description is provided of 
the current 4G LTE IMS authentication architecture and relevant protocols. Finally this 
chapter introduces the most recent research in related areas.  
2.1 Evolution of the mobile network 
2.1.1 1G and 2G 
Wireless cellular communication has evolved since its emergence in the 1980s 
when the 1G analogue mobile network was commercially introduced.  1G systems 
included Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS) in the United States and Nordle 
Mobile Telephone (NMT) in the Europe. 1G systems suffered from performance 
limitations, poor coverage, limited roaming and large handsets; and was replaced by 
second generation (2G) systems in 1990s. The 2G mobile network was originally 
designed as a digital, circuit-switched network for voice services. 2G systems included 
key technologies: 
• Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) was defined by the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and deployed worldwide. GSM 
was the dominant 2G technology. 
• cdmaOne was standardized by the Telecommunications Industry Association 
(TIA) as an Interim Standard (IS-95) [RAPPAPORT 2002] and deployed in Asia-
Pacific, North and Latin America. 
• Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) is an evolution to AMPS and 
standardized in North America as IS-136. TDMA was mostly used in North 
America. 
• Personal Digital Cellular (PDC) was standardized in Japan and was very similar 
to TDMA. PDC was mainly used in Japan and China. 
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2.1.2 3G 
Due to demand and increasing capacity requirements for mobile Internet access 
and IP-based services, the first commercial third generation (3G) network was available 
in Japan at the end of 2001. Under the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
International Mobile Telecommunications 2000 (IMT-2000) framework, the two main 
3G technologies developed included Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
(UMTS) and Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (CDMA 2000). 
• UMTS: UMTS was defined by the 3GPP and was an evolution of 2G GSM 
technology to provide improved services. Two radio interfaces were defined; one 
was CDMA Direct Spread (DS) which corresponds to the Frequency Division 
Duplex (FDD) mode of UMTS; another was CDMA Time Division Duplex 
(TDD) which corresponds to the UMTS TDD mode. However, with 2Mbps 
bitrate, UMTS quickly fell behind meeting the requirements of the fast 
developing mobile Internet services. Therefore, only several years later, High 
Speed Packet Access (HSPA) was launched providing a downlink peak rate of 
14.4Mbps and uplink data rate of 5.7Mbps. HSPA+ was defined in the 3GPP 
release 7 and could provide data rates of 84Mbps on the downlink and 22Mbps 
on the uplink.  Telstra, a major carrier in Australia, was the first carrier in the 
world to launch a HSPA+ mobile network in 2008.   
• CDMA 2000 is also known as CDMA Multi Carrier (MC) and was defined by 
the 3GPP2. CDMA 2000 provided backward compatibility with the 2G cdmaOne 
technology. CDMA 2000 has evolved considerably over time and some of the 
revisions include CDMA2000 1X Rev0, CDMA2000 1xEV-DO Rev 0 / Rev A / 
Rev B / Rev C, CDMA2000 Rev A / Rev B / Rev C / Rev D. 
2.1.3 4G 
With the emergence of the mobile broadband network, smart mobile phones/ 
tablet computers, and the open source application platform, the need for bandwidth has 
doubled every year. In order to meet the evolving user needs, the ITU International 
Mobile Telecommunications-Advanced (IMT-Advanced) specified requirements for the 
4G mobile network and the key points in the specification are [ITU-R M.2134]: 
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• All IP packet based network 
• Enhanced peak data rates to support advanced services and applications (100 
Mbit/s for high and 1 Gbps for low mobility) 
• Cell spectrum efficiency of downlink up to 3 bit/s/Hz/cell and uplink up to 2.25 
bit/s/Hz/cell 
• The minimum requirements for peak spectral efficiencies are 15 bit/s/Hz for 
downlink and 6.75 bit/s/Hz for uplink 
• Scalable bandwidth up to and including 40 MHz. Wider bandwidths (e.g. up to 
100 MHz) are encouraged 
• Control plane latency shall be less than 100ms and user plane latency shall be 
less than 10ms 
By the end of 2009, different technologies from different countries were 
submitted to the ITU as 4G candidates including the Worldwide Interoperability for 
Microwave Access (WiMAX) and Long Term Evolution (LTE). In October 2010, the 
3GPP defined LTE release 10 & beyond (LTE_advanced) was accepted as a 4G 
technology which is the successor of the 2G GSM and 3G UMTS technologies. Since 2G 
GSM and 3G UMTS have a dominant user base, the LTE technology will follow this 
trend and be prevalent.    
2.2 The 3GPP group 
The 3GPP unites telecommunication standard bodies, known as “Organization 
Partners”. The organization partners are the Association of Radio Industries and 
Businesses (ARIB), the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS), 
China Communications Standards Association (CCSA), the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the Telecommunications Technology 
Association (TTA), and Telecommunication Technology Committee (TTC) [3GPP 
2011]. 
The original scope of 3GPP was to produce technical specifications and technical 
reports for a 3G mobile system, and now it is extended to include the development and 
maintenance the 4G LTE systems. 
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2.3 IP Multimedia Subsystem 
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) has been widely adopted as the multimedia 
system architecture for the three networks: (1) 4G mobile network; (2) Next Generation 
Network (NGN); (3) and Internet access. The IMS provides multimedia services (i.e., 
audio, video, text, chat, image, and a combination of them) over Packet Switched 
Networks (PSN) for multiple access networks such as fiber, LTE, and WiMAX 
[Copeland 2009]. The IMS supports interoperating with other IP networks and 
interworking with legacy networks such as the Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN) and GSM. The IMS also defines the underlying standards, including standards 
for security, Quality of Service (QoS), resilience, and chargeability. 
The IMS was first specified by 3GPP in 2003 for mobile communication session 
control over IP transport for 3G networks and then it was extended to include the 
Telecommunication and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced 
Networking (TISPAN) as a subsystem of NGNs. Most of the IMS protocols are 
standardized by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) including the Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP) which has become an important part of many Voice over Internet Protocol  
(VoIP) systems. Other standardization bodies are also involved in the development of 
IMS, such as the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA). 
 
Figure 2-1 IMS three layer architecture 
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Fig. 2-1 shows the IMS the layer architecture. The three layers are independent 
with each other and each layer is responsible for different functions which make the IMS 
an access-agnostic, service-agnostic, and location-agnostic core network. With the IMS, 
network operators can save costs and increase average revenue per user (ARPU) and 
subscriber stickiness which increase the incentive for IMS to be deployed. The 
advantages of IMS can be summarized as follows [Khilifi 2008]. 
• Integrated delivery of Multimedia Services 
• Flexible service environment with rapid service creation & deployment; easy 
service customization and tailoring 
• Fixed-Mobile convergent services (FMC) 
• One IMS for multiple access network: Provide same application, single sign-in, 
consistent user interface, unified charging policy and etc., for  different handsets 
or clients of different access networks by sharing the centralized resources such 
as Home Subscriber Server (HSS), Customer Relationship Management (CRM), 
and Business Support System (BSS) 
• Support of mobility including service mobility and user mobility for both mobile 
users and fixed users 
• End to end QoS and security 
2.4 Long Term Evolution 
LTE is defined by the 3GPP and is an evolution of the 3G UMTS technology. 
Although LTE is always marketed as 4G, the first version of LTE (3GPP release 8) 
doesn’t meet IMT 4G requirements. This pre-4G standard step toward to LTE advanced 
(3GPP release 10) which increases the speed and capacity of the mobile network, and is 
backward compatible to the LTE technologies. The key parameters of LTE, LTE 
advanced, and IMT advanced is compared in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 Comparison of LTE, LTE advanced, and IMT advanced 
 LTE (Rel. 8) LTE advanced (Rel. 10) IMT advanced 
Bandwidth (Max) 20MHz 100MHz 40MHz~100MHz 
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Peak data 
rate 
DL 300Mbps 1Gbps 1Gbps 
UL 75Mbps 500Mbps  
Peak 
spectrum 
efficiency 
DL 15 30 15 
UL 3.75 15 6.75 
 
2.4.1 Network architecture 
To the LTE core network, IMS is the only candidate for the all IP network. Fig. 
2-2 shows the architecture of the LTE IMS integrated system [TS 23.401 2010][TS 
23.228 2010]. The functionalities of the basic system components are briefly described 
as following. 
 
 
Figure 2-2 LTE and IMS integrated system architecture 
• Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) and Evolved 
Node B (eNB): The E-UTRAN consists of eNBs providing Layer 1 and Layer 2 
features of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model. Briefly, 
eNB hosts the functions of the Radio bearer control, Radio resource management, 
Connection mobility control, Radio admission control, and Dynamic resource 
allocation 
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• Mobility Management Entity (MME): The MME is in charge of the Evolved 
Packet System (EPS) mobility management and EPS session management. 
Authentication and authorization are two main functions of MME which request 
authentication vectors from HSS and initiate the mutual authentication 
procedures between the User Equipment (UE) and the MME 
• Serving Gateway (SGW): The SGW serves as a mobility anchor which routes 
and forwards packets between eNBs and between eNB and Packet Gateway 
(PGW) 
• PGW: The PGW is the Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway and provides 
access for sessions to the external Packet Data Network 
• Proxy Call Session Control Function (P-CSCF): The P-CSCF is the first contact 
point in the IMS 
• Interrogating Call Session Control Function (I-CSCF): The I-CSCF is used to 
hide the network’s topology and the main task is to identify the relevant Serving 
Call Session Control Function (S-CSCF) 
• S-CSCF: The S-CSCF performs UE session control services 
• Home Subscriber Server (HSS): The HSS is the master database for the whole 
system and contains subscription-related information 
• Application Server (AS): The AS provides applications to the end users 
2.4.2 Reference Points 
The model reference points include: 
• LTE-Uu: The radio protocol of E-UTRAN between the UE and the eNodeB 
• S1-MME:  Reference point between E-UTRAN and MME. 
• S1-U:  Reference point between E-UTRAN and SGW 
• S6a:  Reference point between MME and HSS 
• S8:  Reference point between the PGW and SGW 
• S11:  Reference point between MME and SGW 
• SGi:  Refernce point between the PGW and the packet data network 
• Mw  Reference Point between a CSCF and another CSCF 
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• Sh  Reference Point between an AS and an HSS 
• Cx  Reference point between a CSCF and an HSS 
• ISC  Reference Point between a CSCF and an AS 
The protocols related to the authentication procedures are: 
• The S6a is based on Diameter protocol 
• The Mw is based on SIP protocol 
• The Cx is based on Diameter protocol 
• The protocol between the UE and the MME is NAS (Non Access Stratum) 
protocol 
 
2.5 4G LTE two-pass AKA authentication 
2.5.1 LTE key hierarchy 
In order to provide security protection for different traffic flows the 3GPP LTE 
introduced a five layer key hierarchy.  
 
Figure 2-3 LTE key hierarchy 
As shown in Fig. 2-3 [TS 33.401 2010], K is the pre-shared key between the UE 
and the HSS and is used to generate the Cipher Key (CK) and Integrity Key (IK). K is 
kept in the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) of the UE and the 
CK, IK 
KNASenc KNASint 
KUPenc KRRCenc KRRCint 
K 
KASME 
KeNB 
USIM/AuC 
UE/HSS 
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Authentication Center (AuC) of the HSS. KASME is derived from CK and IK by the HSS 
and sent to the MME; and then, KASME is stored in the MME and is used to derive five 
keys to protect three different types of information flows which include the traffic 
between the terminal and the MME, the traffic between the terminal and the eNB ; and 
the traffic between the terminal and the SGW[Lescuyer 2008]. 
NAS [TS 24.301 2010] signaling between the terminal and the MME is 
confidentiality and integrity protected by KNASenc and KNASint. The traffic between the 
terminal and the eNB is confidentiality and integrity protected by KRRCenc and KRRCint. 
The user plane data between the terminal and the SGW is protected by KUPenc. 
2.5.2 IMS key hierarchy 
 
Figure 2-4 IMS key hierarchy 
As shown in Fig. 2-4, the IMS uses the two level key hierarchy to protect traffic 
which is defined in [TS 33.203 2009] and is a subset of the LTE five level key hierarchy. 
In the IMS, the HSS generates CK and IK by using the pre-shared key K and distributes 
CK and IK to the S-CSCF and P-CSCF. The traffic between the terminal and the P-
CSCF is confidentiality and integrity protected by CK and IK. 
CK, IK 
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USIM/AuC 
UE/HSS/SCSCF/PCSCF 
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2.5.3 EPS AKA authentication 
 
Figure 2-5 LTE EPS AKA authentication procedure 
According to the 3GPP TS 33.401, the purpose of EPS AKA is to provide mutual 
authentication between the terminal and the network and to agree on a key KASME. The 
triggering of the EPS AKA procedure occurs for several reasons such as a tracking area 
update. In most cases, the EPS AKA is performed in the attach procedure when the user 
terminal is switched on and requesting access to the packet services. 
The procedure of EPS AKA is shown in Fig. 2-5 which is based on [TS 23.401 
2010][TS 33.102 2009][TS 33.401 2010]; 
• E1: In order to register with the LTE network to receive services, the UE initiates 
an Attach Request to the MME with the IMSI number through the NAS protocol; 
• E2: If there aren’t valid AV in the MME, the MME will send an Authentication 
Information Request (AIR) to HSS to fetch the AV by using the diameter 
protocol [TS 29.272 2010]; 
E1: NAS. Attach Request (IMSI) 
UE MME 
E2: Diameter. Authentication 
Information Request (IMSI) 
E3: Diameter. Authentication
Information Answer (RAND, 
AUTN, XRES, KASME) E4: NAS. Authentication Request 
(RAND, AUTN, KSIASME) 
E5: NAS. Authentication 
Response, (RES) 
Compare RES and XRES 
E6: NAS. Attach Accept 
HSS 
Verify AUTN and 
calculate RES 
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• E3: Upon receipt of the request, the HSS uses the IMSI number to fetch the 
user’s profile and generates AV (RAND, AUTN, XRES, KASME); then the HSS 
sends the AV back to the MME by using the Authentication Information Answer 
(AIA) command 
• E4: Upon receipt of the AV from the HSS, the MME initiates the authentication 
procedure by sending an Authentication Request to the UE which contains 
parameters including RAND, AUTN and KSIASME. The Key Set Identifier (KSI) 
is used to identify KASME. 
• E5: The UE checks the received AUTN number first. If the AUTN can be 
accepted, the UE considers that the MME has passed the authentication. After the 
successful AUTN verification, the UE will calculate the RES number by using 
RAND and AUTN, and then sends the RES number back to the MME by using 
the Authentication Response message; 
• E6:  The MME checks whether the RES from UE match the RES from the HSS, 
and if they match, the MME considers that the AKA exchange is successfully 
completed and sends back the Attach Accept message to the UE. 
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2.5.4 IMS AKA authentication 
 
Figure 2-6 IMS AKA authentication procedure 
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After a successful LTE network layer authentication and the creation of the EPS 
bearer, the terminal is eligible to access the packet network. In order to access the 
services, the user has to pass the IMS layer authentication and the procedures are shown 
in Fig. 2-6 [TS 23.228 2010] [TS 33.102 2009] [TS 33.203 2010]. 
• I1: After the successful creation of the EPS bearer, the UE sends a REGISTER 
request to the P-CSCF by using the SIP protocol [TS 24.229 2010]. The SIP 
REGISTER request has the parameters of IMPI = impi and security-setup line in 
which the security–setup line is used to create Security Associations (SAs) with 
the P-CSCF. 
• I2, I3: The P-CSCF stores the security-setup parameters; removes the security-
setup line from the packet and forwards it to the I-CSCF. The I-CSCF fetches the 
user and the S-CSCF information from the HSS, locates the address of the next 
hop S-CSCF and forwards the packet to the S-CSCF. 
• I4: After receiving the SIP REGISTER request, the S-CSCF checks whether it 
has a previously stored AV. If it hasn’t, the S-CSCF sends a Multimedia Auth 
Request to the HSS with IMPI=impi by using the diameter protocol [TS 29.228 
2010] [TS29.229 2010]; 
• I5: The HSS uses the IMPI number to fetch the user’s information and generate 
AVs (RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN); then it sends the AVs back to the S-
CSCF; 
• I6, I7: The S-CSCF stores the AVs, selects the next AV(i) and sends the AV back 
to the P-CSCF through the I-CSCF; 
• I8: The P-CSCF keeps the received AV, selects parameters for creating the SAs 
and sends the packet with the parameters of Security-setup line, IMPI, RAND, 
and AUTN to the UE;  
• I9: After receiving the SIP REGISTER response, the UE checks the validity of 
the AUTN. If this is a valid AUTN, the UE would generate the response number 
RES, calculate the CK and the IK, create the IPSec security association to protect 
the following SIP messages, then sends SIP REGISTER message to the P-CSCF 
with the parameters Security-setup and RES in the security channel; 
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• I10, I11: After the received packet passed the validity checking of the P-CSCF, 
the P-CSCF would send the SIP REGISTER packet to the S-CSCF through the I-
CSCF with RES and integrity-protection=successful 
• I12: The S-CSCF compares the received RES from the UE with the XRES 
received from the HSS. If they match, the S-CSCF considers the AKA is 
successfully completed and sends Server Assignment Request to the HSS; 
• I13, I14, I15, and I16: After receiving the response from the HSS, the S-CSCF 
sends SIP REGISTER response 200 OK to the UE through the I-CSCF and the P-
CSCF. 
2.5.5 Two-pass AKA authentication 
The two-pass authentication process is a consequence of the integration of 
different systems. In the IMS system, each subscriber has two identities, one is for the 
access layer (e.g, IMSI for 4G mobile network), and one (IMPI number) is for the IP 
packet layer. The IMS two-pass authentication is used to authenticate the two subscriber 
identities. In the 4G LTE network, the first authentication step is the LTE layer 
authentication which enables the user to access the LTE and packet data network by 
checking the user’s IMSI number; and the second authentication step is the IMS service 
layer authentication which authenticates the user by checking the user’s IMPI number to 
enable the user to access the multimedia service layer. 
IMS was first specified in 2003 for 3G network when the data services and voice 
services were separated. Two identifiers (IMSI and IMPI) were required for different 
services in that age, IMSI is for the radio access layer and the voice services and IMPI is 
for the IP packet layer and the multimedia services. In order to keep the two systems 
fully independent it is necessary to carry out IMS AKA authentication in the 3G mobile 
network, although the AKA protocol in the two authentication steps are identical. If the 
system does the 3G network layer authentication and bypasses the IMS service layer 
authentication it would cause fraudulent IMS usage which is analysed by Lin [Lin 2005]. 
However, the 4G LTE network is an all IP-based network, and IMS is the only 
candidate for the core network, since all of the services including the voce services and 
data services are all based on IP network, the authentication process of using two 
subscriber identities to do two layers authentication is becoming not so necessary. The 
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management of two user identities and running two identical authentication protocols 
increase the management cost and reduce the system performance. Under such 
background, this research work is trying to provide a novel one-pass authentication 
protocol without complementary of the security. 
2.5.6 Early IMS authentication 
In order to have an easier and quicker introduction of the IMS, the early IMS 
authentication defined in [TR 33.978 2008] could avoid double execution of the AKA 
protocol by IP address binding with the IMPI, IMPU (IMS Public User identity), and 
IMSI. The early IMS authentication could protect the IMS against the most significant 
security threat; however, it suffers from several limitations: 
• Early IMS authentication lacks service flexibility, only one contact IP address 
can be associated with one IMPI; 
• Early IMS authentication compromised security since it doesn’t support mutual 
authentication and it does not include IPSec protection at the IMS level. 
2.6 Related work 
Since authentication is very important to telecommunication networks, there has 
been considerable research carried out in this area. However the common limitation is 
either a lack of security or the need for extra modifications of existing systems. 
Furthermore, 4G network research is current and ongoing. In this section, two related 
research outcomes are analysed. 
2.6.1 Huang and Li   
Huang and Li [Huang 2009] proposed a one-pass IMS AKA to replace the 3GPP 
defined 3G UMTS two-pass AKA authentication which could save 45% of the 
authentication signalling and 76.5% of the storage space without compromising security.  
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Figure 2-7 One pass IMS AKA [Huang 2009] 
As shown in Fig. 2-7, the proposed one pass IMS AKA authentication procedures 
are described as following: 
• Step 1. In the ith one-pass IMS AKA procedure, the UE generates a timestamp 
TS, random number RANDi, IMS key, digest password DPui, and digest-
response. Then it sends SIP request to the P-CSCF with IMPI, RANDi, and 
digest-response. 
• Step 2. Upon receipt of the Step 1 message, the S-CSCF checks the validity of 
the received RANDi number. Then it sends a request to the HSS to request the 
IMS key. 
• Step 3. HSS uses RANDi to derive the IMS key and sends the key back to the S-
CSCF. 
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• Step 4. Upon receipt of the Step 3 message, the S-CSCF keeps the IMS key for 
the UE and derives digest password DP’ui. Then the S-CSCF verifies the digest-
response retrieved from Step 1 using DP’ui. If the result is positive, it means that 
UE is a legal user. Finally the S-CSCF sends a SAR message over Cx reference 
to HSS. 
• Step 5. HSS stores the name of S-CSCF and sends a SAA message over Cx to S-
CSCF. 
• Step 6, and 7. The S-CSCF derives DPsi, CKi, IKi, and response-auth; and sends 
a SIP 200 OK message to the P-CSCF with IMPI, CKi, IKi and the response-
auth. The P-CSCF stores CKi and IKi , and sends the SIP OK message with IMPI 
and the response-auth to the UE. 
• Step 8. The UE checks the validity of the received response-auth firstly, if the 
result is positive, the S-CSCF is legal. Then the UE derives CKi and IKi which 
are used for IPSec security association between UE and P-CSCF. 
For this proposed authentication mechanism, the terminal is responsible for 
generating timestamp TS, random number RAND, IMS key, digest password, and digest 
response, distributing these AV to the server, and checking the response-auth after 
receiving REGISTER response. The S-CSCF has to check the random number, generate 
DP’ui, DPsi, CK, and IK, and verify digest response. From the comparison shown in 
Table 2-2, the proposed mechanism introduces extensive modification and increases the 
system complexity. 
Table 2-2 Huang and Li and 3GPP defined IMS AKA authentication procedure 
comparison 
One pass IMS AKA in [Huang 2009] 3G UMTS two-pass AKA 
UE generates a timestamp TS, random 
number RANDi, IMS key, digest password 
DPui, and digest-response 
- 
SIP Register (UE->P-CSCF,  P-CSCF ->I-
CSCF, I-CSCF->S-CSCF) 
SIP Register (UE->P-CSCF,  P-CSCF -
>I-CSCF, I-CSCF->S-CSCF) 
Diameter Multimedia Auth Request (S-CSCF-
>HSS) 
Diameter Multimedia Auth Request (S-
CSCF->HSS) 
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Calculation IMS key by HSS Calculation AVs by HSS 
Diameter Multimedia Auth Answer 
(HSS->S-CSCF) 
Diameter Multimedia Auth Answer 
(HSS->S-CSCF) 
Storing IMS key by S-CSCF Storing AVs by S-CSCF 
Deriving digest password DP’ui, and checking 
digest-response 
- 
Diameter Server Assignment Request / 
Answer (S-CSCF->HSS, HSS->S-CSCF) 
- 
S-CSCF derives DPsi, CKi, IKi, and 
response-auth 
- 
SIP response 401 UNAUTHORIZED  
(S-CSCF->I-CSCF, I-CSCF->P-CSCF, P-
CSCF->UE) 
SIP response 401 UNAUTHORIZED  
(S-CSCF->I-CSCF, I-CSCF->P-CSCF, 
P-CSCF->UE) 
Checking response-auth, and deriving CKi 
and IKi 
Verification of AUTN and calculation 
of RES number by UE 
Creating IPSec SAs Creating IPSec SAs 
- 
SIP Register (UE->P-CSCF, 
 P-CSCF ->I-CSCF, I-CSCF->S-CSCF) 
- Compare RES and XRES by S-CSCF 
- 
Diameter Server Assignment Request / 
Answer (S-CSCF->HSS, HSS->S-
CSCF) 
- 
SIP REGISTER response 200OK (S-
CSCF->I-CSCF, I-CSCF->P-CSCF, P-
CSCF->UE) 
 
2.6.1 Ntantogian 
Ntantogian [Ntantogian 2010] proposed a generic mechanism for efficient 
authentication in Beyond 3rd Generation (B3G) networks that attempted to reduce the 
execution of the 3GPP defined multi-pass authentication steps by using a security 
binding mechanism. The proposed mechanism authenticates a user in the second and 
third step of multi-pass authentication by using the user’s authentication credentials from 
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the initial step. As shown in Fig. 2-8, the proposed IMS service layer authentication used 
an (IMSI, IMPI) pair to authenticate the user without security protection between the 
Packet Data Gateway (PDG) and the P-CSCF which suffers the following vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 2-8 Proposed IMS AKA for 3G-WLAN in [Ntantogian 2010] 
• Lack of mutual authentication:  In the proposed IMS layer authentication, the 
terminal doesn’t support the authentication of the server. Therefore, an adversary 
may pretend to be the P-CSCF/I-CSCF/S-CSCF/HSS servers to get user related 
confidential information. 
• Lack of confidential and integrity protection: The proposed IMS layer 
authentication doesn’t support the confidential and integrity protection of the 
messages transmitted between the PDG and the P-CSCF which makes it very 
vulnerable to the eavesdropping or the middle-man attack. 
• Vulnerable of the replay attack: it is assumed there is an adversary sits between 
the PDG and the P-CSCF and captures packets. Firstly, it could initiate a replay 
attack by sending the captured packet SIP Register request with (IMPI, IMSI) 
pair to the server. Since the S-CSCF only checks whether the IMSI received from 
the terminal equals to the IMSI received from the HSS, with the captured correct 
(IMPI, IMSI) pair, the adversary will be successful to pass the authentication and 
get access to the services. Secondly, the adversary could pretend to be the IMS 
servers to send the captured SIP 200 OK response to the terminal.  Without the 
right security protection, the terminal will create a trust session with the faked 
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server and send its confidential information to it. Therefore, the proposed IMS 
layer authentication is very vulnerable to the replay attack. 
• Vulnerable to DOS attack:  It is assumed that an adversary sends SIP Register 
request with an IMPI number which belongs to a valid user to the P-CSCF. The 
P-CSCF would forward this packet to the I-CSCF, the S-CSCF, and the HSS.  
Therefore, the adversary could flood the core network and jeopardise the whole 
system.  
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3 Objectives 
The objective of this research is to develop improved IP multimedia subsystem 
authentication for the 4G LTE network with increased performance, security and less 
energy consumption. An OPNET Modeller network simulation would be developed and 
used in this research to validate the improved one-pass authentication system and to 
permit analysis of the authentication steps, security and performance. 
The aim of this thesis is to present research outcomes including a description of 
the mobile network evolution, a description and analysis of the 3GPP defined 4G LTE 
authentication protocol, a description of the proposed IAKA authentication protocol, the 
performance, security, energy consumption analysis of the proposed IAKA 
authentication protocol, and an in-depth comparison between the 3GPP defined 4G LTE 
authentication protocol and the proposed IAKA authentication protocol. Furthermore, 
the research includes the development of a LTE-IMS system model and the simulation of 
the IMS layer authentication procedure which would be used to do the performance 
analysis. 
The research focus includes: 
• Investigation of the mobile network evolution 
• Investigation of LTE and IMS system architecture, interfaces, and procedures 
• Modelling 3GPP 4G LTE EPS layer authentication procedures 
• Modelling 3GPP 4G LTE IMS layer authentication procedures 
• Identifying security requirements of LTE and IMS authentication 
• Utilising the OPNET Modeller v16.0 network simulator to develop a network and 
scenarios 
• Developing LTE-IMS system model by using OPNET Modeller v16.0 
• Developing two scenarios, one is for the 3GPP authentication protocol, and the 
other is for the IAKA authentication protocol 
• Developing a SIP registration procedure which could support packet forwarding 
between different CSCF servers 
• Developing the Diameter authentication protocol between the S-CSCF and the 
HSS 
  27 
• Developing the Diameter service (HSS) which could support the Diameter 
protocol and IMS AKA protocol 
• Developing IMS AKA authentication algorithm f1, f2, f3, f4, f5 to generate 
MAC, RES, CK, IK, and AK [TS 35.206 2009]. 
• Developing IPSec to protect messages transmitted between the UE and the P-
CSCF confidentially and integrity 
• Developing a Key Derivation Function (KDF) to derive keys used in the 
authentication process 
• Collecting authentication delay under different system loads and different 
configurations 
• Performance analysis and comparison 
• Developing system model for energy consumption analysis 
• Energy consumption comparison 
• Security analysis of the mutual authentication, confidential and integrity 
protection, and how to use the proposed authentication approach to avoid 
malicious attacks 
 
3.1 Research Limitations 
This research provided an improved one pass AKA authentication protocol with 
analysis of performance, security and energy consumption. The data used in the 
performance analysis was collected from OPNET Modeller LTE-IMS simulation, and 
the data used in the energy consumption analysis is from previous research work. A 
necessary number of assumptions were made to ensure that reasonable results could be 
generated within the research time-frame. Challenges were faced during the network 
model and simulation scenario development which can be summarized in the following 
points: 
• OPNET Modeller v16.0 doesn’t have an IMS model; 
• OPNET Modeller v16.0 doesn’t support the SIP registration procedure; 
• OPNET Modeller v16.0 doesn’t support SIP packet forwarding between different 
SIP servers; 
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• OPNET Modeller v16.0 doesn’t support Diameter protocol; 
• OPNET Modeller v16.0 doesn’t have a model which could act as a HSS server; 
• OPNET Modeller v16.0 doesn’t support IPSec protocol for the SIP messages; 
• OPNET Modeller v16.0 doesn’t support AKA protocol; 
• OPNET Modeller v16.0 doesn’t support KDF functions; 
OPNET Modeller v16.0 was used to simulate the LTE IMS network and the data 
collected and analysed is anticipated to be slightly different from results collected using 
a real system. OPNET Modeller v16.0 is one of the leading simulation software 
applications available today and for this reason the limitations associated with its use are 
considered acceptable. 
The limitations associated with the tools to be used during the research were 
overcome, the missing nodes, protocols and other elements were developed during the 
research program and the research focused on the architectures, nodes and protocol 
behaviours that reflected the LTE and IMS networks. 
3.2 Assumption 
A necessary number of assumptions were made to keep the simulation 
complexity manageable, while still meeting the research goals. This section describes 
assumptions made in modelling both the LTE and IMS data networks, as well as the 
interworking of these two technologies. 
• The network models provided and used within the OPNET Modeller simulation 
application were considered to be reasonable and suitable for the research. 
References to other research using OPNET Modeller and the network models 
have been provided. 
• The system processing delay and system load provided and used were considered 
to be acceptable and suitable for the research. 
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• The energy consumption system model provided and used in analysing the 
terminal energy consumption was considered to be acceptable and suitable for the 
research. 
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4 Improved one pass authentication protocol 
This chapter includes a description of the improved one pass authentication 
protocol and the steps taken during the development of the simulation models and 
scenarios. 
4.1 The proposed IAKA authentication protocol 
4.1.1 Outline 
 
Figure 4-1 The principle of the improved IAKA authentication protocol 
Two-pass authentication occurs when it is necessary to provide access to two 
systems and to keep them relatively independent. 4G LTE is an all-IP based network and 
the data, voice, and video services are provided via its IP core IMS network. It is 
considered very redundant to manage two subscriber identities and to run two 
authentications to access the voice/data services. Only IMSI or IMPI for one subscriber 
is required in the 4G LTE system to do authentication. Since IMPI is based in IP packet 
layer and across different access networks, it could be used in both the network and 
service layers to do registration, authorization, administration and accounting. As shown 
in Fig. 4-1, this research work proposes IAKA, an improved authentication protocol, 
which provides a secure binding of the network and service layers authentication by 
using the IMPI number which avoids the double execution of the AKA authentication 
protocol. Furthermore, in order to enhance the security and improve the compatibility 
between LTE and IMS, a 4 layer key hierarchy is proposed. As the results show, the 
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proposed IAKA could increase the system’s performance, save the terminal’s energy 
consumption significantly with enhanced security. 
4.1.2 The proposed IMS key hierarchy 
The proposed IMS four layer key hierarchy is shown in Fig. 4-2. Compared to the 
original two layers key hierarchy shown in Fig. 2-4, the intermediate key KASME is used 
to derive KPCSCFenc and KPCSCFint to protect the traffic between the UE and the P-CSCF 
with a particular encryption or integrity algorithm. 
KPCSCFenc = KDF (KASME , s) (1) 
KPCSCFint = KDF (KASME , s) (2) 
 
Figure 4-2 The proposed IMS key hierarchy 
Where KDF is the key derivation function and s is the input string to the KDF. P0 
is a part of the input strings which is used to support the key derivation of KPCSCFenc and 
KPCSCFint as shown in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 Algorithm type distinguishers 
Algorithm distinguisher Value 
PCSCF_enc_alg 0x06 
PCSCF_int_alg 0x07 
 
CK, IK 
KPCSCFenc KPCSCFint 
K 
KASME 
USIM/AuC 
UE/HSS 
UE/PCSCF 
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4.1.3 Improved LTE EPS AKA authentication 
When the mobile terminal is powered on, it invokes the Attach procedure to 
access the LTE network. The EPS AKA is triggered by the Attach procedure to provide 
mutual authentication and agree on key KASME.  
The 4G LTE EPS AKA authentication protocol utilizes the IMSI number as the 
identity used for authentication which introduced more authentication overhead. IMPI is 
a private number of IM systems assigned by home network which is used for 
registration, authorization, administration, and accounting purposes. Since 4G LTE 
network is an all-IP network, the IMPI number can be used in the LTE network layer as 
an identifier to fetch the subscriber’s authentication credentials. The procedure is shown 
in Fig. 4-3.   
 
Figure 4-3 Improved LTE EPS AKA authentication procedure 
• IE1: In order to access the LTE network, the UE sends an Attach Request to the 
MME with the IMPI number using the NAS protocol.  
E1: NAS. Attach Request (IMPI) 
UE MME 
E2: Diameter. Authentication 
Information Request (IMPI) 
E3: Diameter. Authentication
Information Answer (RAND, 
AUTN, XRES, KASME) E4: NAS. Authentication Request 
(RAND, AUTN, KSIASME) 
E5: NAS. Authentication 
Response, (RES) 
Compare RES and XRES 
E6: NAS. Attach Accept 
HSS 
Verify AUTN and 
calculate RES 
  33 
• IE2: If there isn’t a valid AV in the MME, the MME sends an Authentication 
Information Request (AIR) to the HSS to fetch the AV by using the Diameter 
protocol. 
• IE3: The HSS uses the IMPI number to fetch the user’s profile; generate the AV 
(RAND, AUTN, XRES, KASME); and send the AV back to the MME. 
• IE4: After receiving the AV from the HSS, the MME sends an Authentication 
Request (RAND, AUTN, KSIASME) to the UE to start the authentication 
procedure. The Key Set Identifier (KSI) is used to identify KASME. 
• IE5: After receiving the Authentication Request, The UE checks the 
authentication code AUTN first. If this is a valid AUTN number, the terminal 
considers the network entity to be trusted and continues working with it. Then, 
the UE calculates the RES number and sends RES back to the MME. 
• IE6: The MME checks whether the UE RES matches the HSS XRES, and if they 
match the MME considers that the authentication and key agreement exchange is 
successfully completed and sends a message back to the UE to accept the Attach 
request. 
After a successful IAKA EPS authentication, the UE and the MME have 
completed the authentication steps and have the same KASME which is used to derive 
more keys for different security protection purposes. 
4.1.4 The improved IMS AKA authentication 
After a successful EPS AKA authentication and activation of the EPS bearer, the 
UE initiates a REGISTER request to login to the IMS network. The procedure is shown 
in Fig. 4-4 in which step II1 and II4 are used to negotiate the SA parameters and II2 and 
II3 are used to synchronize the AV. After II4, all of the SIP messages are integrity and 
confidentiality protected by using the IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) 
protocol [RFC2406]. 
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Figure 4-4 the improved IMS AKA authentication procedure 
• II1: After activation of the EPS bearer, the UE sends a SIP REGISTER request to 
the P-CSCF to negotiate the parameters to build SAs with the IMPI number, 
Global Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI) number and security-setup line. The 
security-setup line includes the Security Parameters Index (SPI) values, the 
protected ports selected by the UE and the integrity and encryption algorithm list 
that the UE supports. 
• II2: Upon receipt of II1, the P-CSCF derives the MME address from the GUTI 
and sends a Context Request to the MME to fetch the AV with the IMPI and 
GUTI. The protocol between the P-CSCF and the MME is the General packet 
radio services Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) [TS 29.274] and the security is defined 
in [TS33.210 2010]. 
• II3: The MME obtains the user’s AV by using the GUTI number and sends the 
AV back to the P-CSCF.; 
II2: GTP Context 
REGISTER (IMPI, 
GUTI) 
II1: SIP REGISTER 
(Security-setup, IMPI, GUTI) 
UE HSS PCSCF ICSCF/SCSCF 
II5: SIP REGISTER (IMPI) 
II4: SIP REGISTER RESPONSE 
401 UNAUTHORIZED 
(Security-setup) 
EPS bearer activation 
MME 
II3: GTP Context 
Response AV(s)  
II8: Diameter Server 
Assignment Request 
II9: Diameter Server 
Assignment Answer 
II10, II11, II12: SIP REGISTER 
RESPONSE 200 OK 
II6, II7: SIP REGISTER 
The UE and the PCSCF Generate 
KPCSCFenc, and KPCSCFint 
IPSec Security Associations 
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• II4: Upon receipt of the AV from the MME, the P-CSCF chooses the SPIs, port 
numbers, supported integrity and encryption algorithms which are used to 
construct the security-setup line; and sends the security-setup line back to the UE 
by using SIP REGISTER response 401 Unauthorised. Meanwhile, the P-CSCF 
derives the KPCSCFenc and the KPCSCFint for further message protection.; 
• II5: Upon receipt II4, the UE derives the KPCSCFenc and the KPCSCFint and builds 
the SAs by using KPCSCFenc, KPCSCFint, SPIs, ports and the integrity and encryption 
algorithms. The UE sends the SIP REGISTER request to the P-CSCF through the 
IPSec SA; 
• II6: The P-CSCF checks the received SIP packet by decryption and calculation of 
the integrity code. If there is a valid integrity code, the P-CSCF would forward 
the packet to the I-CSCF; 
• II7: The I-CSCF fetches the user and the S-CSCF information from the HSS, 
locates the next hop S-CSCF address, and sends the packet to the S-CSCF; 
• II8: The S-CSCF sends a Server Assignment Request to the HSS with IMPI=impi 
using the Diameter protocol.; 
• II9: The HSS fetches the use’s profile and assigns its status by using the IMPI 
number, and then the HSS sends the Server Assignment Answer back to the S-
CSCF; 
• II10 and II11: Upon receipt the II9, the S-CSCF responds the I-CSCF by using 
SIP 200 OK, and the I-CSCF forwards it to the P-CSCF.  
• II12: The P-CSCF protects the message by IPSec and sends it to the UE. The UE 
checks the validity of the packet. If this is a valid packet, the UE considers that it 
is working with a legal network entity and continues communicating with it.  
 
Table 4-2 IMS LAYER AUTHENTICATION COMPARISON 
IAKA 3GPP 
SIP Register (UE->P-CSCF)  
SIP Register (UE->P-CSCF, 
 P-CSCF ->I-CSCF, I-CSCF->S-
CSCF) 
- 
Diameter Multimedia Auth Request 
(S-CSCF->HSS)  
Obtaining AV from MME - 
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(P-CSCF->MME,  
MME->P-CSCF) 
- Calculation of AVs by HSS 
- 
Diameter Multimedia Auth Answer 
(HSS->S-CSCF) 
- Storing of AVs by S-CSCF 
SIP response 401 UNAUTHORIZED 
(P-CSCF->UE) 
SIP response 401 UNAUTHORIZED  
(S-CSCF->I-CSCF, I-CSCF->P-
CSCF, P-CSCF->UE) 
 
- 
Verification of AUTN and calculation 
of RES number by UE 
Creating IPSec SAs Creating IPSec SAs 
SIP Register (UE->P-CSCF, 
P-CSCF->I-CSCF,  
I-CSCF->S-CSCF) 
SIP Register (UE->P-CSCF, 
 P-CSCF ->I-CSCF, I-CSCF->S-
CSCF) 
- Compare RES and XRES by S-CSCF 
Diameter Server Assignment Request 
/ Answer (S-CSCF->HSS, HSS->S-
CSCF) 
Diameter Server Assignment Request 
/ Answer (S-CSCF->HSS, HSS->S-
CSCF) 
SIP REGISTER response 200OK 
(S-CSCF->I-CSCF, I-CSCF->P-
CSCF, P-CSCF->UE) 
SIP REGISTER response 200OK 
(S-CSCF->I-CSCF, I-CSCF->P-
CSCF, P-CSCF->UE) 
 
 
4.2 System Model 
4.2.1 OPNET Modeller 
OPNET is the abbreviation of Optimized Network Engineering which is a 
provider of the leading software tools for analysing and designing communication 
networks, devices, protocols, and applications [OPNET 2011]. OPNET Modeller can be 
used to simulate and design networks, develop protocols and communication 
technologies, and analyse and compare end to end behaviour. Furthermore, OPNET 
Modeller supports a development environment to enable modelling of network 
technologies including UMTS, LTE and SIP. 
The key reasons for choosing OPNET Modeller for this research include: 
• The fastest discrete event simulation engine among leading industry solutions. 
• Supporting LTE, UMTS, SIP and the other related models with source code. 
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• OPNET Modeller supports flexible customization by using C/C++ programming 
language which allows modelling of all communication protocols, algorithms and 
transmission technologies. 
• OPNET Modeller supports hierarchical models (Project, Node, and Process) 
which parallels to the structure of actual communication networks and makes it 
easy to build simulation network. 
• OPNET Modeller carries out simulations using industry specifications and 
network scenarios that closely match real networks. 
• OPNET Modeller supports graphical editors that permit the models to be entered 
and interacted with. 
As shown in Fig. 4-5, OPNET hierarchical Modelling domains are divided into 4 
layers: Network Domain, Node Domain, Process Domain, and External System Domain.  
• Network Domain: Network Domain is used to define the network topology which 
includes the connection entities (nodes), the links that connect these nodes, and 
the geography information.  
• Node Domain: The Node Domain provides the common entities which are used 
to construct the network such as a SIP Server, a router and so on. A node is 
created using building blocks called Modules which can be a transmitter, a 
receiver, a processor, a queue, or an external system. Packet Stream may be used 
to connect the modules to transmit information. The building block Module is 
edited in the process domain. 
• Process Domain: The process domain uses finite state machines to define the 
behaviour of processes and it is programmed by using C/C++. 
• External System Domain:  OPNET Modeller provides an interface to integrate 
the Modules developed by the other tools into an OPNET network. 
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Figure 4-5: OPNET hierarchical GUI editors 
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4.2.2 Model Methodology 
The following methodology was used to design and develop the LTE-IMS 
models used to carry out the research. 
 
Figure 4-6 OPNET Modeller development methodology 
 
Develop network topology 
Develop network scenarios 
Develop the application “REGISTER” 
Develop the nodes, modules and the 
functions 
Modify Node Configuration attributes 
Choose statistics 
Collect results 
Develop the new node “Diameter 
Server” for HSS server   
Develop SIP registration by modifying 
the modules SIP_UAC and SIP_UAS   
Develop AKA authentication protocol   
Develop Key derivation function   
Develop IPSec protocol  
Develop the system delay, system load, 
and  statistics  
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4.2.3 Network Topology 
 
Figure 4-7 Simulation network topology 
In order to do a comprehensive analysis of the proposed authentication protocol, 
a LTE-IMS model was developed using OPNET Modeller. The LTE-IMS model was 
used to simulate different authentication approaches; and the network topology is shown 
in Fig. 4-7. 
The LTE system is made up of 7 cells; each cell has 5 mobile terminals and 1 
eNB; the 5 terminals are connected to the eNB in the same cell and all of the eNB are 
connected to the EPC. Since the EPC is the integration of the MME, SGW and PGW, it 
takes the responsibility to connect to the IMS system. 
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The IMS system is made up of one P-CSCF server, one I-CSCF server, one S-
CSCF server and one HSS server.  The three CSCF servers are for the call session 
control and the HSS server is for the end user authentication. 
OPNET Modeller includes the 3GPP specified LTE model and the model 
provided meets most of the research requirements.  
OPNET Modeller doesn’t include a standard IMS model based on 3GPP 
specifications. And the standard SIP model supported by OPNET Modeller can’t be used 
to create the IMS scenarios because of the following limitations:  
• There is only one SIP proxy which can be put between two user terminals 
• It doesn’t support SIP registration 
• It doesn’t support multi domain and roaming scenarios 
• It doesn’t consider the intermediaries’ process delays 
• It doesn’t consider all the messages that take part in a dialog among SIP 
intermediaries in the IMS 
• It doesn’t allow the control of intermediaries’ process delays 
• It doesn’t support AKA authentication protocol 
The OPNET Modeller contributed SIP-IMS model [Vazquez 2005] has the 
following features and was therefore selected as a suitable model that would be modified 
and upgraded during the research program to permit the IAKA to be modelled 
adequately: 
• It supports IMS servers: P-CSCF, S-CSCF, and I-CSCF; 
• It supports multi domain and roaming scenarios; 
• It supports process delay. 
An OPNET Modeller HSS model was not found which supports the Diameter 
protocol and the corresponding user authentication and user authorization. Therefore, a 
HSS model was developed using the standard ethernet_server model as the starting 
point. 
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The node models used in the OPNET Modeller simulation scenarios are 
summarized in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3 The Node Model and Link Model used in the simulation 
 
4.2.4 Network Scenarios 
Two scenarios were developed using the LTE-IMS model; one is for the legacy 
3GPP 4G LTE two-pass authentication protocol, and another is the proposed one-pass 
authentication protocol. The two scenarios were used to compare the IMS service layer 
performance using the two authentication approaches. The LTE EPS layer authentication 
wasn’t considered since they they are similar in the two approaches. 
In order to identify the different scenarios, a node attribute “Authentication 
Mode” was defined to show which scenario was active. If the attribute “Authentication 
Mode” was set to “3GPP”, the simulator would run according to the diagram shown in 
Fig. 2-6; and if the attribute “Authentication Mode” was set to “IAKA”, the diagram 
shown in Fig. 4-4 would be run. Furthermore, a global variable “auth_mode” has to be 
defined to read the value of the node attribute “Authentication Mode”. Table 4-4 shows 
the definition of the node attribute “Authentication Mode” and the relationship with the 
global variable “auth_mode”.  
  
Name Model 
UE_X_X lte_wkstn_adv 
eNodeB_X lte_enodeb_atm4_ethernet4_slip4_adv 
EPC lte_epc_atm8_ethernet8_slip8_adv 
route ethernet4_slip8_gtwy 
P-CSCF 
Contributed sip_proxy_server I-CSCF 
S-CSCF 
HSS 
Developed Diameter protocol and authentication 
protocol based on the model ethernet_server 
LTE Attributes lte_attr_definer_adv 
Applications Application Config 
Profiles Profile Config 
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Table 4-4: Node Attribute “Authentication Mode” definition 
Attribute Name 
Variable 
Name 
Attribution 
Value 
Description 
Authentication Mode auth_mode 
3GPP Run 3GPP scenario 
IAKA Run IAKA scenario 
 
The self-defined attribute “Authentication Mode” is under Node “Application 
Config” and the configuration is shown in Fig. 4-8. 
 
Figure 4-8 Node attribute “Authentication Mode” configuration 
In order to define the attribute “Authentication Mode”, we have to open the 
process model of “Application Config” first, choose the “Model Attributes” and add 
“Authentication Mode” into this list. The detailed definition is shown in Fig 4-9. 
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Figure 4-9: Node attribute “Authentication Mode” definition 
Once OPNET Modeller is started, the value of the node interface “Authentication 
Mode” will be read and kept in the global variable “auth_mode” which is used to 
indicate which authentication procedure should be invoked. The pseudo-code is: 
1) Global variable definition 
char auth_mode[128]; 
2) Read the value of the node interface “Authentication Mode” and store the value 
into the global variable 
/* Get the authentication mode */ 
memset(auth_mode, '\0', sizeof(auth_mode)); 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (own_node_objid, "Authentication Mode", auth_mode); 
3) Invoke different authentication procedure based on the value of the auth_mode. 
if(strcmp(auth_mode,"3GPP")==0) 
{ /*invoke the 3GPP AKA authentication procedure*/  } 
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else 
{ /*invoke the IAKA authentication procedure */ } 
 
4.2.5 Application 
A new application “REGISTER” was developed to invoke the SIP Registration 
procedure repetitively; and the process diagram is shown in Fig. 4-9. 
 
Figure 4-10 Application “REGISTER” process diagram 
The application “REGISTER” was developed based on the standard voice 
application. A new value called “Register only” was added to the voice attributes 
“Traffic Modelling” which is shown in Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5: Attribute “Traffic Modelling” definition 
Attribute 
Name 
Data 
Type 
Variable 
Name 
Value Description 
Traffic 
Modelling 
integer 
Simulation
_mode 
0 
Control & Traffic Plane: a complete 
voice service with control signals and 
voice data traffic 
1 
Control Plane Only: a voice service 
only with control signals (no voice 
data traffic) 
2 
Register Only: a service only do SIP 
registration repeatly 
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Figure 4-11: Voice application state transition diagram 
As shown in Fig. 4-11, the transition states are: 
1) Constants in “gna_mgr.h” 
/* Indicates the simulation mode for the Voice & Video Application*/ 
#define GNAC_TRAFFIC_AND_CONTROL 0 
#define GNAC_CONTROL_ONLY   1 
#define GNAC_REGISTER_ONLY   2 
2) States in “gna_voice_calling_mgr.pr.m” 
#define DATA_PLANE  (simulation_mode == 
GNAC_TRAFFIC_AND_CONTROL) 
#define CONTROL_ONLY  (simulation_mode == 
GNAC_CONTROL_ONLY) 
#define REGISTER_ONLY  (simulation_mode == 
GNAC_REGISTER_ONLY) 
#define NON_DATA_PLANE (simulation_mode == 
GNAC_CONTROL_ONLY || simulation_mode == GNAC_REGISTER_ONLY ) 
In the “setup” state, if the “simulation_mode” is “GNAC_REGISTER_ONLY”, 
the current process will invoke the function “sip_request_register” to send a SIP 
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registration request to the process “SIP UAC” to start the authentication procedure.  In 
the “release” state, the voice process also will invoke the function 
“sip_request_register_finish” to terminate the SIP registration repetition in the process 
“SIP UAC”. The detailed source code of the function “sip_request_register” and 
“sip_request_register_finish” is shown in Appendix A.1. 
4.2.6 SIP registration 
Since the SIP registration procedure is not supported by any of the OPNET 
Modeller models, it has to be developed based on the contributed SIP models [Vazquez 
2005] which are made up of two logical end-points “sip_UAC” and “sip_UAS”. In the 
SIP client server model, a SIP User Agent Client (UAC) is a logical network model 
which sends a SIP request, and SIP User Agent Server (UAS) is used to receive a SIP 
request and send a SIP response. In the SIP registration process developed during this 
research, the UE takes the role of sip_UAC, and the CSCF servers take the role of 
sip_UAS. 
Packets are used in the simulations to transfer information from one entity to 
another.   The structure of a SIP packet is shown in Fig. 4-12. 
 
Figure 4-12: SIP packet format 
The definition of the SIP packet is shown as following: 
1) Definition of the packet attribute “type” 
typedef enum 
{ 
SIPC_Packet_Type_Request, 
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SIPC_Packet_Type_ACK, 
SIPC_Packet_Type_Invalid 
}SIPT_Packet_Type; 
2) Definition of the packet attribute “msg” 
#define  SIPC_CALL_INVITE   100  
#define  SIPC_CALL_BYE    101  
#define  SIPC_CALL_CONNECT_SUCCESS 200  
#define  SIPC_CALL_CONNECT_FAIL  400  
#define  SIPC_CALL_DISCONNECT_SUCCESS 201  
#define  SIPC_CALL_DISCONNECT_FAIL 401  
#define  SIPC_CALL_SESSION_PROGRESS        103 
#define  SIPC_CALL_PRACK                     104 
#define  SIPC_CALL_OK                        105 
#define  SIPC_CALL_UPDATE                    106 
#define  SIPC_CALL_RINGING                   107 
#define  SIPC_CALL_ACK                      108 
#define  SIPC_CALL_REGISTER                 109  
#define  SIPC_CALL_REGISTER_RES             110 
#define  SIPC_CALL_REG_UNAUTHORISED      111 
#define  SIPC_CALL_REG_OK                    112 
#define  SIPC_CALL_REG_REPFINISH  113 
#define  SIPC_CALL_REGISTER_NEXT            114 
3) Definition of the packet attribute “call_info” 
typedef struct 
{ 
    SIPT_Call_Status        call_status; 
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    SIPT_Call_Info*         sip_call_info_ptr; 
}SIPT_Call_Info_Shell; 
 
typedef struct 
{ 
Int   call_id; 
int   network_delay; 
     OmsT_Qm_Tos        tos; 
     char*               call_initiator_addr; 
     char*               invitee_addr; 
     double              call_init_time; 
     double              UAC_call_connect_time; 
     double              UAS_call_connect_time; 
Boolean            via_icscf; 
char*               IMPI; 
char*               RAND; 
char*    AUTN; 
char*   XRES; 
char*         CK; 
char*         IK; 
char*   RES; 
char*   IPSec_encrypted; 
char*   IPSec_ICV; 
} SIPT_Call_Info; 
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4.2.6.1 sip_UAC 
The sip_UAC SIP registration diagram is shown in Fig. 4-13 and was developed 
in the process module “sip_UAC”. The detailed state transition diagram of the 
“sip_UAC” module is shown in Fig. 4-14. 
Application start
EXIT
Waiting for the incoming 
packets
Type of the packet?
Type of the request? Type of the response?
call_finish_signal
_received=1
Send it to the SIP 
UAS with msg = 
SIPC_CALL_REGI
STER
Send the packet to the 
SIP UAS with msg = 
SIPC_CALL_REGISTE
R_RES
SIPC_Request_Type_
Register
REG RESP 401 
UNAUTHORIZED
Authentication mode?
Verify AUTN token
Calculate RES number
Calculate CK and IK
Create IPSec security 
association
Derive the keys KPCSCFenc
and KPCSCFint
Create IPSec security 
association
REG RESP 200 OK
request response
SIPC_Request_Type
_Reg_Finish
Check the msg
Record the statistics
call_finish_signal_received 
== 1?
3GPP IAKA
NO
YES
Send packet to SIP 
UAS with msg = 
SIPC_CALL_REGISTE
R_NEXT
 
Figure 4-13: SIP registration diagram of SIP UAC  
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Figure 4-14: sip_UAC state transition diagram 
4.2.6.2 sip_UAS 
sip_UAS is the processing model in the P-CSCF, I-CSCF, and S-CSCF to receive 
SIP related packets, process them and send them to the next hop. Since S-CSCF is also 
connected to the HSS server to do authentication and authorization, the sip_UAS also 
needs to support the Diameter protocol. Therefore the sip_UAS is designed as shown in 
Fig. 4-15; and the state transition diagram is shown in Fig. 4-18.  
As shown in Fig. 4-15, once the process is started, the sip_UAS process begins to 
listen to the packets on its sip_UAS port 506 and DIAMETER port 3868. If a SIP packet 
arrives, the sip_UAS would check the packet type and do the processing corresponding 
to the type which is described in detail in Fig. 4-17. Then the sip_UAS would decide 
what is the next hop for the SIP packet; if the next hop is the user terminal or the CSCF 
servers, the sip_UAS would use a SIP session to send the packet; if the next hop is the 
HSS, the sip_UAS creates a DIAMETER packet, and sends it to the HSS via the 
DIAMETER connection. If a Diameter packet arrives, the sip_UAS checks the packet 
type and translates it to a corresponding SIP packet. The detailed procedure is shown in 
Fig. 4-17. 
  52 
 
Figure 4-15: sip_UAS SIP registration diagram  
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Figure 4-16: SIP packet process 
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Figure 4-17: Diameter receiving process 
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Figure 4-18: sip_UAS state transition diagram 
4.2.7 Diameter server 
Neither the standard OPNET Modeller models nor the contributed OPNET 
Modeller models support Diameter and a new Diameter server model was developed 
during the research program to simulate the HSS server. 
The Diameter server was developed starting with the standard 
ethernet_server_adv model and the Diameter node model is shown in Fig. 4-19. The 
Diameter server model receives Diameter packets, carries out authentication, and sends a 
Diameter answer packet to the S-CSCF. The Diameter server functions are developed in 
the models diameter_UAS_mgr and diameter_UAS. 
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Figure 4-19: ethernet_server_adv node model 
4.2.7.1 Diameter packets 
 
Figure 4-20: Diameter packet format 
The Diameter packet definition includes: 
1) Definition of the packet attribute “type” 
typedef enum 
{ 
    DIAMETERC_Packet_Type_Request, 
    DIAMETERC_Packet_Type_ANSWER, 
    DIAMETERC_Packet_Type_Invalid 
}DIAMETERT_Packet_Type; 
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2) Definition of the packet attribute “msg” 
#define  DIAMETERC_MULTIMEDIA_AUTH_REQUEST  
     30301 /* REQUEST OF AUTHENTICATION       */ 
#define  DIAMETERC_MULTIMEDIA_AUTH_ANSWER  
     30302 /* ANSWER OF AUTHENTICATION       */ 
#define  DIAMETERC_SERVER_ASSIGNMENT_REQUEST  
    30101 /* REQUEST OF SERVER ASSIGNMENT*/ 
#define  DIAMETERC_SERVER_ASSIGNMENT_ANSWER  
     30102 /* ANSWER OF SERVER ASSIGNMENT*/ 
3) Definition of the packet attribute “call_info” 
/*The structure DIAMETERT_Call_Info stores information for identifying and 
managing a call and its resources */ 
typedef struct 
{ 
int          call_id; 
int   network_delay; 
     OmsT_Qm_Tos        tos; 
     char*               call_initiator_addr; 
     char*               invitee_addr; 
     double              call_init_time; 
     double              UAC_call_connect_time; 
     double              UAS_call_connect_time; 
     Boolean            via_icscf; 
 char*               IMPI; 
     char*               RAND; 
 char*   AUTN; 
 char*   XRES; 
 char*         CK; 
  58 
 char*         IK; 
 char*   RES; 
 } DIAMETERT_Call_Info; 
/* DIAMETERT_Call_Info_Shell is the shell around the Call Information which 
is used to check for validity of Call Handles. */ 
typedef struct 
    { 
    DIAMETERT_Call_Status        call_status; 
    DIAMETERT_Call_Info*         diameter_call_info_ptr; 
    }DIAMETERT_Call_Info_Shell; 
4.2.7.2 Diameter_UAS_mgr 
Diameter_UAS_mgr is used to manage and activate the Diameter_UAS process, 
the state transition is shown in Fig. 4-21 and the source code is shown in Appendix A.2. 
 
Figure 4-21: State transition diagram of process Diameter_UAS_mgr 
4.2.7.3 Diameter_UAS 
Diameter_UAS is used to receive and process Diameter request, generate 
Diameter response, and send it back to the client. The process diagram is shown in Fig. 
4-22, the state transition diagram is shown in Fig. 4-23, and the state transition diagram 
is shown in Appendix A.3. 
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Figure 4-22: Process diagram of Diameter_UAS 
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Figure 4-23: Diameter_UAS state transition diagram 
4.2.8 AKA authentication protocol 
AKA authentication protocol is developed using the algorithm described in 3GPP 
TS 35.205 and 3GPP TS 35.206.  
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Figure 4-24: f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, and f5* definition 
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The items displayed in Fig. 4-24 are described as following: 
• RAND is a 128 bits random number; 
• K is the key shared by the UE and the HSS; 
• OP is a 128 bits operator variant algorithm configuration field; 
• OPC is a 128 bits value derived from OP and K; 
• Ek is the kernel encryption algorithm. In this research work, the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm is chosen and developed based on 
[Gladman 2011]; 
• SQN is a 48 bits sequence number which is fresh in each transaction; 
• AMF is a 16 bits authentication management field; 
• f1 is the network authentication function which is used to generate Message 
Authentication Code (MAC); 
• f2 is the user authentication function which is used to generate response number 
(RES); 
• f3 is the Cipher Key (CK) derivation function ; 
• f4 is the Integrity Key (IK) derivation function; 
• f5 is the Anonymity Key (AK) derivation function.  
The following are the algorithm framework which is referred to in 3GPP TS 
35.206. 
• OPC = OP ⊕ E[OP]K. 
• TEMP is a 128 bits intermediate value  which is computed as  
o TEMP = E[RAND ⊕ OPC]K. 
• IN1 is a 128 bit value which is used to construct MAC 
o IN1[0] .. IN1[47] = SQN[0] .. SQN[47] 
o IN1[48] .. IN1[63] = AMF[0] .. AMF[15] 
o IN1[64] .. IN1[111] = SQN[0] .. SQN[47] 
o IN1[112] .. IN1[127] = AMF[0] .. AMF[15] 
• c1, c2, c3, c4, and c5 are five 128 bits constants: 
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o c1[i] = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 127 
o c2[i] = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 127, except that c2[127] = 1 
o c3[i] = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 127, except that c3[126] = 1 
o c4[i] = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 127, except that c4[125] = 1 
o c5[i] = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 127, except that c5[124] = 1  
• r1, r2, r3, r4, and r5 are 5 integers: 
o r1 = 64;  
o r2 = 0;  
o r3 = 32;  
o r4 = 64;  
o r5 = 96 
• OUT1, OUT2, OUT3, OUT4, and OUT5 are five 128 bits intermediate value: 
o OUT1 = E[TEMP ⊕ rot(IN1 ⊕ OPC, r1) ⊕ c1]K ⊕ OPC 
o OUT2 = E[rot(TEMP⊕ OPC, r2) ⊕ c2]K ⊕ OPC 
o OUT3 = E[rot(TEMP⊕ OPC, r3) ⊕ c3]K ⊕ OPC 
o OUT4 = E[rot(TEMP⊕ OPC, r4) ⊕ c4]K ⊕ OPC 
o OUT5 = E[rot(TEMP⊕ OPC, r5) ⊕ c5]K ⊕ OPC 
• MAC, RES, CK, IK and AK are the outputs of the 5 functions: 
o Output of f1 = MAC-A, where MAC-A[0] .. MAC-A[63] = OUT1[0] .. 
OUT1[63] 
o Output of f2 = RES, where RES[0] .. RES[63] = OUT2[64] .. OUT2[127] 
o Output of f3 = CK, where CK[0] .. CK[127] = OUT3[0] .. OUT3[127] 
o Output of f4 = IK, where IK[0] .. IK[127] = OUT4[0] .. OUT4[127] 
o Output of f5 = AK, where AK[0] .. AK[47] = OUT2[0] .. OUT2[47] 
Based on the algorithm described above, the AKA algorithm was developed 
using C/C++ in OPNET Modeller, Appendix A.4. 
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4.2.9 Key derivation of KPCSCFenc and KPCSCFint 
KPCSCFenc and KPCSCFint are the two keys derived from KASME to protect the traffic 
between the UE and the P-CSCF. According to [TS 33.220 2010] and [TS 33.401 2010], 
the key derivation function (KDF) is defined as following: 
Derived key = HMAC-SHA-256(key, S) in which  
• Key = KASME 
• S= FC || P0 || L0 || P1 || P0 
• FC = 0x15 
• P0 = algorithm type distinguisher 
• L0 = length of algorithm type distinguisher 
• P1 = algorithm identity 
• L1 = length of algorithm identity 
The key derivation function HMAC-SHA-256 was developed using [Eastlake 
2011]. 
4.2.10 IPSEC 
As defined in [TS 33.203 2009], the SIP signalling messages are confidentially 
and integrity protected by IPSec ESP protocol [RFC 2406]. The encryption algorithm 
used in the simulator is AES, and the integrity algorithm used is HMAC-SHA-1-96 
[Eastlake 2011]. 
4.2.11 Other system processes 
Compared to the authentication procedure defined in Sections 2.5.4 and 4.1.4, the 
following activities were not implemented and were simulated as a network delay: 
• The request processing on the P-CSCF, I-CSCF, S-CSCF and HSS which should 
be supported in the two approaches and is currently simulated as DELAYprocessing.  
• The I-CSCF locating the next hop S-CSCF address by checking the information 
from the HSS which should be supported in the two approaches and is currently 
simulated as DELAYICSCFHSS. 
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• The database operations on the HSS such as searching the user’s profile by using 
IMPI number should be supported in the two approaches and is currently 
simulated as DELAYHSS. 
• The P-CSCF obtaining the AVs from the MME should be supported in the IAKA 
authentication protocol and is currently simulated as DELAYAVretrieval. 
Two configuration types were utilized for the assumed delays including a fixed 
network delay configuration and a varying network delay configuration. 
The fixed network delay configuration was used to assign a fixed value to the 
system processing delay to observe the system performance. Referring to [Foster 2002], 
it was assumed DELAYprocessing = 0.025s, DELAYHSS = 0.055s, DELAYICSCFHSS = 
0.055s; and DELAYAVretrieval = 0.025s.  
For the varying network delay configuration an average network delay was used. 
It was assumed that DELAYprocessing = DELAYHSS = DELAYICSCFHSS = DELAYAVretrival = 
averageDelay. The average delay started from 1ms and the terminals carried out SIP 
registration procedures repeatedly and each procedure has a 1ms increment.  
A node attribute “delay loop” is defined under the “Application Config” node to 
identify different configuration modes. If the attribute “delay loop” is set to “no”, the 
OPNET Modeller will use the fixed network delay configuration mode to simulate the 
system processing. If the attribute “delay loop” is set to “yes”, the OPNET Modeller will 
use the varying network delay configuration mode to simulate the system processing. 
Furthermore, a global variable “delay_loop” has to be defined to read the value of the 
node attribute “delay loop”. Table 4-6 shows the definition of the node attribute “delay 
loop” and the relationship with the global variable “delay_loop”.  
Table 4-6: The definition of Node Attributes “delay loop” 
Attribute Name 
Variable 
Name 
Attribution 
Value 
Description 
delay loop delay_loop 
no 
fixed network delay 
configuration 
yes 
varying network delay 
configuration 
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The self-defined attribute “delay loop” is under Node “Application Config” and 
the configuration is shown in Fig. 4-25. 
 
Figure 4-25 Configuration of Node Attribute “delay loop” 
Under the fixed delay authentication mode, for sip_proxy_server (P-CSCF, I-
CSCF, and S-CSCF), the delays are configured under “SIP Proxy Server Parameters” as 
shown in Fig. 4-26. For the HSS model, the delays are configured under “Diameter 
Proxy Server Parameters” as shown in Fig. 4-27. 
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Figure 4-26 Configuration of system processing delay of sip_proxy_server 
 
Figure 4-27 Configuration of system processing delay of HSS model 
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4.2.12 System Load 
Simultaneous Rate Per Terminal (SPT) is used to describe the number of SIP 
registration procedures each terminal initiated simultaneously and the effect on system 
load. Four different system loads were chosen with SPT = 1, SPT = 20, SPT = 30, and 
SPT = 40.  
The SPT is configured under node “Profile Config” by setting the application 
“REGISTER” to run concurrently which is shown in Fig. 4-28. 
 
Figure 4-28 Configuration of SPT 
4.2.13 Statistics 
Authentication delay is used to measure the performance of different 
authentication approaches which is the time taken between sending the first SIP Register 
request and receiving the SIP Register response 200 OK, shown in Fig. 4-29. 
 
Figure 4-29 Authentication delay 
SIP REGISTER 
UE 
SIP REGISTER RESPONSE 200 OK 
Authentication Delay 
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4.2.14 Node Configuration 
In the LTE-IMS model, in order to make the results achieved comparative to 
those expected on a real network, the IMS signals are transmitted in the correct EPS 
bearer. According to the definition in [TS 23.203 2011], the IMS signalling has highest 
priority and the QOS Class Identifier (QCI) is 5 which is shown in Table 4-7. 
Table 4-7: Standardized QCI characteristics [TS 23.203 2011] 
QCI Resource 
Type 
Priority Packet 
Delay 
Budget 
(NOTE 1) 
Packet 
Error 
Loss 
Rate 
(NOTE 2) 
Example Services 
1  2 100 ms 10
-2
 Conversational Voice 
2  
GBR 
4 150 ms 10
-3
 Conversational Video (Live Streaming) 
3  3 50 ms 10
-3
 Real Time Gaming 
4  5 300 ms 10
-6
 Non-Conversational Video (Buffered 
Streaming) 
5  1 100 ms 10
-6
 IMS Signalling 
6   
6 
 
300 ms 
 
10
-6
 
Video (Buffered Streaming) 
TCP-based (e.g., www, e-mail, chat, ftp, 
p2p file sharing, progressive video, etc.) 
7 Non-GBR  
7 
 
100 ms 
 
10
-3
 
Voice, 
Video (Live Streaming) 
Interactive Gaming 
8   
8 
 
 
300 ms 
 
 
10
-6
 
 
Video (Buffered Streaming) 
TCP-based (e.g., www, e-mail, chat, ftp, 
p2p file  
9  9   sharing, progressive video, etc.) 
 
To include the 3GPP definition in the LTE-IMS model, firstly, the Type of 
Service (ToS) of the application is defined to Excellent Effort (3); secondly, an EPS 
bearer called “platinum” is created under the node “LTE Attributes” which is shown in 
Fig. 4-29; and finally the UE has to be configured to support the EPS bearer “platinum” 
and the Traffic Flow Template (TFT) is used to map the Excellent Effort traffic in this 
EPS bearer. The configuration of the UE EPS bearer is shown in Fig. 4-30.  
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Figure 4-30 EPS bearer “platinum” configuration 
 
Figure 4-31 UE EPS bearer configuration 
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4.2.15 Run Simulation 
 
Figure 4-32 Simulation runtime configuration 
The simulation is run under the environment which is configured as shown in 
Fig. 4-31. The simulation duration was ten minutes. 
4.2.16 Simulation Results 
The simulation results were collected and a detailed analysis and discussion of 
provided in Section 5. 
4.3 Summary 
This section has provided the research work carried out and a description of the 
simulation environment and models developed to support the study network.  
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5 Analysis 
The proposed one-pass authentication protocol was simulated and an analysis 
was carried out by comparing it with the 4G LTE two-pass authentication protocol and 
the proposed one-pass authentication protocol.    
5.1 Performance Analysis 
In order to analyse the performance of the proposed one-pass authentication, a 
LTE-IMS OPNET Modeller scenario was developed to compare IAKA with the 4G LTE 
3GPP defined two-pass authentication protocol. As described in Section 4.2, the 
performance was compared under different network delay configurations and different 
system loads. 
5.1.1 Fixed Network Delay Configuration 
5.1.1.1 System Load SPT 1 
When SPT = 1, no background system load is assumed. Under such conditions, 
the authentication delay is very stable. The average IMS layer authentication delay of the 
4G LTE two-pass AKA protocol is 0.4s and the average delay of the proposed IAKA is 
0.267s which is shown in Fig. 5-1. Therefore, compared to the legacy 4G LTE two-pass 
AKA authentication protocol, the proposed IAKA could save 33.34% of the IMS layer 
authentication delay which is shown in Fig. 5-2. 
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Figure 5-1 Authentication Delay (SPT = 1) 
 
Figure 5-2 Authentication Delay Saving Rate (SPT = 1) 
5.1.1.2 System Load SPT 20 
When SPT = 20, each terminal generates 20 requests simultaneously. Under this 
scenario, the authentication delay begins to increase with increasing system load as 
shown in Fig. 5-3 and Fig. 5-4.  
From Fig 5-3 and Fig. 5-4, it can be seen that there is no traffic between 0~100 
seconds simulation time because the application starts at simulation time between 100 to 
110 seconds (uniform (100,110)). 
After the first 100 seconds the application (about the simulation time 100 to 199 
seconds) is still in the initialization phase and the results are unreliable.  
From simulation time 200 seconds, the authentication delay and the ADSR begin 
to increase with the increasing system load. From Table 5-1, it is shown that at 
simulation time 200~299 seconds, the authentication delay of the IAKA approach is 
0.30s and the 4G LTE approach is 0.43s while the IAKA mode processes 7682 requests / 
responses per second and the 4G LTE mode processes 5264 requests/requests per 
second. At simulation time 500~599 seconds,  the authentication delay of the IAKA 
approach is 0.33s and the 3GPP approach is 0.48s while the IAKA mode processes 8400 
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requests / responses per second and the 3GPP mode processes  5664 requests / responses 
per second. 
The IAKA authentication mode processes more requests and responses because 
the terminal initiates the same requests simultaneously for the two authentication steps 
and repeatedly generates another request once it finishes one authentication procedure. 
Since the authentication delay of the IAKA mode is shorter than the 4G LTE mode, the 
UE of the IAKA mode could initiate more authentication request than the 4G LTE mode, 
and the IAKA mode would have higher a system load than the 3GPP mode. 
Table 5-1 Average simulation results (SPT = 20) 
Simulati
on time 
(second) 
Authentication Delay 
(second) 
ASDR 
(%) 
System load of eNB/EPC 
(requests/ responses per second) 
4G LTE IAKA 4G LTE IAKA 
100~199 0.40 0.27 32.72% 2176 3220 
200~299 0.43 0.30 30.60% 5264 7682 
300~399 0.46 0.32 31.63% 5671 8400 
400~499 0.47 0.32 31.95% 5669 8400 
500~599 0.48 0.33 32.12% 5664 8400 
 
 
Figure 5-3 Authentication Delay (SPT = 20) 
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Figure 5-4 Authentication Delay Saving Rate (SPT = 20) 
5.1.1.3 System Load SPT 30 
When SPT = 30, each terminal generates 30 requests simultaneously. Under this 
scenario, the authentication delay begins to increase with increasing system load as 
shown in Fig. 5-5 and Fig. 5-6.  
As described in Section 5.1.1.3, there is no traffic between 0~100 seconds 
simulation time because the application starts between 100 to 110 seconds. The results 
for 100 to 199 seconds are unreliable because the system is in an initialization phase. 
Also, the IAKA mode system is under higher system load because it processes more 
requests and responses than the 4G LTE mode system.  
From simulation time 200 seconds, the authentication delay and the ADSR begin 
to increase with increasing system load. From Table 5-2, it is shown that at simulation 
time 200~299 seconds, the authentication delay of the IAKA approach is 0.30s and the 
4G LTE approach is 0.43s while the IAKA mode system processes 7952 requests / 
responses per second and the 4G LTE mode system processes 5193 requests / responses 
per second. At simulation time 500~599 seconds,  the authentication delay of the IAKA 
approach is 0.38s and the 4G LTE approach is 0.58s while the IAKA mode system 
processes 10850 requests / responses per second and the 3GPP mode system processes  
7006 requests / responses per second. 
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Table 5-2 Average simulation results (SPT = 30) 
Simulati
on time 
(second) 
Authentication Delay 
(second) 
ASDR 
(%) 
System load of eNB/EPC 
(requests / responses per second) 
4G LTE IAKA 4G LTE IAKA 
100~199 0.40 0.27 32.72% 2176 3220 
200~299 0.43 0.30 31.31% 5193 7952 
300~399 0.52 0.34 34.21% 6856 10504 
400~499 0.56 0.37 34.67% 7001 10850 
500~599 0.58 0.38 34.89% 7006 10850 
 
 
Figure 5-5 Authentication Delay (SPT = 30) 
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Figure 5-6 Authentication Delay Saving Rate (SPT = 30) 
5.1.1.4 System Load SPT 40 
When SPT = 40, each terminal generates 40 requests simultaneously. Under this 
scenario, the authentication delay begins to increase with increasing system load as 
shown in Fig. 5-7 and Fig. 5-8.  
Also as described in Section 5.1.1.3, there is no traffic between 0~100 seconds 
simulation time because the application starts between 100 to 110 seconds. The results of 
100 to 199 seconds are unreliable because the system is in an initialization phase. 
Furthermore, the IAKA mode system is under higher system load because it processes 
more requests and responses.  
From simulation time 200 seconds, the authentication delay and the ADSR begin 
to increase with the increasing of the system load. From Table 5-3, it is shown that at 
simulation time 200~299 seconds, the authentication delay of the IAKA approach is 
0.30s and the 4G LTE approach is 0.43s while the IAKA mode system processes 7952 
requests / responses per second and the 3GPP mode system processes 5193 requests / 
responses per second. At simulation time 500~599 seconds,  the authentication delay of 
the IAKA approach is 0.41s and the 4G LTE approach is 0.66s while the IAKA mode 
system processes 12201 requests / responses per second and the 3GPP mode system 
processes  7168 requests / responses per second. 
Table 5-3 Average simulation results (SPT = 40) 
Simulati
on time 
(second) 
Authentication Delay 
(second) 
ASDR 
(%) 
System load of eNB/EPC 
(requests/ responses per second) 
4G LTE IAKA 4G LTE IAKA 
100~199 0.40 0.27 32.72% 2176 3220 
200~299 0.43 0.30 31.31% 5193 7952 
300~399 0.52 0.34 34.48% 7036 10972 
400~499 0.61 0.38 36.72% 7200 12221 
500~599 0.66 0.41 38.07% 7168 12201 
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Figure 5-7 Authentication Delay (SPT = 40) 
 
 
Figure 5-8 Authentication Delay Saving Rate (SPT = 40) 
5.1.1.5 Summary 
Based on the results shown above, it is identified that: 
• In non-loaded condition, the average IMS layer authentication delay of the 4G 
LTE two-pass authentication protocol is 0.4s, the average delay of the proposed 
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IAKA is 0.267s. The proposed IAKA algorithm could save 33.34% of the IMS 
layer authentication delay. 
• The authentication delay increased with increased system load as expected from 
Fig. 5-9. The effect of the average authentication delay under different system 
loads during the simulation period 500 to 599 seconds is shown in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4 Average simulation results during simulation period (500 second~599 second) 
SPT Authentication Delay 
(second) 
ASDR 
(%) 
System load of eNB/EPC 
(requests/ responses per second) 
4G LTE IAKA 4G LTE IAKA 
20 0.4798 0.3257 32.12% 5664 8400 
30 0.5775 0.376 34.89% 7006 10850 
40 0.6641 0.4112 38.08% 7168 12201 
 
 
Figure 5-9 IMS layer Authentication Delay under fixed network delay configuration 
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Figure 5-10 IMS layer Authentication Delay Saving Rate under fixed network delay 
configuration 
• In the loaded network condition, as system load increases the ADSR increases as 
expected from Fig. 5-10. As shown in Table 5-4, the average ASDR is 38.08% 
when SPT = 40 which is much higher than the ASDR for SPT = 20 and SPT = 
30. 
• Under low system load (SPT = 20), the IMS authentication delay of the IAKA 
protocol increased faster than the 3GPP AKA protocol. The main reason for this 
outcome was found at the eNB / EPC which in the IAKA scenario processed 
more requests / responses during the same period which is shown in Table 5-4. 
The wireless network is more sensitive than the wired network in low system 
load conditions. Therefore, the ASDR under low system load (SPT =20) is lower 
than the ASDR without system load (SPT = 1). 
• Under a high system load, the IMS authentication delay of the 3GPP protocol 
increased faster than the IAKA protocol. Although the wireless network IAKA 
approach processed more packets, the authentication steps saved in the proposed 
IAKA authentication protocol occurred in the wired network. Under certain 
system loads, the wired network is very sensitive to the packets processed. 
Therefore, the wired part of the authentication delay of the 3GPP approach 
increased faster than the proposed IAKA authentication approach and the ADSR 
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of SPT =30 and SPT = 40 is higher than the ADSR without system load (SPT = 
1). 
5.1.2 Varying Network Delay Configuration 
For the varying network delay configuration the average network delay was used. 
It was assumed that DELAYprocessing = DELAYHSS = DELAYICSCFHSS = DELAYAVretrival = 
averageDelay. The average delay started from 1ms and the terminals carried out SIP 
registration procedures repeatedly and each procedure has a 1ms increment. In the non-
loaded condition (SPT = 1), the statistics for the authentication delay and ADSR were 
collected from the UE and the results are shown in Fig. 5-11 and Fig. 5-12. Fig. 5-11 and 
Fig. 5-12 show that the authentication delay and the ADSR increase with increasing 
network delay. Under the non-loaded network environment, with increasing the network 
delay, the proposed IAKA authentication protocol could save up to 33% of the 
authentication delay. 
 
 
Figure 5-11 Authentication Delay with varying network delay configuration 
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Figure 5-12 ADSR with varying network delay configuration 
5.2 Security Analysis 
This section describes the proposed IAKA authentication protocol security 
mechanism, and shows that the proposed IAKA protocol carries out authentication 
correctly, supports mutual authentication, confidential and integrity message protection, 
and prevents possible malicious attacks.  
5.2.1 Authentication Accuracy 
This section describes the proposed IAKA authentication process in the network 
and service layers. The UE authenticates with network entities in the network layer and it 
is assumed there is a mobile terminal with a pre-shared key Kue and a network entity with 
the key Khss. The network entity initiates a NAS Authentication Request to the UE with 
the random number RAND and authentication code AUTN as shown in (3) and (4). 
AUTN = SQN ⊕ AK || AMF || MAC     (3) 
MAC = f1K(SQN||RAND||AMF)     (4) 
Where f1 is the message authentication function and K is the key used. After 
receiving the Authentication Request with the RAND and the AUTN, the terminal 
computes the AK and the SQN first, then calculates XMAC by using (4). The terminal 
checks whether the received MAC calculated by the server is equal to the XMAC 
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calculated by the terminal. If XMAC == MAC, the network entity is accepted and 
continues to communicate with the terminal. For a server with an invalid key identified 
by the IMPI number Kue ≠ Khss, the calculated MAC won’t be equal to the XMAC 
calculated by the terminal, and the terminal rejects the server connection and ceases the 
server connection and communication process. 
After receiving the RES from the UE, the MME checks the RES number. If the 
RES is equal to the XRES received from the HSS, the terminal authentication is accepted 
and the terminal can access the network. XRES and RES are calculated by using (5).  
XRES = f2K (RAND)       (5) 
Where f2 is a message authentication function and K is the key. If it is an invalid 
terminal without a valid key so that Kue ≠ Khss, the RES wouldn’t be equal to XRES and 
the MME would reject the terminal attach attempt. Therefore, only the terminal with the 
correct key identified by the same IMPI number can pass authentication and successfully 
login to the LTE network. 
In the IMS service layer, the P-CSCF performs authentication for the network by 
checking the Integrity Checking Value (ICV), described in (6), received in SIP Register 
Request using the IPSec ESP protocol.   
ICV = fintK (M)       (6) 
Where fint is the function used to generate the integrity code, M is the ESP 
packet minus the ICV and K is the key KPCSCFint. A valid UE, after a successful network 
layer authentication, can derive an intermediate key KASME which is equal to the KASME 
stored in the P-CSCF and identified by the IMPI number. Using (2), both the terminal 
and the P-CSCF derive KPCSCFint by using the same KASME, hence, the KPCSCFintUE = 
KPCSCFintHSS. The P-CSCF, after receiving the ESP packet, retrieves the ICV from the 
ESP packet and calculates XICV by using (6), and if the terminal and the P-CSCF use 
the same key and the M wasn’t changed during transmission, the ICV would be equal to 
XICV. Without a valid pre-shared key to generate the correct KASME and KPCSCFint, ICV ≠ 
XICV, and the P-CSCF rejects the register request. 
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Finally, the UE authenticates the network in the IMS service layer by checking 
the ICV received in the SIP Register Response encapsulated by the IPSec ESP protocol 
packet. Using (6), when the UE and the P-CSCF have the same key and the input string 
M, the received ICV will be equal to the calculated XICV. Any server without a correct 
key KASME can’t generate a valid ICV to pass authentication at the terminal, and the 
communication session is rejected. 
5.2.2 Mutual authentication 
As described, the network and service layers authentication using the proposed 
IAKA protocol support mutual authentication. Only the terminals and the network 
entities with the correct keys and a valid IMPI number authenticate successfully and 
build a trust relationship with each other. Without the valid pre-shared key identified by 
the IMPI number, adversaries cannot pretend to be a legal terminal and access the 
network and the service resources. Also, adversaries cannot pretend to be a valid 
network entity to get the user’s private information. 
5.2.3 Confidential and integrity protection 
This section describes the confidential and integrity protection of the proposed 
IAKA IMS service layer authentication. The network layer is not discussed in this 
section because the confidential and integrity protection of the IAKA network layer is 
the same as the 3GPP definition. 
The proposed IAKA IMS layer authentication protocol creates a pair of IPSec 
security associations to protect the information transmitted between the terminal and the 
P-CSCF. Before transmission, the sender encrypts the data by using the symmetric 
encryption algorithm and the key KPCSCFenc. Only a receiver with the same key KPCSCFenc 
can decrypt the message and obtain the correct plain text. 
The messages between the terminal and the P-CSCF are also integrity protected 
in the IPSec SAs. The receiver checks the message’s integrity by using the ICV number. 
If the received ICV doesn’t equal to the calculated XICV, the received message is 
incomplete and will be discarded. 
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5.2.4 Possible attacks 
This section analysed how the proposed IAKA prevented the possible replay 
attack and DOS attack. 
A replay attack can’t be achieved in the network and service layers because in the 
network layer, if an adversary was eavesdropping on the conversation between the 
terminal and the MME and captured the NAS Authentication Request and NAS 
Authentication Response (RES), it might initiate a replay attack by sending the 
Authentication Request (RAND, AUTN and KSIASME) packet to the terminal; however, 
the adversary couldn’t pass a SQN number check which is a part of the AUTN. As 
defined in [TS 33.102 2009], the SQN should be different in the new session and the 
terminal should check the SQN number validity first. If the received SQN is the same as 
the previously accepted SQN number, the terminal would send an error response to the 
fake server. The adversary might do a replay attack by sending the Authentication 
Response packet to the server, however, a RES number check would identify this as a 
fake message. Using (5), RES is calculated by using the HSS randomly generated RAND 
which is different for each session. Therefore in a new session, the captured packet with 
the old RES number would be identified as a fake message and access to the services 
would be prevented. 
In the service layer, adversaries can’t get the user or the server’s information by 
sending the captured packets because the packets are protected by using IPSec ESP 
which includes a monotonically increasing sequence number. After receiving a packet, 
the receiver verifies the sequence number first to make sure this is not a duplicated 
packet; hence, the captured packet with the old sequence number would not be accepted. 
Therefore, the proposed IAKA authentication protocol can protect the system from the 
malicious replay attack. 
The proposed IAKA protocol has higher security against a DOS attack than the 
legacy 3GPP defined authentication protocol. With the legacy 3GPP defined 
authentication protocol the IMS core system is vulnerable to a DOS attack. Assume the 
adversary floods the P-CSCF/I-CSCF/S-CSCF/HSS by sending SIP REGISTER requests 
with a valid IMPI number which belongs to a valid subscriber X. The P-CSCF would 
forward the requests to the core network servers I-CSCF/S-CSCF/HSS. However, for 
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IAKA authentication, the flood messages can only reach the P-CSCF and the MME, 
leaving the core network fully protected. If the subscriber X hasn’t logged into the LTE 
network and the P-CSCF is not able to retrieve the subscriber’s AV from the MME, the 
P-CSCF considers this to be an invalid terminal and will reject the Register request. If 
the subscriber X has already registered with the LTE network, the adversary is required 
to transmit SIP Register requests in the IPSec security associations, and without the valid 
key, the messages transmitted to the P-CSCF will not be validated and forwarded to the 
next hop. Therefore the adversaries cannot jeopardize the core I-CSCF / S-CSCF / HSS 
servers. 
5.3 Energy Consumption Analysis 
In this section, the energy cost of the user terminal’s authentication related 
security activities was calculated. It is shown that the IAKA authentication protocol 
could save 81.82% of the energy consumption in IMS layer authentication and save 
39.13% of the terminal’s energy consumption in both the network layer and service 
layer. 
For the 3GPP defined 4G LTE and proposed IAKA authentication protocols, the 
terminal’s security activities include the execution of the EPS AKA and the IMS AKA 
authentication protocol. Therefore, E = EEPS-AKA + EIMS-AKA where E denotes the energy 
consumption.  
In the 3GPP defined authentication protocol, the terminal’s energy cost to 
execute the EPS AKA authentication protocol includes (a) checking the AUTN number 
which is made up of generating AK and MAC (b) generating the RES number, and (c) 
generating CK, IK and deriving KASME. 
E4G-EPS-AKA = EAK + EMAC  + ERES + ECK + EIK + EKASME   (7) 
The energy cost to execute the IMS AKA authentication protocol is shown in (4). 
E4G-IMS-AKA = EAK + EMAC  + ERES + ECK + EIK    (8) 
For the IMS layer, the IPSec energy consumption wasn’t considered because 
IPSec is mainly used for message transmission and it is the same in the two approaches. 
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As described in Section 4.2.8, this research work uses the AV generation functions f1, 
f2, f3, f4, f5 to generate MAC, RES, CK, AK, and choose AES as the kernel encryption 
algorithm. Also, HMAC-SHA-256 is used as the key derivation function to derive 
KASME, KPCSCFint, and KPCSCFenc. For the energy consumption calculation, only the energy 
used in encryption is considered. The security operations of bitwise exclusive-OR and 
bitwise rotation aren’t calculated as they won’t affect the results significantly. The 
energy consumption of AES and HMAC was studied in [Potlapally 2006], and the results 
showed the energy consumption of the AES algorithm is made up of two phases, the first 
is in the key setup phase EKEY-SETUP which is 7.87 µJ and the second is in the 
encryption/decryption phase EENC/DEC. In the encryption/decryption phase, the energy 
consumption per byte (EPB) is 1.21 µJ and for the HMAC-SHA-256, the EPB is 1.16 µJ. 
Therefore the energy can be calculated as shown in (9) and (10). 
EAES (n) = 7.87 µJ + 1.21 µJ * n    (9) 
EHMAC (n) = 1.16 µJ * n     (10) 
Where n is the length of the input string in bytes. Although the MAC, RES, CK, 
IK, and AK have different lengths, they were all generated by encrypting 16 byte data 
blocks three times. Therefore, referring to (9), EAK = EMAC  = ERES = ECK = EIK = 81.69  
µJ. For KASME, KPCSCFint, and KPCSCFenc, they were derived by using 32 byte data blocks 
so the energy consumption is 37.12 µJ by using (10).  For the 3GPP defined 4G LTE 
authentication protocol, referring to (7) and (8), (a) E4G-EPS-AKA = 445.57 µJ, and (b) E4G-
IMS-AKA = 408.45 µJ. 
For the improved IAKA authentication protocol, the LTE network layer energy 
consumption is same as it in the 3GPP approach which is 445.57 µJ (EIAKA-EPS-AKA = 
445.57 µJ). The energy cost of the IMS service layer includes key derivation of KPCSCFint 
and KPCSCFenc by using HMAC-SHA-256 which is 74.24 µJ (EIAKA-IMS-AKA = 74.24 µJ).  
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Figure 5-13 Energy Consumption Comparison 
ESRI-IMS AKA = (E4G-IMS-AKA - EI-IMS-AKA) / E4G-IMS-AKA *100%  (11) 
ESRIAKA = (E4G - EIAKA) / E3GPP *100%     (12) 
By using (11) and (12), ESRI-IMS AKA = 81.82% and ESRIAKA = 39.13%. This 
means that by using the improved authentication protocol, the terminal could save 
81.82% of IMS layer security related activity energy consumption; and save 39.13% of 
the security activity energy consumption in both the network layer authentication and the 
IMS service layer authentication by using the improved authentication protocol 
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6 Conclusion 
The scope and objectives of this research were successfully completed. The 
research provided an improved one-pass IMS authentication protocol for the LTE system 
with higher performance, higher security and lower energy consumption. A 
comprehensive investigation of the current 3GPP defined 4G LTE two-pass AKA 
authentication protocol and the related research work were carried out in this research; 
and the proposed authentication protocol was simulated to prove its achievability. 
Furthermore the performance analysis, security performance and energy consumption 
were provided by comparing the proposed authentication protocol and the 4G LTE 
authentication protocol by using the system model identified in this research. 
An important outcome of the literature review was identifying previous one pagss 
authentication approaches lacked security or required significant system modification. 
Furthermore, most of the previous research work was focused on the 3G network or the 
network layer authentication. 
The initial research results were presented at the International Conference on 
Information Networking (ICOIN 2011) conference, which was held in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia in January 2011 and the conference paper [Gu 2011a] is provided in Appendix 
B. The research results about the energy consumption and security were presented at 
Australian Telecommunication Network and Application Conference (ATNAC 2011) in 
Melbourne, Australia in November 2011 and the conference paper [Gu 2011b] is shown 
in Appendix C. The research results presented in this thesis have been included in a 
journal paper [Gu 2011c] and the revised version was submitted to the IEEE 
Transactions on Wireless Communications at 7 Dec. 2011, Appendix D.  
The research was focused on 4G LTE network and IMS authentication, and the 
research outcome was an improved one-pass authentication protocol that improves 4G 
system performance, security, and reduces UE energy consumption. The results provided 
in this thesis include: 
• A literature review of the mobile network which starts from 1G through to 4G 
and includes a review of the 4G LTE network and IMS network. 
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• The introduction and analysis of the 4G LTE IMS two-pass IAKA authentication 
protocol, the security mechanism and why this approach is important; 
• An introduction and analysis of the related research work and identifies their 
limitations; 
• Proposed the IAKA one-pass authentication protocol with security key hierarchy, 
LTE EPS AKA authentication procedure and the improved IMS AKA 
authentication procedure; 
• A comprehensive system model was designed and a LTE-IMS model was 
developed using OPNET Modeller v16. The models were used to compare the 
system performance between different authentication approaches; 
• The proposed IAKA authentication proposed was developed successfully and 
models, nodes and protocols were developed using C/C++ within OPNET 
Modeller v16 and integrating with the OPNET provided LTE-IMS models; 
• A comprehensive comparison of the system performance, security, and energy 
consumption between the proposed authentication protocol and the current 
standardized 4G LTE authentication protocol; 
• It was found that the proposed IAKA one-pass authentication protocol simplifies 
the 4G LTE / IMS authentication procedures significantly; 
• On system performance, by comparing the IAKA one-pass authentication 
protocol with the current standardized 4G LTE authentication protocol, the 
following conclusions are made: 
o  For the system’s packet processing delay configured to a fixed value 
 In non-loaded environment, the proposed IAKA could save up to 
33.34% of the authentication delay; 
 The authentication delay increased with increasing system load 
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 In the loaded system environment, the proposed IAKA could 
reduce authentication delay with higher system load 
 In the loaded system environment, the proposed IAKA could 
reduce the authentication delay by 38%. 
o If the system’s packet processing delay is configured to a varying value 
which starts from 1ms with 1ms increments for each procedure, the 
proposed IAKA one-pass authentication protocol could reduce the 
authentication delay by 33%. 
• On security, it was proved that the proposed IAKA one-pass authentication 
protocol could not only authenticate the end user correctly but also support 
mutual authentication, confidential and integrity message protection and prevents 
possible malicious attack. Furthermore, the proposed IAKA provides stronger 
system protection against the DOS attack.  
• On energy consumption, it was found that the proposed IAKA one-pass 
authentication protocol could save up to 81.82% in the IMS service layer 
authentication and save up to 39.13% in the combined two layer authentication 
processes. 
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7 Future Work 
A number of future research topics were identified during this research.  Future 
research may include further investigation of the improved one-pass authentication 
protocol, and the following is a suggested list of possible research directions. 
• Current research mainly focuses on the home users that the end user and the HSS 
server are in the same network domain. The authentication for the roaming users 
including a visited end user from different area of the same carrier, a visited end 
user from a different carrier with different network environment consideration 
may be further studied.  
• The next generation network is a highly integrated network. WLAN network, 
mobile network, fibre network and the other networks can be seamlessly 
integrated under one core network to provide the end user the most flexible 
services. The current multi-pass authentication protocol will be a big burden and 
there will be high requirements for a generic authentication protocol for the 
highly integrated next generation network. The prospective research work my 
include the design and develop a generic authentication protocol for mobile 
network, wireless network, fibre network and the other networks; simulation of 
the proposed authentication protocol to prove its achievability, and a 
comprehensive analysis of the proposed authentication protocol with the other 
authentication approaches. 
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Appendix A 
Source Code in Opnet       
This section presents the source code developed in OPNET to create the LTE and 
IMS system to do the authentication simulation. 
A.1: Source Code for application SIP REGISTER 
A.1.1: Function “sip_request_register”  
/*send request of register to SIP UAC*/ 
SIPT_Call_Info_Shell* sip_request_register (Prohandle register_CP_prohndl, Prohandle  
sip_UAC_mgr_prohndl, const char* invitee_addr, OmsT_Qm_Tos tos) 
{ 
static int    call_id = 0; 
 Ici*    sip_req_ici_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 Prohandle*   register_CP_prohndl_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 SIPT_Call_Info*   sip_call_info_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 SIPT_Call_Info_Shell*  sip_call_info_shell_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 Objid    call_initiator_node_objid; 
 Objid    call_initiator_tpal_module_id; 
  
 /* This function sends an REGISTER request to the specified UAC */ 
 FIN (sip_request_register (inviting_CP_prohndl, sip_UAC_mgr_prohndl)); 
  
 /* Check if the specified UAC mgr exists */ 
 if (op_pro_valid (sip_UAC_mgr_prohndl) == OPC_FALSE) 
 { 
  /* Issue an error message and return NIL */ 
  sip_service_unsupported_log_write ();  
  FRET (OPC_NIL); 
 } 
 
 /* Allocate memory to store the call information */ 
 sip_call_info_ptr = (SIPT_Call_Info*) op_prg_mem_alloc (sizeof (SIPT_Call_Info)); 
 /* Assign a unique ID to the call */ 
 sip_call_info_ptr->call_id = call_id++; 
 /*set network delay = 0 ms*/ 
 sip_call_info_ptr->network_delay = -1; 
 /* Assign the invitee addr to the call */ 
 sip_call_info_ptr->invitee_addr = (char*) invitee_addr; 
 /* Reset the via field */ 
 sip_call_info_ptr->via_icscf = OPC_FALSE; 
 /* Assign the type of service to the call */ 
 sip_call_info_ptr->tos = tos; 
 /* Get the node objid */ 
 call_initiator_node_objid = op_topo_parent (op_id_self ()); 
 /* Get the tpal id of the node initiating the call */ 
 call_initiator_tpal_module_id = sip_tpal_module_id_get (call_initiator_node_objid); 
 /* Get the TPAL address */ 
 sip_call_info_ptr->call_initiator_addr = sip_tpal_addr_get (call_initiator_tpal_module_id); 
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 /* Time stamp the init time of this call request */ 
 sip_call_info_ptr->call_init_time = op_sim_time (); 
 /* Create the handle to be returned */ 
 sip_call_info_shell_ptr = (SIPT_Call_Info_Shell*) op_prg_mem_alloc (sizeof 
(SIPT_Call_Info_Shell)); 
 
 /* Assign the call information to the shell */ 
 sip_call_info_shell_ptr->sip_call_info_ptr = sip_call_info_ptr; 
  
 /* Set the status of the call to indicate that the call has just now been initiated */ 
 sip_call_info_shell_ptr->call_status = SIPC_Call_Initiated; 
  
 /* Create an ICI to communicate with the UAC */ 
 sip_req_ici_ptr = op_ici_create ("sip_req"); 
    
 /* Allocate memory to pass the caller's prohandle */ 
 /* It will be deallocated by the UAC              */ 
 register_CP_prohndl_ptr = (Prohandle*) op_prg_mem_alloc (sizeof (Prohandle)); 
 *register_CP_prohndl_ptr = register_CP_prohndl; 
    
 /* Set the fields of the ICI */ 
 op_ici_attr_set (sip_req_ici_ptr, "appl_prohandle_ptr", register_CP_prohndl_ptr); 
 op_ici_attr_set (sip_req_ici_ptr, "request_type", SIPC_Request_Type_Register); 
 op_ici_attr_set (sip_req_ici_ptr, "call_info_ptr", sip_call_info_shell_ptr); 
 
 /* Install the ICI */ 
 op_ici_install (sip_req_ici_ptr); 
    
 /* Schedule an interrupt to the UAC with the INVITE request */ 
 op_intrpt_schedule_process (sip_UAC_mgr_prohndl, op_sim_time (), SIPC_REQUEST); 
    
 FRET (sip_call_info_shell_ptr); 
}/* End sip_request_register () */ 
A.1.2: Function “sip_request_register_finish”  
/*The function “sip_request_register_finish” is invoked by the voice process to terminate SIP registration 
repletion in SIP UAC.*/ 
 
Void sip_request_register_finish (Prohandle leaving_CP_prohndl, Prohandle  sip_UAC_mgr_prohndl, 
SIPT_Call_Info_Shell* sip_call_info_shell_ptr) 
{ 
 Ici*     sip_req_ici_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 Prohandle*    leaving_CP_prohndl_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
  
FIN (sip_request_register_finish (inviting_CP_prohndl, sip_UAC_mgr_prohndl, 
sip_call_info_shell_ptr)); 
  
 /* Create an ICI to communicate with the UAC */ 
 sip_req_ici_ptr = op_ici_create ("SIP_req"); 
 /* Allocate memory to pass the caller's prohandle */ 
 /* It will be deallocated by the UAC              */ 
 leaving_CP_prohndl_ptr = (Prohandle*) op_prg_mem_alloc (sizeof (Prohandle)); 
 *leaving_CP_prohndl_ptr = leaving_CP_prohndl; 
 /* Set the fields of the ICI */ 
 op_ici_attr_set (sip_req_ici_ptr, "appl_prohandle_ptr", leaving_CP_prohndl_ptr); 
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 /* Set the fields of the ICI */ 
 op_ici_attr_set (sip_req_ici_ptr, "request_type", SIPC_Request_Type_Reg_Finish); 
 /* Set the fields of the ICI */ 
 op_ici_attr_set (sip_req_ici_ptr, "call_info_ptr", sip_call_info_shell_ptr); 
 /* Install the ICI */ 
 op_ici_install (sip_req_ici_ptr); 
 /* Schedule an interrupt to the UAC with the BYE request */ 
 op_intrpt_schedule_process (sip_UAC_mgr_prohndl, op_sim_time (), SIPC_REQUEST); 
 FOUT; 
}/* End sip_request_register_finish () */ 
 
A.2: Source Code for DIAMETER_UAS_mgr model  
static void diameter_UAS_spawn_passive () 
{ 
 Prohandle  diameter_UAS_prohndl; 
 char   msg [128]; 
   
 /* This function spawns a UAS process which can LISTEN to incoming requests */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_spawn_passive ()); 
  
/* Spawn a diameter UAS */ 
 diameter_UAS_prohndl = op_pro_create ("diameter_UAS", UAS_ptc_mem_ptr); 
 if (ltrace_diameter_UAS_mgr_active) 
 { 
sprintf(msg, "UAS_mgr (PID %d) has spawned UAS (PID %d)", my_pro_id, op_pro_id 
(diameter_UAS_prohndl)); 
  op_prg_odb_print_major(msg, OPC_NIL); 
 } 
  
 /* Invoke the diameter UAS so that it can initialize itself */ 
 op_pro_invoke (diameter_UAS_prohndl, OPC_NIL); 
  
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_spawn_passive ()*/ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_mgr_attrs_parse () 
{ 
 Objid   my_node_objid; 
 Objid   comp_attr_objid; 
 Objid   row_objid; 
 char   temp_str[256]; 
  
 /* This function parses the diameter attributes set on this node */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_mgr_attrs_parse ()); 
  
 /* Get the objid of the node on which this UAC mgr runs*/ 
 my_node_objid = op_topo_parent (op_id_self ()); 
  
 /* Get the diameter Parameters attribute */ 
 op_ima_obj_attr_get (my_node_objid, "Diameter Proxy Server Parameters", &comp_attr_objid); 
  
 /* Get the first (and only) row */ 
 row_objid = op_topo_child (comp_attr_objid, OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, 0); 
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 /* Get the max number of simultaneous calls this node can handle */ 
     op_ima_obj_attr_get (row_objid, "Maximum Simultaneous Calls", &open_lines_count); 
  
 /* Check if the Maximum Simultaneous Calls is set to Unlimited */ 
 if (open_lines_count == -1) 
 { 
  /* Set it to the largest possible integer */ 
  open_lines_count = OPC_INT_INFINITY; 
 } 
 
 /* Get domain name */ 
     op_ima_obj_attr_get (row_objid, "Domain Name", temp_str); 
 domain_name = (char*) op_prg_mem_alloc (strlen (temp_str) + 1); 
 strcpy (domain_name, temp_str); 
 
 /* Get area name */ 
     op_ima_obj_attr_get (row_objid, "Area Name", temp_str); 
 area_name = (char*) op_prg_mem_alloc (strlen (temp_str) + 1); 
 strcpy (area_name, temp_str); 
 
 /* Get proxy type */ 
     op_ima_obj_attr_get (row_objid, "Proxy Type", temp_str); 
 proxy_type = (char*) op_prg_mem_alloc (strlen (temp_str) + 1); 
 strcpy (proxy_type, temp_str); 
  
 /* Get processing delay */ 
     op_ima_obj_attr_get (row_objid, "Processing Delay", &processing_delay); 
  
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_mgr_attrs_parse ()*/ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_mgr_stats_register () 
{ 
  
 /* This function register all the stats for the UAS */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_mgr_stats_register ()); 
  
 /* Register the Call Setup Requests stat */ 
UAS_call_setup_requests_stathandle = op_stat_reg ("diameter UAS.Call Setup Requests", 
OPC_STAT_INDEX_NONE, OPC_STAT_LOCAL); 
  
 /* Register the Calls Connected stat */ 
UAS_calls_connected_stathandle = op_stat_reg ("diameter UAS.Calls Connected", 
OPC_STAT_INDEX_NONE, OPC_STAT_LOCAL); 
  
 /* Register the Calls Rejected stat */ 
UAS_calls_rejected_stathandle = op_stat_reg ("diameter UAS.Calls Rejected", 
OPC_STAT_INDEX_NONE, OPC_STAT_LOCAL); 
  
 /* Register the Active Calls stat */ 
UAS_active_calls_stathandle = op_stat_reg ("diameter UAS.Active Calls", 
OPC_STAT_INDEX_NONE, OPC_STAT_LOCAL); 
  
 /* Register the Active Calls stat */ 
UAS_call_duration_stathandle = op_stat_reg ("diameter UAS.Call Duration (sec)", 
OPC_STAT_INDEX_NONE, OPC_STAT_LOCAL); 
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 /* Initialize the active calls stat */ 
 op_stat_write (UAS_active_calls_stathandle, 0); 
  
 FOUT; 
} /* End diameter_UAS_mgr_stats_register ()*/ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_mgr_ptc_mem_create () 
{ 
 /* This function creates the parent-to-child memory */ 
 /* which is passed between the UAS_mgr and the UAS  */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_mgr_ptc_mem_create ()); 
  
 /* Allocate memory for the UAC parent-to-child memory */ 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr = (DIAMETERT_UAS_PtC_Mem*) op_prg_mem_alloc 
 (sizeof(DIAMETERT_UAS_PtC_Mem)); 
  
 /* Assign the TPAL address of the node on which this process runs */ 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->strm_to_tpal_ptr = &strm_to_tpal; 
  
 /* Assign the open lines counter */ 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->open_lines_count_ptr = &open_lines_count; 
  
 /* Assign the domain name */ 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->domain_name_ptr = domain_name; 
 
 /* Assign the area name */ 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->area_name_ptr = area_name; 
 
 /* Assign the processing delay */ 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->processing_delay_ptr = &processing_delay; 
  
 /* Assign the proxy type */ 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->proxy_type_ptr = proxy_type; 
  
 /* Assign the active calls counter */ 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->active_calls_count_ptr = &active_calls_count; 
  
 /* Assign the stathandles */ 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->call_setup_requests_stathandle = UAS_call_setup_requests_stathandle; 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->calls_connected_stathandle  = 
UAS_calls_connected_stathandle; 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->calls_rejected_stathandle   = UAS_calls_rejected_stathandle; 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->active_calls_stathandle   = UAS_active_calls_stathandle; 
 UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->call_duration_stathandle   = UAS_call_duration_stathandle; 
 
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_mgr_ptc_mem_create ()*/ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_mgr_ltrace_activate () 
{ 
 /* This function activates the ODB traces */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_mgr_ltrace_activate ()); 
  
 /* Set the full trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_mgr_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter"); 
  
 /* Set the error trace */ 
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 ltrace_diameter_UAS_mgr_errors_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_error"); 
  
 /* Set the INVITE trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_mgr_invite_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_invite"); 
  
 /* Set the BYE trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_mgr_bye_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_bye"); 
  
 /* Set the all REQUESTS trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_mgr_req_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_req"); 
  
 /* Set the all RESPONSES trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_mgr_resp_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_resp"); 
  
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_mgr_ltrace_activate ()*/ 
A.3: Source Code for DIAMETER_UAS 
/***** Requests Related Functions *****/ 
static void diameter_UAS_req_process (Packet* pk_ptr)  
{ 
 char     msg [128]; 
 int      request_type; 
  
 /* This function updates the message on the packet   */ 
 /* based on the request type. The message informs    */ 
 /* the destination UAC of the request of the src UAC */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_req_process (pk_ptr)); 
  
 /* Get the request type from the packet */ 
 op_pk_nfd_get (pk_ptr, "msg", &request_type); 
 
 /* Show a trace */ 
 if(op_prg_odb_ltrace_active("PACKET")) 
 { 
  diameter_packet_trace(pk_ptr); 
 } 
 
 /* Update the message on the packet based on the request type */ 
 switch (request_type) 
 { 
  case (DIAMETERC_MULTIMEDIA_AUTH_REQUEST): 
  { 
   diameter_UAS_Register_req_process(pk_ptr); 
   break; 
  } 
  case (DIAMETERC_SERVER_ASSIGNMENT_REQUEST): 
  { 
   diameter_UAS_Register_res_req_process(pk_ptr); 
   break;  
  } 
    
  default: 
  { 
   /* Print an error message */ 
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   sprintf (msg, "Unknown Request Type received by UAS (PID %d)",                
my_pro_id); 
   op_prg_odb_print_major (msg, OPC_NIL); 
   break; 
   } 
   }  
  
 FOUT; 
 }/* End diameter_UAS_req_process () */ 
 
 
/***** Transport Layer Related Functions *****/ 
static void diameter_UAS_conn_open_passive (char* protocol, OmsT_Qm_Tos tos) 
 { 
 Objid      my_node_objid; 
 Objid        my_module_objid; 
 DIAMETERT_Session*    diameter_session_ptr; 
 char      msg [128]; 
 Ici*      session_ici_ptr; 
 DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*  session_ici_map_ptr; 
  
   
 /* This function opens a passive transport connection */ 
 /* to which UACs can connect to communicate with UAS  */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_conn_open_passive ()); 
  
 if (ltrace_diameter_UAS_active || ltrace_diameter_UAS_conn_active) 
 { 
sprintf (msg, "UAS (PID %d) opening a passive connection on port (%d)", my_pro_id, 
DIAMETERC_UAS_LISTENING_PORT); 
  op_prg_odb_print_major (msg, OPC_NIL); 
 } 
   
 /* Get the objid of the node on which this UAS runs */ 
 my_module_objid = op_id_self (); 
 my_node_objid = op_topo_parent (my_module_objid); 
  
 /* Create the session information */ 
diameter_session_ptr = (DIAMETERT_Session *) op_prg_mem_alloc (sizeof 
(DIAMETERT_Session)); 
 diameter_session_ptr->diameter_prohndl = op_pro_self(); 
 diameter_session_ptr->session_index = next_sess_index; 
DIAMETERC_UAS_LISTENING_PORT, protocol); 
  
 /* Open a passive TCP connection */ 
session_ici_ptr = tpal_session_open_passive_v2 (my_node_objid, 
DIAMETERC_UAS_LISTENING_PORT, protocol, DIAMETER_UAS_SERVICE_NAME, 
diameter_session_ptr, OPC_NIL, tos, APPL_TYPE_SIP); 
 /* Create a structure to store this transport session in a list which maps   */ 
 /* destination addresses to transport sessions.*/ 
session_ici_map_ptr = (DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*) 
op_prg_mem_alloc(sizeof(DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map)); 
 session_ici_map_ptr->session_ici_ptr = session_ici_ptr; 
 session_ici_map_ptr->session_index = next_sess_index; 
  
 /* Save it in the mappings list */ 
 op_prg_list_insert (sessions_ici_map_lptr, session_ici_map_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
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 /* Increment the next session index so that the next session gets a unique identifier */ 
 next_sess_index++; 
  
 FOUT; 
 }/* End diameter_UAS_conn_open_passive () */ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_conn_open_active (char* dest_tpal_addr, int dest_port, char* protocol, 
OmsT_Qm_Tos tos) 
{ 
 Objid      my_module_objid; 
 Objid      my_node_objid; 
 DIAMETERT_Session*    diameter_session_ptr; 
 char      msg [128]; 
 Ici*      session_ici_ptr; 
 DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*   session_ici_map_ptr; 
  
 /* This function opens an active connection to the UAS */ 
 FIN(diameter_UAS_conn_open_active ()); 
 
 if (ltrace_diameter_UAS_active || ltrace_diameter_UAS_conn_active) 
 { 
sprintf (msg, "UAS (PID %d) opening an active (%s) connection to dest (%s) on port 
(%d)",  
  my_pro_id, protocol, dest_tpal_addr, dest_port); 
  op_prg_odb_print_major (msg, OPC_NIL); 
 }  
 
 /* Get the objid of the node on which this UAC exists */ 
 my_module_objid = op_id_self (); 
 my_node_objid = op_topo_parent (my_module_objid); 
   
 /* Create the session information */ 
diameter_session_ptr = (DIAMETERT_Session *) op_prg_mem_alloc (sizeof 
(DIAMETERT_Session)); 
 diameter_session_ptr->diameter_prohndl = op_pro_self(); 
 diameter_session_ptr->session_index = next_sess_index; 
   
 /* Open a connection */ 
session_ici_ptr = tpal_session_open_active_v2 (my_node_objid, dest_tpal_addr, dest_port, 
protocol, DIAMETER_UAS_SERVICE_NAME , diameter_session_ptr, OPC_NIL, tos, 
APPL_TYPE_SIP); 
  
 /* Create a structure to store this transport session in a list which maps   */ 
 /* destination addresses to transport sessions.      */ 
session_ici_map_ptr = (DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*) 
op_prg_mem_alloc(sizeof(DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map)); 
 session_ici_map_ptr->session_ici_ptr = session_ici_ptr; 
 session_ici_map_ptr->dest_tpal_addr = dest_tpal_addr; 
 session_ici_map_ptr->session_index = next_sess_index; 
  
 /* Save it in the mappings list */ 
 op_prg_list_insert (sessions_ici_map_lptr, session_ici_map_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  
 /* Increment the next session index so that the next session gets a unique identifier */ 
 next_sess_index++; 
  
  106 
 FOUT; 
 }/* End diameter_UAS_conn_open_active ()*/ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_conn_close (int session_index) 
{ 
 Objid   my_module_objid; 
 Objid   my_node_objid; 
 Ici*   session_ici_ptr; 
  
 /* This function closes the transport connection */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_conn_close (session_index)); 
  
 /* Get the session ici - whose position in the sesions list */ 
 /* will always correspond to the session index              */ 
 session_ici_ptr = diameter_UAS_session_ici_from_index_get (session_index); 
  
 /* Get the objid of the node on which this UAC runs */ 
 my_module_objid = op_id_self (); 
 my_node_objid = op_topo_parent (my_module_objid); 
  
 /* Request tpal to close the connection */ 
 op_ici_install(session_ici_ptr); 
 tpal_session_close (my_node_objid); 
  
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_conn_close () */ 
 
/***** Manager Feedback Related Functions *****/ 
static void diameter_UAS_mgr_inform_open () 
 { 
  
 /* This function informs the diameter_UAS mgr that the */ 
 /* active transport connection has been established */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_mgr_inform_open ()); 
  
 /* Schedule a forced interrupt for the UAS_mgr to inform that  */ 
 /* an active connection has been established.             */ 
op_intrpt_schedule_process (my_mgr_prohandle, op_sim_time (), 
DIAMETERC_UAS_ACTIVATED); 
  
 /* Set the ODB tag to "active" since this UAS is connected to a UAC */ 
 op_pro_tag_set (my_prohandle, "active"); 
 
 FOUT; 
 }/* End diameter_UAS_mgr_inform_open () */ 
  
/**** Utility Functions ****/ 
static void diameter_UAS_ltrace_activate () 
{ 
 /* This function activates the ODB traces */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_ltrace_activate ()); 
  
 /* Set the full trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter"); 
  
 /* Set the error trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_errors_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_error"); 
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 /* Set the INVITE trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_invite_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_invite"); 
  
 /* Set the BYE trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_bye_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_bye"); 
  
 /* Set the all REQUESTS trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_req_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_req"); 
  
 /* Set the all RESPONSES trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_resp_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_resp"); 
  
 /* Set the all RESPONSES trace */ 
 ltrace_diameter_UAS_conn_active = op_prg_odb_ltrace_active ("diameter_conn"); 
  
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_ltrace_activate ()*/ 
 
static Ici* diameter_UAS_session_ici_from_index_get (int session_index) 
{ 
 DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*       session_ici_map_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 int       num_sessions; 
 int       ith_session; 
  
 /* This function searches the sessions_ici_map_lptr to find   */ 
 /* an existing transport session to the specified destination */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_session_ici_from_index_get (session_index)); 
  
 /* Get the number of currently active sessions */ 
 num_sessions = op_prg_list_size (sessions_ici_map_lptr); 
  
 /* Loop through to find the session which matches the */ 
 /* destination of interest                            */ 
 for (ith_session = 0; ith_session < num_sessions; ith_session++) 
 { 
  /* Get the ith active session */ 
  session_ici_map_ptr = (DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*) op_prg_list_access  
  (sessions_ici_map_lptr, ith_session); 
   
  /* Check if this session has the destination of interest */ 
  if (session_ici_map_ptr->session_index == session_index) 
  FRET (session_ici_map_ptr->session_ici_ptr);  
 } 
  
 FRET (OPC_NIL); 
}/* End diameter_UAS_session_ici_from_index_get () */ 
 
static Ici* diameter_UAS_session_ici_from_addr_get (char*  dest_tpal_addr) 
{ 
 DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*       session_ici_map_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 int        num_sessions; 
 int        ith_session; 
  
 /* This function searches the sessions_ici_map_lptr to find   */ 
 /* an existing transport session to the specified destination */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_session_ici_from_addr_get (dest_tpal_addr)); 
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 /* Get the number of currently active sessions */ 
 num_sessions = op_prg_list_size (sessions_ici_map_lptr); 
  
 /* Loop through to find the session which matches the    */ 
 /* destination of interest - the 0th session is not      */ 
 /* considered because it it the session to the call host */ 
 for (ith_session = 1; ith_session < num_sessions; ith_session++) 
 { 
  /* Get the ith active session */ 
session_ici_map_ptr = (DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*) op_prg_list_access 
(sessions_ici_map_lptr, ith_session); 
   
  /* Check if this session has the destination of interest */ 
  if (strcmp(session_ici_map_ptr->dest_tpal_addr,dest_tpal_addr) == 0) 
  FRET (session_ici_map_ptr->session_ici_ptr);  
 } 
 FRET (OPC_NIL); 
}/* End diameter_UAS_session_ici_from_addr_get () */ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_session_map_destroy (int  session_index) 
{ 
 DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*       session_ici_map_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 int        num_sessions; 
 int        ith_session; 
  
 /* This function searches the sessions_ici_map_lptr to remove */ 
 /* the transport session with the given session index. This   */ 
 /* function is called atthe time the session is closed.       */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_session_map_destroy (dest_tpal_addr)); 
  
 /* Get the number of currently active sessions */ 
 num_sessions = op_prg_list_size (sessions_ici_map_lptr); 
  
 /* Loop through to find the session which matches the */ 
 /* destination of interest                            */ 
 for (ith_session = 0; ith_session < num_sessions; ith_session++) 
 { 
  /* Get the ith active session */ 
  session_ici_map_ptr = (DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*) op_prg_list_access  
  (sessions_ici_map_lptr, ith_session); 
   
  /* Check if this session has the destination of interest */ 
  if (session_index == session_ici_map_ptr->session_index) 
  { 
   /* Remove the session from the list */ 
session_ici_map_ptr = (DIAMETERT_Session_Ici_Map*) op_prg_list_remove 
(sessions_ici_map_lptr, ith_session); 
    
   /* Free its memory */ 
   op_prg_mem_free (session_ici_map_ptr); 
    
   FOUT; 
   } 
  } 
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_session_map_destroy () */ 
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static void diameter_UAS_mem_free () 
{ 
 /* This function frees all the memory associated with  */ 
 /* this process and is called just before this process */ 
 /* destroys itself                                     */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_mem_free ()); 
  
 /* Free the list of packets waiting to be relayed   */ 
 /* This list should be empty at this time    */ 
 if (op_prg_list_size (relay_packets_lptr) > 0) 
  op_prg_odb_print_major ("DIAMETER UAS is being destroyed while there are pending 
RELAY PACKETS", OPC_NIL); 
 else 
  op_prg_mem_free (relay_packets_lptr); 
  
 /* Free the list of transport sessions to diffeernt UACs   */ 
 /* This list should be empty at this time           */ 
 if (op_prg_list_size (sessions_ici_map_lptr) > 0) 
  op_prg_odb_print_major ("DIAMETER UAS is being destroyed while there are 
ACTIVE sessions", OPC_NIL); 
 else 
  op_prg_mem_free (sessions_ici_map_lptr); 
  
  
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_mem_free () */ 
  
static void diameter_get_proxy(const char* proxy_type, const char* domain, const char* area, char *addr) 
{ 
 int       count; 
 int       i; 
 int       number; 
 int       this_one; 
 int       matches; 
 
  
 /* This function returns the address */ 
 /* of a particular diameter proxy server */ 
 FIN (diameter_get_proxy ()); 
 
 /* Multiple elements could satisfy the search */ 
 /* Randomly choose an element to use */ 
 number = diameter_count_proxy(proxy_type, domain, area, addr);   
 this_one = (int)op_dist_uniform(number); 
  
 /* Loop through every node */ 
 count = op_topo_object_count (OPC_OBJTYPE_NODE_FIX); 
 for (i = 0, matches = 0; i < count; i++) 
 { 
  Objid     node; 
   
  node = op_topo_object (OPC_OBJTYPE_NODE_FIX, i); 
  if (op_ima_obj_attr_exists (node, "Server Address")) 
  { 
   char    temp_string [128]; 
   Objid    diameter_UAS; 
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   Objid    diameter_UAS_row; 
   char    node_domain[128]; 
   char    node_area[128]; 
   char    node_proxy_type[128]; 
    
   /* Get the address and check if it is the right proxy */ 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (node, "Server Address", temp_string); 
   strcpy(addr, temp_string); 
    
   /* Get the attribute family */ 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (node, "DIAMETER Proxy Server Parameters", 
&diameter_UAS); 
 
   /* Get the only row */ 
diameter_UAS_row = op_topo_child (diameter_UAS, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, 0); 
 
   /* Get the domain name */ 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (diameter_UAS_row, "Domain Name", node_domain); 
 
   /* Get the area name */ 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (diameter_UAS_row, "Area Name", node_area); 
    
   /* If no area name is specified, ignore it */ 
   if (strcmp (area, "") == 0) 
   { 
    strcpy (node_area, area); 
   }    
 
   /* Get the proxy type */ 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (diameter_UAS_row, "Proxy Type", node_proxy_type); 
   if (strcmp (domain, node_domain) == 0 &&strcmp (area, node_area) == 0 &&
   strcmp (proxy_type, node_proxy_type) == 0) 
   { 
    if (matches == this_one) 
     { 
     break; 
     } 
    else 
     { 
     matches++; 
     } 
   }    
 
   /* No matching */ 
   strcpy (addr, ""); 
   }   
  } 
 FOUT; 
} 
  
static int diameter_count_proxy(const char* proxy_type, const char* domain, const char* area, char *addr) 
{ 
 int       count; 
 int       i; 
 int       n = 0; 
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 /* This function returns the number of addresses */ 
 /* that match a particular diameter proxy server type */ 
 FIN (diameter_count_proxy ()); 
 
 /* Loop through every node, starting at a random one */ 
 count = op_topo_object_count (OPC_OBJTYPE_NODE_FIX); 
 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) 
 { 
  Objid     node; 
   
  node = op_topo_object (OPC_OBJTYPE_NODE_FIX, i); 
  if (op_ima_obj_attr_exists (node, "Server Address")) 
  { 
   char    temp_string [128]; 
   Objid    diameter_UAS; 
   Objid    diameter_UAS_row; 
   char    node_domain[128]; 
   char    node_area[128]; 
   char    node_proxy_type[128]; 
    
   /* Get the address and check if it is the right proxy */ 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (node, "Server Address", temp_string); 
   strcpy(addr, temp_string); 
    
   /* Get the attribute family */ 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (node, "DIAMETER Proxy Server Parameters", 
&diameter_UAS); 
 
   /* Get the only row */ 
diameter_UAS_row = op_topo_child (diameter_UAS, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, 0); 
 
   /* Get the domain name */ 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (diameter_UAS_row, "Domain Name", node_domain); 
 
   /* Get the area name */ 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (diameter_UAS_row, "Area Name", node_area); 
    
   /* If no area name is specified, ignore it */ 
   if (strcmp (area, "") == 0) 
   { 
    strcpy (node_area, area); 
   }    
 
   /* Get the proxy type */ 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (diameter_UAS_row, "Proxy Type", node_proxy_type); 
   if (strcmp (domain, node_domain) == 0 && strcmp (area, node_area) == 0 && 
   strcmp (proxy_type, node_proxy_type) == 0) 
   { 
    n++; 
   }    
 
   /* No matching */ 
   strcpy (addr, ""); 
   }   
  } 
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 FRET(n); 
} 
 
static void diameter_get_destination_domain_and_area(const char* invitee_addr, char* domain_name, 
char* current_domain, char* current_area) 
{ 
 int       count; 
 int       i; 
  
 /* This function returns the domain */ 
 /* of a particular client */ 
 FIN (diameter_get_destination_domain ()); 
 
 /* Loops through every node */ 
 count = op_topo_object_count (OPC_OBJTYPE_PROC); 
 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) 
 { 
  Objid     process; 
   
  process = op_topo_object (OPC_OBJTYPE_PROC, i); 
  if (op_ima_obj_attr_exists (process, "Address")) 
  { 
   char    temp_string [128]; 
    
   /* Get the address and check it */ 
   op_ima_obj_attr_get (process, "Address", temp_string);  
  
   if (strcmp (temp_string, invitee_addr) == 0) 
   { 
    Objid   node; 
    Objid   diameter_UAC; 
    Objid   diameter_UAC_row; 
     
    /* We found the desired process */ 
     
    /* Get the node */ 
    node = op_topo_parent (process); 
 
    /* Get the attribute family */ 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (node, "DIAMETER UAC Parameters", 
&diameter_UAC); 
 
    /* Get the only row */ 
diameter_UAC_row = op_topo_child (diameter_UAC, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, 0); 
 
    /* Get the domain name */ 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (diameter_UAC_row, "Domain Name", 
domain_name); 
 
    /* Get the current domain */ 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (diameter_UAC_row, "Current Domain", 
current_domain); 
 
    /* Get the current area */ 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (diameter_UAC_row, "Current Area", 
current_area); 
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    break; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 
 FOUT; 
} 
 
static void diameter_packet_trace (Packet* pk_ptr) 
{ 
 int      request_type; 
 char     tipo [128]; 
 
 /* This function shows a trace related to a packet */ 
 FIN (diameter_packet_trace ()); 
  
 /* Get the request type from the packet */ 
 op_pk_nfd_get (pk_ptr, "msg", &request_type); 
  
 if (request_type == DIAMETERC_MULTIMEDIA_AUTH_REQUEST) 
 { 
  strcpy (tipo, "Multimedia Auth Request"); 
 } 
 else if (request_type == DIAMETERC_SERVER_ASSIGNMENT_REQUEST) 
 { 
  strcpy (tipo, "Server Assignment Request"); 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  strcpy (tipo, "Invalid"); 
 } 
  
 printf ("%f - %s (%s, %s, %s): DIAMETER %s packet received\n", op_sim_time (), my_name, 
UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->proxy_type_ptr, UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->domain_name_ptr, UAS_ptc_mem_ptr-
>area_name_ptr, tipo); 
  
 FOUT; 
} 
 
static OmsT_Qm_Tos diameter_UAS_tos_get () 
{ 
 /* This function specifies the type of service */ 
 /* to be used for diameter signalling */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_tos_get ()); 
 
 FRET (OmsC_Qm_Tos_Reserved); 
 } /* End diameter_UAS_tos_get () */ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_Register_req_process (Packet* pk_ptr) 
{ 
 DIAMETERT_Call_Info_Shell*  diameter_call_info_shell_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 DIAMETERT_Call_Info*   diameter_call_info_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
  
 /* This function processes the register request */ 
 /* It adjusts the message on the packet and   */ 
 /* time stamps the associated ICI             */ 
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 FIN (diameter_UAS_register_req_process ()); 
  
 /* Check if there are open lines available to process this request */ 
 /* Set the packet msg_index field to indicate REGISTER */ 
 op_pk_nfd_set (pk_ptr, "msg", DIAMETERC_MULTIMEDIA_AUTH_REQUEST); 
   
 /* Set packet type field */ 
 op_pk_nfd_set (pk_ptr, "type", DIAMETERC_Packet_Type_Request); 
 
 /* Get the call information from the ICI */ 
 op_pk_nfd_access (pk_ptr, "call_info", &diameter_call_info_shell_ptr); 
 diameter_call_info_ptr = diameter_call_info_shell_ptr->diameter_call_info_ptr; 
   
 /* Save the call handle (shell) for reference */ 
 call_info_shell_ptr = diameter_call_info_shell_ptr; 
   
 /* Decrement the open lines counter */ 
 (*(UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->open_lines_count_ptr))--; 
   
 /* If this node is a HSS, process the registration request*/ 
 if (strcmp(auth_mode,"3GPP")==0) 
 { 
  diameter_UAS_ack_reg_unauth(pk_ptr); 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  diameter_UAS_ack_reg_OK(pk_ptr); 
 } 
 FOUT; 
} /* End diameter_UAS_Register_req_process ()*/ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_ack_reg_unauth (Packet* pk_ptr) 
{ 
 Ici*      session_ici_ptr; 
 
 /* This function processes the ACK of registration unauthorised */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_ack_reg_unauth ()); 
    
 /* Set packet type field */ 
 op_pk_nfd_set (pk_ptr, "type", DIAMETERC_Packet_Type_ANSWER); 
  
 /* Set packet msg field*/ 
 op_pk_nfd_set (pk_ptr, "msg", DIAMETERC_MULTIMEDIA_AUTH_ANSWER); 
  
  
 /*********INVOKE the 3GPP AKA PROTOCOL**********************/ 
  
 diameter_AKA_AV_gen (pk_ptr); 
  
 /* Get the session ici - whose position in the sesions list */ 
 /* will always be 0 for the UAC that started this call      */ 
 session_ici_ptr = diameter_UAS_session_ici_from_index_get (0); 
    
 /* Install the session ici */ 
 op_ici_install (session_ici_ptr); 
 
 /* Send the packet back to the UAC */ 
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 op_pk_send (pk_ptr, strm_to_tpal); 
 
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_ack_reg_unauth ()*/ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_ack_reg_OK (Packet* pk_ptr) 
{ 
 Ici* session_ici_ptr; 
  
 /* This function processes the ACK of registration OK */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_ack_reg_OK ()); 
    
 /* Set packet type field */ 
 op_pk_nfd_set (pk_ptr, "type", DIAMETERC_Packet_Type_ANSWER); 
  
 /* Set packet msg field*/ 
 op_pk_nfd_set (pk_ptr, "msg", DIAMETERC_SERVER_ASSIGNMENT_ANSWER); 
  
 /* Get the session ici - whose position in the sesions list */ 
 /* will always be 0 for the UAC that started this call      */ 
 session_ici_ptr = diameter_UAS_session_ici_from_index_get (0); 
    
 /* Install the session ici */ 
 op_ici_install (session_ici_ptr); 
 
 /* Send the packet back to the UAC */ 
 op_pk_send (pk_ptr, strm_to_tpal); 
 
 FOUT; 
}/* End diameter_UAS_ack_reg_OK ()*/ 
 
static void diameter_UAS_Register_res_req_process (Packet* pk_ptr) 
{ 
 DIAMETERT_Call_Info_Shell*  diameter_call_info_shell_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 DIAMETERT_Call_Info*   diameter_call_info_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
  
 /* This function processes the register request */ 
 /* It adjusts the message on the packet and   */ 
 /* time stamps the associated ICI             */ 
 FIN (diameter_UAS_Register_res_req_process ()); 
  
 /* Check if there are open lines available to process this request */ 
 /* Set the packet msg_index field to indicate REGISTER */ 
 op_pk_nfd_set (pk_ptr, "msg", DIAMETERC_SERVER_ASSIGNMENT_REQUEST); 
   
 /* Set packet type field */ 
 op_pk_nfd_set (pk_ptr, "type", DIAMETERC_Packet_Type_Request); 
 
 /* Get the call information from the ICI */ 
 op_pk_nfd_access (pk_ptr, "call_info", &diameter_call_info_shell_ptr); 
 diameter_call_info_ptr = diameter_call_info_shell_ptr->diameter_call_info_ptr; 
   
 /* Save the call handle (shell) for reference */ 
 call_info_shell_ptr = diameter_call_info_shell_ptr; 
   
 /* Decrement the open lines counter */ 
 (*(UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->open_lines_count_ptr))--; 
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 diameter_UAS_ack_reg_OK(pk_ptr); 
 
 /* Write the Call Setup Request statistics */ 
 op_stat_write (UAS_ptc_mem_ptr->call_setup_requests_stathandle, 1); 
 
 FOUT; 
  
} /* diameter_UAS_Register_res_req_process ()*/ 
 
A.4: Source Code for AKA authentication  
typedef unsigned char   u1byte; /* an 8 bit unsigned character type */  
typedef unsigned short  u2byte; /* a 16 bit unsigned integer type   */  
typedef unsigned long   u4byte; /* a 32 bit unsigned integer type   */  
  
typedef signed char     s1byte; /* an 8 bit signed character type   */  
typedef signed short    s2byte; /* a 16 bit signed integer type     */  
typedef signed long     s4byte; /* a 32 bit signed integer type     */ 
 
/*3GPP AKA*/ 
static void sip_AKA_AV_gen (Packet* pk_ptr) 
{ 
 SIPT_Call_Info_Shell*  sip_call_info_shell_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 SIPT_Call_Info*   sip_call_info_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
  
 u1byte var_rand[16]; 
 u1byte var_res[8],cli_XRES[8]; 
 u1byte var_ck[16],cli_ck[16]; 
 u1byte var_ik[16],cli_ik[16]; 
 u1byte var_ak[6]; 
 u1byte var_autn[16]; 
 u1byte cli_SQN[6]; 
 u1byte cli_AMF[2]; 
 u1byte cli_MAC[8],cli_XMAC[8]; 
 char show_string[500]; 
  
 /* This function processes the generation of AKA Authenticaion Vectors */ 
 FIN (sip_AKA_AV_gen ()); 
    
 /*initialize the variables*/ 
 memset(var_rand,0,sizeof(var_rand)); 
 memset(var_res,0,sizeof(var_res)); 
 memset(var_ck,0,sizeof(var_ck)); 
 memset(var_ik,0,sizeof(var_ik)); 
 memset(var_ak,0,sizeof(var_ak)); 
 memset(var_autn,0,sizeof(var_autn)); 
 memset(show_string,0,sizeof(show_string)); 
  
 memset(cli_XRES,0,sizeof(cli_XRES)); 
 memset(cli_ck,0,sizeof(cli_ck)); 
 memset(cli_ik,0,sizeof(cli_ik)); 
 memset(cli_SQN,0,sizeof(cli_SQN)); 
 memset(cli_AMF,0,sizeof(cli_AMF)); 
 memset(cli_MAC,0,sizeof(cli_MAC)); 
  117 
 memset(cli_XMAC,0,sizeof(cli_XMAC)); 
  
 /*GET CALL_INFO FROM THE PACKET*/ 
 op_pk_nfd_access (pk_ptr, "call_info", &sip_call_info_shell_ptr); 
 sip_call_info_ptr=sip_call_info_shell_ptr->sip_call_info_ptr; 
  
 /*get the random number*/ 
 strcpy(show_string,sip_call_info_ptr->RAND); 
 sip_gen_byte(show_string,32,var_rand); 
 
 /*get CK*/ 
 strcpy(show_string,sip_call_info_ptr->CK); 
 sip_gen_byte(show_string,32,var_ck); 
 
 /*get IK*/ 
 strcpy(show_string,sip_call_info_ptr->IK); 
 sip_gen_byte(show_string,32,var_ik); 
 
 /*get AUTN*/ 
 strcpy(show_string,sip_call_info_ptr->AUTN); 
 sip_gen_byte(show_string,32,var_autn); 
 
 /*generate AK*/ 
 sip_f5_AK(u1_KEY,var_rand,u1_OP,var_ak); 
 sip_gen_string(var_ak,6,show_string); 
 if(op_prg_odb_ltrace_active("AUTH")) 
 { 
  printf("\tAK:%s\n\n",show_string); 
 } 
  
 /*********from client side*****************/ 
 /*generate SQN AMF and MAC*/ 
 sip_gen_SQN_AMF_MAC(var_autn,var_ak,cli_SQN,cli_AMF,cli_MAC); 
 sip_f1_MACA(u1_KEY,var_rand,cli_SQN,cli_AMF,u1_OP,cli_XMAC); 
 sip_gen_string(cli_XMAC,8,show_string); 
 if(op_prg_odb_ltrace_active("AUTH")) 
 { 
  printf("\tCLIENT MAC:%s\n\n",show_string); 
 } 
 
 /*generate RES*/ 
 sip_f2_RES(u1_KEY,var_rand,u1_OP,cli_XRES); 
 sip_gen_string(cli_XRES,8,show_string); 
 strcpy(sip_call_info_ptr->RES,show_string); 
 if(op_prg_odb_ltrace_active("AUTH")) 
 { 
  printf("\tCLIENT RES:%s\n\n",sip_call_info_ptr->RES); 
 } 
 
 sip_f3_CK(u1_KEY,var_rand,u1_OP,cli_ck); 
 sip_gen_string(cli_ck,16,show_string); 
 if(op_prg_odb_ltrace_active("AUTH")) 
 { 
  printf("\tCLIENT CK:%s\n\n",show_string); 
 } 
  
 sip_f4_IK(u1_KEY,var_rand,u1_OP,cli_ik); 
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 sip_gen_string(cli_ik,16,show_string); 
 /*Save the new SIP_CALL_INFO to the packet*/ 
 op_pk_nfd_set (pk_ptr, "call_info", sip_call_info_shell_ptr, sip_call_info_fdstruct_copy_proc, 
sip_call_info_fdstruct_destroy_proc, 0); 
  
 FOUT; 
}/* End sip_AKA_AV_gen ()*/ 
 
static void sip_gen_rand(u1byte out_rand[16]) 
{ 
 
 int                 new_seed, rand_int; 
 PrgT_Random_Gen     *my_rng; 
 int     i=0; 
  
 /* This function processes the generation of random number*/ 
 FIN (sip_gen_rand ()); 
    
 /* create a new random number generator */ 
 new_seed=(int)op_sim_time(); 
 my_rng = op_prg_random_gen_create (new_seed); 
  
 for (i=0;i<16;i++) 
 { 
  /* generate a random integer in the interval [0,255] */ 
  rand_int = (op_prg_random_integer_gen (my_rng) % 256); 
  out_rand[i]=rand_int; 
 } 
 
 /* destroy the random number generator */ 
 op_prg_random_gen_destroy (my_rng); 
 
 FOUT; 
 
}/* End sip_gen_rand ()*/ 
 
static void sip_gen_ini(const u1byte in_SQNhe[6], const u1byte in_AMF[2], u1byte out_ini[16]) 
{ 
 
int i=0; 
    FIN(sip_gen_ini()); 
   
   for(i=0;i<=5;i++) 
   { 
      out_ini[i]=in_SQNhe[i]; 
   } 
 
   out_ini[6]=in_AMF[0]; 
   out_ini[7]=in_AMF[1]; 
 
   i=i+2; 
   for(i=8;i<14;i++) 
   { 
      out_ini[i]=in_SQNhe[i-8]; 
   } 
 
   out_ini[14]=in_AMF[0]; 
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   out_ini[15]=in_AMF[1]; 
   
   FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_gen_ini */ 
 
static void sip_gen_temp(const u1byte in_rand[16],const u1byte in_opc[16],const u1byte 
in_key[16],u1byte out_temp[16]) 
{ 
   u1byte i_temp[16]; 
   int i=0; 
   
   FIN(sip_gen_temp()); 
   
   for(i=0;i<=15;i++) 
   { 
      i_temp[i]=in_rand[i]^in_opc[i]; 
   } 
   
   sip_encrypt(in_key,128,i_temp,out_temp); 
   
   FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_gen_temp()*/ 
 
static void sip_rotate(const u1byte in_var[16],int r,u1byte out_var[16]) 
{ 
   u1byte temp_var1[16]; 
   u1byte temp_var2[16]; 
   int byte_num=0,bit_num=0; 
   u1byte s_part=0,a=0,b=0,c=0; 
   int i=0; 
   
   FIN(sip_rotate()); 
 
   for(i=0;i<sizeof(temp_var1);i++) 
   { 
      temp_var1[i]=0; 
      temp_var2[i]=0; 
   } 
 
   byte_num=r/8; 
   bit_num=r%8; 
 
   for(i=0;i<16-byte_num;i++) 
   { 
      temp_var1[i]=in_var[i+byte_num]; 
   } 
 
   for(i=0;i<byte_num;i++) 
   { 
      temp_var1[i+16-byte_num]=in_var[i]; 
   } 
 
   if (bit_num>0) 
  { 
      for(i=0;i<sizeof(temp_var1);i++) 
      { 
         if(i==0) 
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         { 
            s_part=in_var[i]>>(8-bit_num); 
            a=temp_var1[i]<<bit_num; 
            b=temp_var1[i+1]>>(8-bit_num); 
           c=a|b; 
           temp_var2[i]=c; 
         } 
         else if(i==sizeof(temp_var1)-1) 
         { 
            a=temp_var1[i]<<bit_num; 
            b=s_part; 
           c=a|b; 
            temp_var2[i]=c; 
         } 
         else 
         { 
            a=temp_var1[i]<<bit_num; 
            b=temp_var1[i+1]>>(8-bit_num); 
            c=a|b; 
            temp_var2[i]=c; 
         } 
      } 
   } 
   else 
   { 
        for(i=0;i<sizeof(temp_var1);i++) 
        { 
           temp_var2[i]=temp_var1[i]; 
        } 
   } 
 
   for(i=0;i<sizeof(temp_var1);i++) 
   { 
      out_var[i]=temp_var2[i]; 
   } 
   FOUT; 
} 
 
static void sip_XOR_16(const u1byte in_var1[16], const u1byte in_var2[16],u1byte out_var3[16]) 
{ 
  int i=0; 
 
   FIN(sip_XOR_16()); 
   
   for (i=0;i<=15;i++) 
   { 
      out_var3[i]=in_var1[i]^in_var2[i]; 
   } 
   FOUT; 
  }/*end of sip_XOR_16*/ 
 
static void sip_XOR_6(const u1byte in_var1[6], const u1byte in_var2[6],u1byte out_var3[6]) 
{ 
   int i=0; 
 
   FIN(sip_XOR_6()); 
   for (i=0;i<=5;i++) 
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   { 
      out_var3[i]=in_var1[i]^in_var2[i]; 
   } 
   FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_XOR_6*/ 
 
static void sip_f1_MACA(const u1byte in_key[16],const u1byte in_rand[16],const u1byte 
in_SQN[6],const u1byte in_AMF[2],u1byte in_op[16],u1byte out_MACA[8]) 
{ 
   u1byte var_eop[16]; 
   u1byte var_opc[16]; 
   u1byte var_ini[16]; 
   u1byte var_iniopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_rotiniopcr1[16]; 
   u1byte var_temp[16]; 
   u1byte var_temprot[16]; 
   u1byte var_temprotc1[16]; 
   u1byte var_etempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_out1[16]; 
   int i=0; 
 
   FIN(sip_f1_MACA()); 
   
  sip_encrypt(in_key,128,in_op,var_eop); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_eop,in_op,var_opc); 
   sip_gen_ini(in_SQN,in_AMF,var_ini); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_ini,var_opc,var_iniopc); 
   sip_rotate(var_iniopc,r1,var_rotiniopcr1); 
  sip_gen_temp(in_rand,var_opc,in_key,var_temp); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_temp,var_rotiniopcr1,var_temprot); 
  sip_XOR_16(var_temprot,c1,var_temprotc1); 
   sip_encrypt(in_key,128,var_temprotc1,var_etempopc); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_etempopc,var_opc,var_out1); 
 
   for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
   { 
     out_MACA[i]=var_out1[i]; 
   } 
   FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_f1_MACA() */ 
 
static void sip_f2_RES(const u1byte in_key[16],const u1byte in_rand[16],const u1byte in_op[16],u1byte 
out_RES[8]) 
{ 
   u1byte var_eop[16]; 
   u1byte var_opc[16]; 
   u1byte var_temp[16]; 
   u1byte var_tempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_rottempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_tempopcc2[16]; 
   u1byte var_etempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_out2[16]; 
   int i=0; 
 
   FIN(sip_f2_RES()); 
  sip_encrypt(in_key,128,in_op,var_eop); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_eop,in_op,var_opc); 
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   sip_gen_temp(in_rand,var_opc,in_key,var_temp); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_temp,var_opc,var_tempopc); 
   sip_rotate(var_tempopc,r2,var_rottempopc); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_rottempopc,c2,var_tempopcc2); 
   sip_encrypt(in_key,128,var_tempopcc2,var_etempopc); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_etempopc,var_opc,var_out2); 
 
   for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
   { 
      out_RES[i]=var_out2[i]; 
   } 
   FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_f2_RES()*/ 
 
 
static void sip_f3_CK(const u1byte in_key[16],const u1byte in_rand[16],const u1byte in_op[16],u1byte 
out_CK[16]) 
{ 
   u1byte var_eop[16]; 
   u1byte var_opc[16]; 
   1byte var_temp[16]; 
   u1byte var_tempopc[16]; 
  u1byte var_rottempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_tempopcc2[16]; 
   u1byte var_etempopc[16]; 
 
   FIN(sip_f3_CK()); 
   sip_encrypt(in_key,128,in_op,var_eop); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_eop,in_op,var_opc); 
   sip_gen_temp(in_rand,var_opc,in_key,var_temp); 
  sip_XOR_16(var_temp,var_opc,var_tempopc); 
   sip_rotate(var_tempopc,r3,var_rottempopc); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_rottempopc,c3,var_tempopcc2); 
   sip_encrypt(in_key,128,var_tempopcc2,var_etempopc); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_etempopc,var_opc,out_CK); 
 
   FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_f3_CK()*/ 
 
static void sip_f4_IK(const u1byte in_key[16],const u1byte in_rand[16],const u1byte in_op[16],u1byte 
out_IK[16]) 
{ 
   u1byte var_eop[16]; 
   u1byte var_opc[16]; 
   u1byte var_temp[16]; 
   u1byte var_tempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_rottempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_tempopcc2[16]; 
   u1byte var_etempopc[16]; 
  
   FIN(sip_f4_IK()); 
   
   sip_encrypt(in_key,128,in_op,var_eop); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_eop,in_op,var_opc); 
   sip_gen_temp(in_rand,var_opc,in_key,var_temp); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_temp,var_opc,var_tempopc); 
   sip_rotate(var_tempopc,r4,var_rottempopc); 
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   sip_XOR_16(var_rottempopc,c4,var_tempopcc2); 
   sip_encrypt(in_key,128,var_tempopcc2,var_etempopc); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_etempopc,var_opc,out_IK); 
 
   FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_f4_IK()*/ 
 
static void sip_f5_AK(const u1byte in_key[16],const u1byte in_rand[16],const u1byte in_op[16],u1byte 
out_AK[6]) 
{ 
   u1byte var_eop[16]; 
   u1byte var_opc[16]; 
   u1byte var_temp[16]; 
   u1byte var_tempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_rottempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_tempopcc2[16]; 
  u1byte var_etempopc[16]; 
   u1byte var_out5[16]; 
  int i=0; 
 
   FIN(sip_f5_AK); 
   sip_encrypt(in_key,128,in_op,var_eop); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_eop,in_op,var_opc); 
   sip_gen_temp(in_rand,var_opc,in_key,var_temp); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_temp,var_opc,var_tempopc); 
   sip_rotate(var_tempopc,r5,var_rottempopc); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_rottempopc,c5,var_tempopcc2); 
   sip_encrypt(in_key,128,var_tempopcc2,var_etempopc); 
   sip_XOR_16(var_etempopc,var_opc,var_out5); 
 
   for(i=0;i<6;i++) 
   { 
      out_AK[i]=var_out5[i]; 
   } 
  FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_f5_AK*/ 
 
static void sip_gen_AUTN(const u1byte in_SQN[6],const u1byte in_AK[6],const u1byte in_AMF[2],const 
u1byte in_MAC[8],u1byte out_AUTN[16]) 
{ 
 u1byte var_SQNAK[6]; 
 u1byte var_outemp[16]; 
 int i=0; 
 
 FIN(sip_gen_AUTN()); 
 sip_XOR_6(in_SQN,in_AK,var_SQNAK); 
 for(i=0;i<6;i++) 
 { 
  var_outemp[i]=var_SQNAK[i]; 
 } 
 var_outemp[6]=in_AMF[0]; 
 var_outemp[7]=in_AMF[1]; 
 
 for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
 { 
  var_outemp[8+i]=in_MAC[i]; 
 } 
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 for (i=0;i<16;i++) 
 { 
  out_AUTN[i]=var_outemp[i]; 
 } 
  FOUT; 
 
}/*end of sip_gen_AUTN()*/ 
 
static void sip_gen_SQN_AMF_MAC(const u1byte in_AUTN[16],const u1byte in_AK[6],u1byte 
out_SQN[6],u1byte out_AMF[2],u1byte out_MAC[8]) 
{ 
 u1byte var_SQNAK[6]; 
 int i=0; 
 
 FIN(sip_gen_SQN_AMF_MAC()); 
  
 for (i=0;i<6;i++) 
 { 
  var_SQNAK[i]=in_AUTN[i]; 
 } 
 out_AMF[0]=in_AUTN[6]; 
 out_AMF[1]=in_AUTN[7]; 
  
 for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
 { 
  out_MAC[i]=in_AUTN[i+8]; 
 } 
 sip_XOR_6(var_SQNAK,in_AK,out_SQN); 
 
 FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_gen_SQN_AMF_MAC*/ 
 
static void sip_gen_string(const u1byte in_bytes[],int in_len, char *outstring) 
{ 
 int i=0; 
 char my_string[300]; 
 char tempLow,tempHigh; 
  
 FIN(sip_gen_string()); 
  
 for(i=0;i<sizeof(my_string);i++) 
 { 
  my_string[i]=0; 
 } 
 
 for(i=0;i<in_len;i++) 
 { 
  tempLow=in_bytes[i]&15; 
  tempHigh=(in_bytes[i]>>4)&15; 
  if (tempLow>=0&&tempLow<=9) 
  { 
   tempLow=tempLow+48; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   tempLow=tempLow+55; 
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  } 
   
  if (tempHigh>=0&&tempHigh<=9) 
  { 
   tempHigh=tempHigh+48; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   tempHigh=tempHigh+55; 
  } 
  my_string[i*2]=tempHigh; 
  my_string[i*2+1]=tempLow; 
 } 
  
 strcpy(outstring,my_string); 
 
 FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_gen_string*/ 
 
static void sip_gen_byte(char *in_string,int in_len,u1byte out_bytes[]) 
{ 
 int i=0,j=0; 
 char tempLow,tempHigh; 
 
  
 FIN(sip_gen_byte()); 
  
 
 for(i=0;i<in_len;i=i+2) 
 { 
  tempHigh=in_string[i+0]; 
  tempLow=in_string[i+1]; 
 
  if ((tempHigh>=0x30)&&(tempHigh<=0x39)) 
  { 
   tempHigh=tempHigh-0x30; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   tempHigh=tempHigh-55; 
  } 
  tempHigh=tempHigh<<4; 
 
  if ((tempLow>=0x30)&&(tempLow<=0x39)) 
  { 
   tempLow=tempLow-0x30; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   tempLow=tempLow-55; 
  } 
  out_bytes[j]=tempHigh|tempLow; 
  j++; 
 } 
 
 FOUT; 
}/*end of sip_gen_byte*/ 
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Abstract—As defined in the 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project specifications, a Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
user device has to carry out two authentication 
steps to access multimedia services in IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). The first 
authentication step is used to gain UMTS 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) network 
admission. The second authentication step is the 
IMS authentication. The authentication steps 
utilize Authentication and Key Agreement 
(AKA) and many of the authentication steps are 
similar. This paper proposed a simplified 
authentication process known as Improved AKA 
(IAKA) which reduced the two authentication 
steps used to access the UMTS GPRS network 
and IMS services to one authentication step. 
Simulation results showed the IAKA protocol 
could significantly reduce the authentication 
delay and improve overall efficiency. 
Keywords: Authentication; IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS); Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS); 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA); 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP); Call Session 
Control Function (CSCF). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) was first 
specified in 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP) and the IMS provides multimedia 
services (i.e. audio, video, text, image, and 
combinations) over Packet Switched Networks 
(PSN) for multiple access networks [1], such as 
3G/4G, DSL, and WLAN. The centralized Home 
Subscriber Server (HSS) makes it possible to 
deliver applications using single sign-in, unified 
charging policy and other features, for different 
handsets or clients over different access 
networks. However, the complexities of the 
service procedures raise performance concerns 
and affect the IMS deployment scenarios. 
 
Figure1 IMS architecture for UMTS 
As shown in Fig. 1, in order to access 
multimedia services, a user of Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) has to pass 
two Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) 
authentication steps [2] [3] which include the key 
material generation, distribution and the user’s 
authentication. First, the user sends requests to 
the SGSN; the SGSN fetches the user’s 
Authentication Vectors (AVs) from the HSS and 
enables the user to access UMTS and the packet 
data network. Secondly, through the Proxy CSCF 
(PCSCF) and the Interrogating CSCF (ICSCF), 
the User Equipment (UE) sends requests to the 
SCSCF and the SCSCF retrieves the user’s AVs 
from the HSS and authenticates the user. After 
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the second authentication step the user can access 
IMS services. It was observed that the two-pass 
AKA authentication includes two executions of 
the AKA mechanism and many of the steps are 
similar. 
In this paper, an Improved-AKA (IAKA) 
authentication mechanism is proposed to replace 
the original two-pass authentication process. In 
IAKA, AKA is executed once to generate 
authentication vectors by using the user’s unique 
IP Multimedia Private-user Identity. The network 
entities use the authentication vector to do mutual 
authentication and enable the user to access the 
UMTS GPRS network and IMS services. The 
IAKA approach has the following features: (1) 
reduced authentication time, (2) reduced 
computation on the level of the HSS and 
terminal, (3) No compromising of the security 
level, and (4) minimal impact on the existing 
UMTS and IMS system. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows: 
Section II is the related work; Section III 
describes the legacy two-pass AKA 
authentication; Section IV introduces the 
proposed IAKA authentication process; Section 
V includes simulation results that show the 
IAKA is more efficient than the legacy two-pass 
authentication process; Section VI includes an 
analysis of the security level; Section VII 
includes an analysis of the authentication 
process; VIII summarizes the features of the 
proposed IAKA authentication process and 
provides future work. 
 
II. Related Work 
Authentication is an important function carried 
out for user devices connecting to the network 
and network subsystems. Research is being 
carried out to reduce authentication complexity 
and improve the authentication process 
efficiency. However, a common limitation of 
research presented in the literature is that 
proposed methods require extensive modification 
to the network infrastructure or there is a 
reduction in security. 
Lin et al. [4] proposed a simple one-pass 
authentication scheme that only needs to perform 
UMTS GPRS authentication. At the IMS level 
the CSCF stores a International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and IP Multimedia 
Private-user Identity (IMPI) pair to do an implicit 
authentication without the duplicated AKA 
operations which may save up to 50% of the IMS 
authentication traffic. However, the one-pass 
authentication solution disclosed the user’s 
private identity and is vulnerable to adversary 
attacks such as the fake attack, eavesdropping 
attack and others. 
Huang and Li [5] proposed an Evolutionary 
IMS AKA (E-IMS AKA) to replace the IMS 
AKA which not only adheres to the security 
requirements of IMS AKA but also maintains the 
efficiency of Lin et al.’s one-pass authentication. 
However, E-IMS used a temporary key in the 
authentication and compromised security. Two 
years later, the authors [6] improved the E-IMS 
authentication procedures and presented a 
simpler and more flexible solution. However, it 
used the terminal to generate key information and 
distribute the key information to the 
authentication server which increased the 
system’s complexity.  
Nitantogian and Xenakis [7] proposed an 
improved authentication procedure for the 3G-
WLAN integrated networks that enables a 
WLAN user to get access to the 3G packet 
switched services or to the public Internet 
through the 3G public land mobile network . The 
proposed one-pass EAP-AKA procedure 
combines the initial and the second 
authentication steps by making a security binding 
between them which significantly reduces the 
authentication overhead without compromising 
the security services when compared to the 
legacy two-pass authentication process. In 2010, 
based on [4] and [7], Nitantogian et al. [8] 
extended their research to the Beyond 3rd 
Generation (B3G) networks and proposed a 
generic mechanism for efficient authentication 
for B3G networks. However, on the IMS layer, 
the proposed authentication disclosed the user’s 
identity and this is a security risk. 
 
III. 3GPP two-pass 
authentication 
In this section, the two-pass AKA 
authentication process including the UMTS 
GPRS AKA authentication and the IMS AKA 
authentication are described. 
A. UMTS GPRS AKA Authentication 
If the user wants to access GPRS services, the 
UE invokes an attach request which triggers the 
authentication procedure. The authentication 
procedure is shown in Figure 2 which is defined 
in 3GPP TS 33.102 [9]. 
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Figure2 UMTS GPRS AKA autentication 
procedure 
The UMTS GPRS AKA authentication process 
includes: 
1) U1: In order to access GPRS services, UE 
sends SGSN an GMM Attach Request with the 
parameter IMSI=imsi. The protocol between UE 
and SGSN is GMM (GPRS Mobility 
Management); 
2) U2: if the SGSN does not have a previously 
stored authentication vector, it sends a 
sendAuthenticationInfo Request to HSS with 
IMSI=imsi. The protocol between SGSN and 
HSS is MAP (Mobile Application Part); 
3) U3: Upon receipt the request, the HSS uses 
IMSI=imsi to retrieve the user’s record and 
generate Authenticaion Vectors. One 
Authentication Vector includes RAND, XRES, 
CK (Cipher Key), IK (Integrity Key), AUTN. 
The AVs are ordered by sequence number; Then 
the HSS sends the ordered array of n 
Authentication vectors to the SGSN; 
4) U4: Upon receipt the ordered AVs, the 
SGSN stores the AVs, selects the next AV(i), and 
sends (RAND(i), AUTN(i)) to the user through a 
GMM Authentication and Ciphering Request; 
5) U5: The UE checks whether the received 
AUTN can be accepted. If so, it produces a 
response RES which is sent back to the SGSN 
through a GMM Authentication and Ciphering 
Response message; 
6) U6:  The SGSN compares the received RES 
with the XRES. If they match, the SGSN 
considers the authentication and key agreement 
exchange to be successfully completed and sends 
back the UE GMM Attach Accept to accept the 
Attach. 
B. IMS AKA Authentication 
After the GPRS attach and GPRS PDP Context 
activation, the UE can access the GPRS services 
and the packet data network. The UE may then 
invoke the IMS layer authentication to request 
the IMS service access. The IMS AKA 
authentication procedure is shown in Fig. 3 
which is defined in 3GPP TS 33.203 [12]. 
The IMS AKA authentication procedure 
includes: 
1) I1: After activation of the PDP context, the 
UE sends a SIP Register request to the PCSCF 
with IMPI=impi and security-setup line. The 
security–setup line is used to negotiate security 
association (SA) parameters with PCSCF to 
create SAs which includes Security Parameters 
Index (SPI), the port number chosen, and the 
supported integrity and encryption algorithms. 
 
Figure 3 IMS AKA autentication procedure 
2) I2, I3: PCSCF temporary stores the security-
setup parameters; removes the security-setup line 
from the packet and forwards it to SCSCF 
through ICSCF; 
  130 
3) I4: if the SCSCF does not have a previously 
stored authentication vector, it sends a 
Multimedia Auth Request to HSS with 
IMPI=impi through the Cx reference point; 
4) I5: Upon receipt the request, HSS uses 
IMPI=impi to retrieve the user’s record and 
generate Authenticaion Vectors (RAND, XRES, 
CK, IK, AUTN); then the HSS send the array of 
AVs to the SCSCF which is ordered by sequence 
number; 
5) I6, I7: The SCSCF stores the AVs, selects 
the next AV(i) and sends (IMPI, RAND, AUTN, 
CK, IK) back to ICSCF through SIP 401 
Unauthorized response; and ICSCF forwards it to 
PCSCF; 
6) I8: Upon receipt the message, the PCSCF 
keeps the received authentication challenges, 
selects security parameters for creating the SAs 
and sends the (Security-setup, IMPI, RAND, 
AUTN) to the UE;  
7) I9: The UE checks whether the received 
AUTN can be accepted. If so, it produces a 
response RES. On the other hand, the UE 
computes CK and IK, creates IPsec security 
associations which is used to protect the 
following SIP messages and sends SIP register 
message to PCSCF with the parameter Security-
setup and RES in the security channel; 
8) I10, I11: after PCSCF successfully checked 
the parameter of Security-setup, it would send the 
SIP Register packet to SCSCF through ICSCF 
with RES and integrity-protection=successful 
9) I12: Upon receipt of the SIP request with 
the RES from  the UE, SCSCF compares the 
received RES with the XRES. If they match, the 
SCSCF considers the authentication and key 
agreement exchange to be successfully 
completed and sends Server Assignment Request 
to HSS; 
10) I13: Upon receipt of the Server 
Assignment Request, the HSS stores the SCSCF 
name and replies a Cx Server Assignment 
Answer message to the SCSCF; 
11) I14, I15, I16: SCSCF sends SIP Register 
response 200 OK  to UE through ICSCF and 
PCSCF. 
 
IV. Improved one-pass 
authentication 
3GPP uses the duplicated two-pass AKA 
authentication to enable the end user to access 
IMS services because of the following two 
reasons: 
1) Two-pass authentication achieves mutual 
authentication when the IMPI and IMSI don’t 
have a one to one relationship. According to 
3GPP TS 23.228 [3] the relationship between 
IMPI and IMSI is shown in Figure 4; and 
2) Two-pass authentication is a good way to 
keep the IMS system layers independent because 
the network layer and the service layer complete 
authentication separately. 
 
Figure 4.  The relationship between IMPI and 
IMSI 
The proposed IAKA authentication binds the 
two AKA procedures by using the unified IMPI 
number which is defined in 3GPP TS 23.228[3]. 
If the unified IMPI is used as an index in the HSS 
to do AKA authentication, the generated AV are 
the same in the two procedures. Hence both of 
the UMTS network layer and IMS service layer 
could use the unified AV to do mutual security 
authentication. The proposed IAKA 
authentication could not only reduce the 
authentication time but also keep the features of 
the legacy two-pass authentication. 
A. The improved UMTS AKA authentication 
(initial authentication) 
Compared to the initial UMTS AKA 
authentication procedures in the legacy two-pass 
authentication which is shown in Figure 3, the 
proposed initial IAKA UMTS AKA 
authentication has the following improvements: 
1) In step U1: In order to access GPRS 
services, UE sends SGSN a GMM Attach 
Request with the parameter IMSI=imsi and 
IMPI=impi in which the parameter IMPI is 
optional; 
2) In step U3: Upon receipt the request, HSS 
uses IMPI=impi as an index to retrieve the user’s 
profile and generate AVs. If there isn’t IMPI in 
the request, IMPI=imsi; and 
3) In step U6:  The SGSN compares the 
received RES with the XRES. If they match, the 
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SGSN considers the authentication and key 
agreement exchange to be successfully 
completed, SGSN distribute the AV(i) to PCSCF. 
At the same time the SGSN sends back the UE 
GMM Attach Accept to accept the Attach 
request. 
After completing the initial authentication, the 
following has been achieved: ⑴The UE and the 
SGSN have authenticated each other; ⑴The AVs 
were generated by using the index IMPI 
(IMPI=imsi, if no IMPI is available); ⑴The 
SGSN stores the AVs; ⑴The UE has CK, IK to 
do further authentication; and ⑴he PCSCF has 
the AV(i) from SGSN. Because SGSN and 
PCSCF are located in the same network, it is 
assumed that it is secure  to distribute the AV(i) 
B. The improved IMS AKA authentication 
(second authentication) 
After the initial UMTS AKA authentication, 
both of the UE and the PCSCF have the same CK 
and IK which would be used in the second IMS 
AKA authentication to create IPSec security 
associations to transmit data safely. The 
procedure is shown in Figure 5 in which the first 
and second steps are used to negotiate the 
parameters of creating the security associations, 
and the step 3 to step 10 are used to do user 
registration in which all the SIP messages are 
integrity and confidentiality protected. 
1) II1: After activation of the PDP context, the 
UE and the PCSCF starts to negociate the 
parameters of creating the security associations. 
Firstly, the UE sends a SIP Register request to 
the PCSCF with the parameters of IMPI and 
security-setup. The security-setup line includes 
Security Parameters Index (SPI), the port number 
chosen, and the supported integrity and 
encryption algorithms which are used to create 
the SA.  
 
Figure 5  IMS AKA authentication procedure 
(IAKA) 
2) II2: Upon receipt of II1, the PCSCF selects 
the corresponding SPI, port number, supported 
integrity and encryption algorithms and sends 
them back to the UE through the parameter of 
security-setup in the packet of SIP REGISTER 
RESPONSE 401 Unauthorised.  
3) Upon receipt of II2, the UE creates the 
security association with the PCSCF by using the 
CK and IK obtained in the initial UMTS 
authentication and the following SIP messages 
would be integrity and confidentiality protected.  
4) II3, II4, II5: the UE sends a SIP REGISTER 
request with IMPI=impi to PCSCF. The PCSCF 
extracts the SIP request from the IPSec Security 
Association and forwards it to SCSCF through 
ICSCF; 
5) II4: Upon receipt the request, SCSCF sends 
a Cx Server Assignment Request to HSS with 
IMPI=impi; 
6) II5: HSS uses IMPI=impi as an index to 
retrieve the user’s profile and assign user’s 
status; and then it sends back a Cx Server 
Assignment Answer to SCSCF; 
7) II6, II7, and II8: if the registration is 
successful, the SCSCF sends a SIP 200 OK 
response to PCSCF through ICSCF, PCSCF 
sends the request to UE through IPSec Security 
association. 
V. IAKA AUTHENTICATION 
SIMULATION 
 
Figure 6  IAKA simulator system architecture 
Following the references 3GPP TS 23.060 [2] 
and 3GPP TS 23.228 [3], the IAKA simulation 
system was developed using Opnet Modeler V16 
and is shown in Figure 6. 
Two authentication scenarios were developed 
to permit comparison between the legacy two-
pass authentication and the proposed IAKA one-
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pass authentication. In the first scenario, the 
legacy two-pass authentication procedures were 
defined based on 3GPP TS 33.102 [9] and 3GPP 
TS33.203 [12], and the proposed IAKA 
authentication procedures were defined in the 
second scenario. The Opnet Modeler [15] 
definition of the IMS AKA for the two 
authentication algorithms is shown in Figure 7 
and Figure 8. 
 
Figure 7  IMS AKA procedure definition for two-
pass authentication 
 
Figure 8  IMS AKA procedure definition for 
IAKA authentication 
Two statistics were chosen to compare the 
results. The first is the task response time which 
is the time taken in the second step of the IMS 
AKA authentication. As shown in Figure 9, the 
average time is 2.483s in the legacy two-pass 
authentication, and the average time is 1.704s in 
the proposed IAKA authentication. The proposed 
IAKA algorithm reduced the IMS-AKA 
authentication time by up to 31.4%. 
 
Figure 9  IMS AKA task response time 
The second statistic is the application response 
time which is the time taken for the complete 
authentication process (UMTS AKA and IMS 
AKA). As shown in Figure 10, the average 
authentication time in the two-pass authentication 
is 3.254s, and the average authentication time in 
the proposed IAKA is 2.475s. The proposed 
IAKA algorithm reduced the complete UMTS 
IMS authentication by up to 24%. 
 
Figure 10  Application response time 
The performance results shown in Fig. 9 and 
Fig. 10 demonstrate that the proposed IAKA 
authentication algorithm out performs the legacy 
two-pass authentication. 
VI. Security Analysis 
The IAKA authentication process provides a 
robust secure mechanism that satisfies the 3GPP 
requirements. In this section the IAKA security 
approach is presented. 
A. Mutual Authentication between UE and 
PCSCF 
After the initial UMTS GPRS authentication, 
the UE, the SGSN, and the PCSCF have the same 
keys generated by the HSS by using the unified 
IMPI number. By using the shared keys, the UE 
and the PCSCF could do mutual authentication to 
ensure they are connecting to a trusted entity. 
Hence an adversary terminal couldn’t pretend to 
be a valid user to access IMS services and attack 
the network. Also, adversary terminals couldn’t 
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pretend to be a valid network device and attempt 
to get UE security information. 
B. Advanced security services 
Before exchanging confidential information on 
the network, there is an IPSec security 
association created between the UE and the 
PCSCF which provides confidentiality and 
integrity of data transmissions. The IPSec 
security association provides a secure data 
transmission tunnel to withstand eavesdropping. 
VII. IAKA authentication 
In the initial authentication, the HSS retrieves 
the UE profile and generates AVs by using IMPI 
as an index. After completing the first 
authentication, the UE, SGSN, and PCSCF share 
the AV. The AV is made up of RAND, XRES, 
CK, IK, and AUTN parameters. 
A cipher key CK = f3K (RAND) where f3 is a 
key generating function; 
An integrity key IK = f4K (RAND) where f4 is 
a key generating function; 
K is a pre-shared key between the HSS and the 
UE related to the unified IMPI number. 
In the second authentication, the UE and the 
PCSCF authenticate each other by using CK and 
IK, because CK and IK are derived from the 
same pre-shared key which is allocated to the 
user when the user subscribes to the service by 
using IMPI number. This means that only UE 
with a valid IMPI number, valid pre-shared key, 
and that have passed the initial authentication can 
register with the IMS system. Therefore, the 
proposed IAKA authentication procedure can be 
used to replace the legacy two-pass 
authentication procedure. 
VIII. Conclusion 
This paper presents a new IAKA 
authentication procedure which has the following 
features: (1) reduced authentication time; (2) 
reduced the AV calculation time within the HSS 
and the UE; (3) achieves the 3GPP security 
requirements; and (4) minimal impact on the 
existing system. The IAKA authentication 
procedure provides improved performance 
without compromising security. The research 
simulation model was based upon UMTS and 
future work is to extend the research to the other 
access network technology, such as Long Term 
Evolution and Next Generation Networks. 
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Abstract—The 4th generation (4G) mobile access 
network and the core network are evolving towards a 
secure, fast, and Internet Protocol-based network. With 
the emergence of next generation battery-powered smart 
mobile phone and open source application platforms, 
security and the terminal’s energy consumption have 
become big issues. Long Term Evolution (LTE) is one of 
the most popular 4G technologies defined by 3rd 
Generation Partnership Projects (3GPP). It is observed 
that the end user requires two authentication steps to 
access multimedia services. The first is the LTE network 
layer authentication, and the second is the IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS) service layer authentication. The 
authentication steps utilize energy and are carried out 
using the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) 
protocol. This paper proposes an Improved AKA (IAKA) 
authentication protocol which authenticates the user on 
both the network layer and the service layer without 
double execution the AKA protocol and simplifies the 
authentication steps. Furthermore, the security and 
energy consumption were analyzed and the results 
showed the proposed IAKA could save up to 81.82% of 
the terminal’s energy consumption related to 
authentication with increased security. 
 
Keywords—4G; Authentication; IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS); Long Term Evolution (LTE); 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA); Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP); Call Session Control Function 
(CSCF) . 
 
I. introduction 
The 4th Generation (4G) mobile access network 
and the core network are evolving towards a common 
IP based secure and fast transport layer. As a popular 
4G mobile technology Long Term Evolution (LTE) 
may provide up to 1Gbps peak data rate. Within the 
core network, the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is 
the candidate for providing the next generation wired 
and wireless Packet Switched Networks (PSN) with 
multimedia services (i.e., audio, video, text, image, 
and combinations). However, with the emergence of 
new battery-powered smart mobile phones and 
tablets, security and the terminal’s energy 
consumption have become more important issues 
[1][2]. It is observed that a LTE user device carries 
out two authentication steps to get access to the 
multimedia services and this increases authentication 
complexity and the terminal’s energy consumption.   
 
Figure1 LTE and IMS integrated system architecture 
 
LTE and IMS were both defined by 3rd Generation 
Partnership Projects (3GPP) and the integrated 
system architecture is shown in Fig. 1 [3] [4]. In 
order to access the multimedia services, LTE users 
have to be authenticated in both the LTE network 
layer and the IMS service layer. 
The LTE network layer authentication occurs first. 
After receiving the user’s request, the Mobility 
Management Entity (MME) sends a message to the 
Home Subscriber Server (HSS) to request an 
Authentication Vector (AV); the HSS generates the 
AV by using the user’s International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number and distributes the 
AV to the MME and the User Equipment (UE); and 
the UE and the MME authenticate each other by 
using the received AV. After a successful network 
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layer authentication, the terminal can access the LTE 
and packet data network. 
The second authentication is the IMS service layer 
authentication. Through the Proxy Call Session 
Control Function (PCSCF) and Interrogating CSCF 
(ICSCF), the terminal sends a request to the Serving 
CSCF (SCSCF); the SCSCF requests the AVs from 
the HSS which was generated by the user’s IP 
Multimedia Private-user Identity (IMPI) number; and 
then the SCSCF sends the AVs to the ICSCF, PCSCF 
and the terminal. The terminal and the network 
entities authenticate each other by using the received 
AV. After a successful service layer authentication, 
the terminal can access the multimedia services in 
IMS layer. 
This 3GPP defined authentication protocol suffers 
from two main limitations.  
Firstly, it increased the terminal’s energy 
consumption and the system complexity. The 3GPP 
defined authentication approach executed the 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol 
twice, once in each layer, including requesting, 
generating and distributing the AV and mutual 
authentication by using the received AV.  To the 
battery-powered mobile terminal which is very 
sensible to energy consumption, this approach brings 
high energy cost and reduces the terminal battery life. 
Secondly, the 3GPP defined authentication 
protocol is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DOS) 
attack. After receiving a request, the PCSCF/MME 
sends the request to the core network 
(ICSCF/SCSCF/HSS) to do authentication, which 
means, a malicious attack could flood the 
ICSCF/SCSCF/HSS by sending correct packets with 
invalid IMSI/IMPI numbers. 
In this paper, an Improved AKA (IAKA) 
authentication protocol is proposed to reduce energy 
consumption and increase security. A secure binding 
of the network layer and service layer authentication 
by using the IMPI number is used to avoid the double 
execution of the AKA protocol. Energy consumption 
and security were modeled and the results are 
provided in this paper. Results and analysis showed: 
(a) the proposed IAKA authentication protocol could 
reduce energy consumption by up to 81.82% in the 
IMS service layer and 39.13% across the two layers; 
and (b) the proposed IAKA approach can not only 
meet 3GPP defined security requirements but will 
also provide improved security against DOS attacks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section II is the related work; Section III 
describes the 3GPP defined security architecture; 
Section IV describes the proposed IAKA 
authentication protocol; Section V is the energy 
consumption analysis, Section VI provides an 
analysis of the security of the proposed IAKA; and 
Section VII provides a summary, conclusion and 
discussion of future work. 
II. Related Work 
Authentication is a very important aspect of access 
networks and research is constantly being carried out 
regarding next generation network design [5] … [12]. 
However the common limitation is either a lack of 
security or the need to authenticate on more than one 
network layer. In this section recent research into 
authentication is presented.   
Huang and Li [8] proposed a one-pass IMS AKA 
to replace the 3GPP defined IMS which could save 
45% of the authentication signaling and 76.5% of the 
storage space without compromising security. In the 
proposed mechanism, the terminal is responsible for 
generating a random number, IMS key, digest 
password, and digest response, distributing the AV to 
the server, and checking the digital password after 
receiving the REGISTER response. The SCSCF has 
to check the random number, generate digest 
password, Cipher key (CK), and Integrity Key (IK). 
Compared to the legacy IMS AKA, the proposed 
mechanism introduced extensive modification and 
increased complexity. 
Ntantogian et al. [12] proposed a generic 
mechanism for efficient authentication in Beyond 3rd 
Generation (B3G) networks to reduce the execution 
of the 3GPP defined multi-pass authentication steps 
by using a security binding mechanism. The 
proposed mechanism authenticates a user in the 
second and third step of a multi-pass authentication 
by using the user’s authentication credentials of the 
initial step. The proposed IMS service layer 
authentication used a (impi, imsi) pair to authenticate 
the user without the security protection between the 
UE and the PCSCF. However, this approach is very 
vulnerable to the fraudulent use of IMS services, 
eavesdropping attack, Fake server attack, and 
Temporary cheat. 
III. 3GPP security architecture 
A. 3GPP LTE key hierarchy 
In order to provide adequate security protection for 
different traffic flows, 3GPP LTE introduced the key 
hierarchy.  
As shown in Fig. 2 [14], K is the pre-shared key 
passed between the UE and the HSS. K is used to 
generate CK and IK and kept in the Universal 
Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) of the UE and 
the Authentication Center (AuC) of the HSS. 
KASME is derived from CK and IK by HSS and sent 
to MME, and then, KASME is stored in the MME 
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and is used to derive five keys for protection of three 
different flow types. 
 
Figure2 LTE key hierarchy 
Non Access Stratum (NAS) signaling between the 
terminal and the MME is confidentiality and integrity 
protected by KNASenc and KNASint. The traffic between 
the terminal and the eNB is confidentiality and 
integrity protected by KRRCenc and KRRCint. And the 
user plane data between the terminal and the SGW is 
protected by KUPenc. 
B. 3GPP IMS key hierarchy 
As shown in Fig. 3 [15], IMS uses the two level 
key hierarchy to protect traffic which is a subset of 
the LTE five level key hierarchy. In IMS, the HSS 
generates CK and IK by using the pre-shared key K 
and distributes them to SCSCF and PCSCF. The 
traffic between the terminal and the PCSCF is 
confidentiality and integrity protected by CK and IK. 
 
Figure3 IMS key hierarchy 
IV. Improved AKA Authentication 
Since the 4G LTE and IMS network could provide 
voice, video and data services in one IP-based 
network, the IMPI number could be used in both of 
the network layer and service layer to do registration, 
authorization, administration and accounting. This 
paper proposes IAKA, an improved authentication 
protocol, which provides a secure binding of the 
network layer and service layer authentication by 
using the IMPI number which avoids the double 
execution of the AKA authentication protocol. 
Furthermore, in order to enhance the security and 
improve the compatibility between the LTE and IMS, 
a 4 layer key hierarchy is proposed. As the results 
show, the proposed IAKA could save the terminal’s 
energy consumption significantly with enhanced 
security. 
A. The proposed IMS key hierarchy 
 
Figure4 proposed IMS key hierarchy 
The proposed IMS four layer key hierarchy is 
shown in Fig. 4. Compared to the original two layer 
key hierarchy, the intermediate key KASME is used to 
derive KPCSCFenc and  KPCSCFint to  protect the traffic 
between the UE and the PCSCF with a particular 
encryption or integrity algorithm. 
KPCSCFenc = KDF (KASME , s) (1) 
KPCSCFint = KDF (KASME , s) (2) 
Where KDF is key derivation function and s is the 
input string to the KDF. P0 is a part to construct input 
string s which needs to be extended to support the 
key derivation of KPCSCFenc and  KPCSCFint as shown in 
Table I. 
Table I Algorithm Type distinguishers 
Algorithm 
distinguisher 
Value 
PCSCF_enc_alg 0x06 
PCSCF_int_alg 0x07 
 
B. The improved EPS AKA authentication 
When the mobile terminal is powered on, it 
invokes the Attach procedure to access the LTE 
network. The Evolved Packet System (EPS) AKA 
[14] is triggered by the Attach procedure to provide 
mutual authentication and agree on key KASME.  
The 3GPP defined EPS AKA authentication 
protocol utilizes the IMSI number as the identity to 
do authentication [14]. The improved EPS AKA 
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authentication protocol presented in this paper 
supports mutual authentication by using the IMPI 
number within the HSS to generate AV. The 
procedure is shown in Fig. 5.   
 
Figure 5 Improved LTE EPS AKA autentication procedure 
1) IE1: In order to access the LTE network, the UE 
sends an Attach Request to the MME with IMPI 
number through the NAS protocol.  
2) IE2: If there isn’t a valid AV in the MME, the 
MME sends an Authentication Information Request 
(AIR) to the HSS to fetch the AV by using the 
Diameter protocol. 
3) IE3: The HSS uses the IMPI number to fetch the 
user’s profile; generate the AV (RAND, AUTN, 
XRES, KASME); and send the AV back to the MME. 
4) IE4: After receiving the AV from the HSS, the 
MME sends Authentication Request (RAND, AUTN, 
KSIASME) to the UE to start the authentication 
procedure. KSI is Key Set Identifier which is used to 
identify KASME. 
5) IE5: After receiving the Authentication Request, 
The UE checks the authentication code AUTN first. 
If this is a valid AUTN number, the terminal 
considers this is a trusted network entity and keeps 
working with it. Then, the UE calculates RES 
number and sends it back to the MME. 
6) IE6: The MME checks whether the RES from 
the UE matches the XRES from the HSS, if they 
match, the MME considers that the authentication 
and key agreement exchange is successfully 
completed and sends a message back to the UE to 
accept the Attach request. 
After a successful IAKA EPS authentication, the 
UE and the MME have completed the authentication 
steps and have the same KASME which is used to 
derive more keys for different security protection 
purposes. 
 
C. The improved IMS AKA authentication 
The improved IMS layer authentication is shown 
in Fig.6. Steps II1 and II4 are used to build security 
associations; steps II2 and II3 are for AV 
synchronization; and steps II5 to II12 are used to do 
authentication and all of the SIP messages are 
integrity and confidentiality protected by using IPSec 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)[18]. 
 
Figure 6 The improved IMS AKA autentication procedure 
1) II1: After creation of the EPS bearer, the UE 
sends a SIP REGISTER request to the PCSCF to 
negotiate the parameters of building SAs with the 
IMPI number, Global Unique Temporary Identity 
(GUTI) number and security-setup line. The security-
setup line includes the parameters to build the IPSec 
SAs; 
2) II2: The PCSCF derives the MME address from 
GUTI and sends a Context Request to the MME to 
fetch the AV with IMPI and GUTI. The protocol 
between the PCSCF and the MME is the GTP [16] 
and the security is defined in [17]. 
3) II3: The MME obtains the user’s AV by using 
GUTI number and sends the AV back to the PCSCF; 
4) II4: Upon receipt of the AV from the MME, the 
PCSCF chooses the parameters to build the SA, uses 
the parameters to construct the security-setup line; 
and sends it back to the UE. Then the PCSCF derives 
two keys KPCSCFenc and the KPCSCFint; 
5) II5: The UE derives KPCSCFenc and KPCSCFint 
and builds the IPSec SAs; then it sends the SIP 
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REGISTER request to the PCSCF through the IPSec 
SA; 
6) II6: The PCSCF checks the received SIP packet 
by decryption and calculation the integrity code. If 
this is a valid packet, the PCSCF forwards it to the 
ICSCF; 
7) II7: The ICSCF fetches the user and the SCSCF 
information from the HSS, locates the SCSCF 
address, and sends the packet to the SCSCF; 
8) II8: The SCSCF sends a Server Assignment 
Request to HSS with IMPI=impi by using the 
Diameter protocol; 
9) II9: The HSS fetches the use’s profile and 
assigns  status by using the IMPI number, and then 
sends the Server Assignment Answer back to the 
SCSCF; 
10) II10 and II11: The SCSCF sends the SIP 
response to the ICSCF and the ICSCF forwards it to 
the PCSCF. 
11) II12: By using IPSec, the PCSCF sends the 
packet to the UE and the UE authenticates the 
PCSCF by checking the ICV (Integrity Checking 
Value) of the packet. If this is a valid ICV code, the 
network entity passes the authentication and 
continues interacting with the terminal. 
A comparison of the IMS layer authentication of 
the proposed IAKA and the 3GPP defined approach 
is provided in TABLE II. The comparison identifies 
the proposed IAKA would simplify the 
authentication procedures significantly.  
IMS layer authentication comparison  
IAKA 3GPP 
SIP Register (UE-
>PCSCF)  
SIP Register (UE->PCSCF, 
 PCSCF ->ICSCF, ICSCF-
>SCSCF) 
- 
Diameter Multimedia Auth 
Request 
(SCSCF->HSS)  
Obtaining AV from 
MME 
(PCSCF->MME,  
MME->PCSCF) 
- 
- Calculation of AVs by HSS 
- 
Diameter Multimedia Auth 
Answer 
(HSS->SCSCF) 
- Storing of AVs by SCSCF 
SIP response 401 
UNAUTHORIZED 
(PCSCF->UE) 
SIP response 401 
UNAUTHORIZED  
(SCSCF->ICSCF, ICSCF-
>PCSCF, PCSCF->UE) 
 
- 
Verification of AUTN and 
calculation of RES number by 
UE 
Creating IPSec SAs Creating IPSec SAs 
SIP Register (UE-
>PCSCF, 
PCSCF->ICSCF,  
ICSCF->SCSCF) 
SIP Register (UE->PCSCF, 
 PCSCF ->ICSCF, ICSCF-
>SCSCF) 
- 
Compare RES and XRES by 
SCSCF 
Diameter Server 
Assignment Request / 
Answer (SCSCF->HSS, 
HSS->SCSCF) 
Diameter Server Assignment 
Request / Answer (SCSCF-
>HSS, HSS->SCSCF) 
SIP REGISTER 
response 200OK 
(SCSCF->ICSCF, 
ICSCF->PCSCF, 
PCSCF->UE) 
SIP REGISTER response 
200OK 
(SCSCF->ICSCF, ICSCF-
>PCSCF, PCSCF->UE) 
 
V. Energy Cost Analysis 
In this section, the energy cost of the user 
terminal’s authentication related security activities 
was calculated. It is shown that the IAKA 
authentication protocol could save 81.82% of the 
energy consumption in IMS layer authentication and 
save 39.13% of the terminal’s energy consumption in 
both the network layer and service layer. 
For the 3GPP defined and proposed IAKA 
authentication protocols, the terminal’s security 
activities include the execution of the EPS AKA and 
the IMS AKA authentication protocol. Therefore, E = 
EEPS-AKA + EIMS-AKA where E denotes the 
energy consumption.  
In the 3GPP defined authentication protocol, the 
terminal’s energy cost to execute the EPS AKA 
authentication protocol includes (a) checking the 
AUTN number which is made up of generating AK 
and MAC (b) generating the RES number, and (c) 
generating CK, IK and deriving KASME as shown in 
(3). 
E3GPP-EPS-AKA = EAK + EMAC  + ERES + ECK + EIK + 
EKASME (3) 
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The energy cost to execute the IMS AKA 
authentication protocol is shown in (4). 
E3GPP-IMS-AKA = EAK + EMAC  + ERES + ECK + EIK 
 (4) 
For the IMS layer, the IPSec energy consumption 
wasn’t considered because IPSec is mainly used for 
message transmission and it is the same in the two 
approaches. This paper uses the AV generation 
functions f1, f2, f3, f4, f5 defined in [19] to generate 
Message Authentication Code (MAC), RES, CK, IK, 
Anonymity Key (AK), and choose Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) as the kernel encryption 
algorithm. Also, HMAC-SHA-256 is used as the key 
derivation function to derive KASME, KPCSCFint, and 
KPCSCFenc. For the energy consumption calculation, 
only the energy used in encryption is considered. The 
security operations of bitwise exclusive-OR and 
bitwise rotation aren’t calculated as they won’t affect 
the results significantly. The energy consumption of 
AES and HMAC was studied in [1], and the results 
showed the energy consumption of the AES 
algorithm is made up of two phases, the first is in the 
key setup phase EKEY-SETUP which is 7.87 µJ and 
the second is in the encryption/decryption phase 
EENC/DEC. In the encryption/decryption phase, the 
energy consumption per byte (EPB) is 1.21 µJ and 
for the HMAC-SHA-256, the EPB is 1.16 µJ. 
Therefore the energy can be calculated as shown in 
(5) and (6). 
EAES (n) = 7.87 µJ + 1.21 µJ * n (5) 
EHMAC (n) = 1.16 µJ * n  (6) 
where n is the length of the input string in bytes. 
Although the MAC, RES, CK, IK, and AK have 
different lengths, they were all generated by 
encrypting 16 byte data blocks three times. 
Therefore, referring to (5), EAK = EMAC  = ERES = ECK 
= EIK = 81.69  µJ. For KASME, KPCSCFint, and KPCSCFenc, 
they were derived by using 32 byte data blocks so the 
energy consumption is 37.12 µJ by using (6).  For the 
3GPP defined authentication protocol, referring to (3) 
and (4), (a) E3GPP-EPS-AKA = 445.57 µJ, and (b) E3GPP-
IMS-AKA = 408.45 µJ. 
For the improved IAKA authentication protocol, 
the LTE network layer energy consumption is same 
as it in the 3GPP approach which is 445.57 µJ (EIAKA-
EPS-AKA = 445.57 µJ). The energy cost of the IMS 
service layer includes key derivation of KPCSCFint and 
KPCSCFenc by using HMAC-SHA-256 which is 74.24 
µJ (EIAKA-IMS-AKA = 74.24 µJ).  
ESRI-IMS AKA = (E3-IMS-AKA - EI-IMS-AKA) / E3-IMS-AKA 
*100% (7) 
ESRIAKA = (E3GPP - EIAKA) / E3GPP *100% (8) 
By using (7) and (8), ESRI-IMS AKA = 81.82% and 
ESRIAKA = 39.13%. This means that by using the 
improved authentication protocol, the terminal could 
save 81.82% of IMS layer security related activity 
energy consumption; and save 39.13% of the security 
activity energy consumption in both the network 
layer authentication and the IMS service layer 
authentication by using the improved authentication 
protocol. 
 
Figure 7 Energy consumption comparison 
VI. Security Analysis 
A. Authentication accuracy and mutual 
authentication 
In the proposed IAKA authentication protocol, the 
UE and the network authenticate each other in both 
of the network layer and IMS service layer. Only 
terminals and the network entities with a valid key 
identified by the impi number can pass authentication 
and build a trust relationship. 
At the network layer, the UE authenticates 
correctly using the impi number. It is assumed there 
is a mobile terminal with IMPI = impi and a pre-
shared key K = kue, and a network entity with a pre-
shared key K = khss. Firstly, the network entity 
generates a random number RAND and 
authentication code AUTN and sends them to the UE. 
AUTN = SQN ⊕ AK || AMF || MAC (9) 
MAC = f1 (SQN || RAND || AMF, K) (10) 
Where SQN is the sequence number, AMF is 
authentication management field, f1 is the message 
authentication function and K is the key used. After 
receiving the packet, the UE gets MAC from the 
AUTN, calculates its own XMAC, and compares 
them. If MAC is equal to XMAC, the network entity 
passes the authentication and continues interacting 
with the terminal. Only the network entity with a 
correct key khss identified by the terminal’s IMPI 
number could generate the MAC which is equal to 
the XMAC generated by the terminal by using the 
key kue = khss, otherwise, XMAC ≠ MAC, and the 
terminal will reject the network’s authentication 
request.  
The network also can authenticate the terminal 
correctly on the network layer by checking the RES 
number according to (11). 
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RES=f2 (RAND, K)  (11) 
Where f2 is a message authentication function and 
K is the pre-shared key identified by IMPI number. 
To the MME, if the RES received from the terminal 
equals to the XRES received from the HSS, the 
terminal passes the authentication and has the right to 
access the network. For an invalid terminal with a 
stored key kue ≠ khss, its generated RES must be 
different with the XRES generated by the HSS by 
using a different khss. Therefore, the MME won’t let 
the terminal access the network resources. 
On the IMS service layer, the UE and the Network 
entity could authenticate each correctly by checking 
the Integrity Checking Value (ICV) received in SIP 
Register request/response packets encapsulated by 
IPSec ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) protocol 
as shown in (12). 
ICV = fint (KPCSCFint, M)  (12) 
Where fint is the integrity code generation function 
and M is the input string used to generate ICV. For 
the IPSec ESP protocol, the input string M is the ESP 
packet minus the ICV. The IMS service layer 
authentication is performed in the PCSCF and the 
terminal. After a successful network layer 
authentication, the valid terminal and PCSCF have 
the same key KASME to derive KPCSCFint to protect the 
data transmitted between them and KPCSCFintue = 
KPCSCFinthss. For the sender (UE/ PCSCF), it calculates 
the ICV by using the key KPCSCFint, placing the ICV at 
the end of the ESP packet and sending the packet to 
the receiver. After receiving the packet, the receiver 
(PCSCF/ UE) gets the ICV from the last part of the 
ESP packet, calculates the XICV by using the key 
KPCSCFint and compares the ICV and the XICV. If the 
ICV is equal to the XICV, the sender passes 
authentication and continues interacting with the 
receiver.  Without a successful network layer 
authentication, the UE and the PCSCF won’t have the 
same KASME identified by the IMPI number to derive 
the same KPCSCFint and generate the same integrity 
checking code ICV to pass the authentication. 
Therefore, in the proposed IAKA authentication 
protocol, the UE and the PCSCF authenticate each 
other correctly in the IMS service layer. 
B. Confidential and integrity protection 
The proposed IAKA supports confidential and 
integrity protection of the messages transmitted 
between the UE and the PCSCF to avoid the 
disclosure of confidential information. The network 
layer security isn’t discussed here for it is the same as 
the 3GPP definition. 
For the IMS service layer, as shown in Fig. 6, after 
parameter negotiation, two IPSec SA pairs are 
created to protect the information transmitted 
between the terminal and the PCSCF. All of the 
information transmitted in IPSec SAs is encrypted by 
the symmetric encryption algorithm. For the sender, 
encrypted text = fenc (plain text, KPCSCFenc) where 
fenc is the symmetric encryption function. Only the 
receiver with the same key KPCSCFenc can decrypt the 
message. 
The messages between the terminal and the 
PCSCF are also integrity protected by using the ICV 
number. By using (12), (a) the received ICV = fint 
(KPCSCFint, msent), (b) the calculated XICV = fint 
(KPCSCFint, mreceived), and (c) msent ≠ mreceived, if the 
received message is incomplete or it is modified in 
transit. This is a complete message if the received 
ICV equals the calculated XICV. Otherwise, with the 
correct key KPCSCFint and ICV ≠ XICV, the message is 
incomplete. 
C. Possible Attacks 
This section analyzed how the proposed IAKA 
prevents the replay attack and DOS attack. Firstly, 
the proposed IAKA avoids replay attacks in the 
network and service layers. At the network layer, an 
adversary might sit between the terminal and the 
MME and capture packets passing between them. 
The adversary might capture the (RAND, AUTN) 
and send it to the terminal. After receiving the faked 
packet, the terminal checks the SQN which is a part 
of the AUTN and the value should be different in 
different sessions. If the received SQN is equal to the 
SQN accepted previously, the terminal considers the 
packet to be an invalid packet and sends an error 
message to the server. Therefore, the faked server 
couldn’t carry out a replay attack on the terminal get 
confidential information. Secondly, the faked server 
might capture RES and send it to the MME, however, 
the adversary couldn’t pass a check of the RES 
number. In each new session, the MME receives 
XRES from the HSS which is generated by using the 
key and the new random number RAND. If the 
received RES from the terminal doesn’t match the 
new XRES from the HSS in this session, the MME 
will reject the terminal’s request and close the 
session. Therefore, in the network layer, the 
adversary couldn’t carry out a replay attack on the 
server and get access to the network. At the service 
layer, all of the packets transmitted between the 
terminal and the PCSCF are protected by the IPSec 
ESP protocol. Sequence number is a field in the ESP 
packet used to prevent a replay attack. Upon 
receiving a packet, the receiver (UE/PCSCF) verifies 
the sequence number first to make sure this is not a 
duplicated packet. If it is, the receiver will discard the 
packet and send an error message back to the sender. 
Therefore, the adversary could not achieve a replay 
attack by sending captured packets in the service 
layer to get access to confidential information. 
The proposed IAKA has a higher security level 
against DOS attacks than the legacy 3GPP 
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authentication protocol. For the improved IAKA 
authentication, it is assumed that the adversary is 
trying to flood the core network by sending SIP 
Register request with a valid IMPI number which 
belongs to a subscriber. Firstly, if the subscriber 
hasn’t registered with the LTE network and there is 
no AV stored in the MME, the PCSCF can’t get the 
authentication vectors from the MME and keep on 
serving the terminal. Secondly, if the subscriber has 
registered with the LTE network, the adversary will 
be asked to transmit information from the IPSec SAs. 
Without the correct pre-shared key, the messages sent 
by the adversary can’t get past the PCSCF and reach 
the core network. Therefore, the adversary cannot 
jeopardize the core ICSCF / SCSCF / HSS servers. 
The DOS attack can only reach the PCSCF and the 
MME and the core network is fully protected. 
VII. Conclusion 
The paper proposes a green and secure 
authentication protocol for the 4th generation LTE 
and IMS integrated system which reduces the 
authentication procedures significantly by a secure 
binding of the network and service layer 
authentication using the IMPI number.  An in-depth 
analysis of the energy consumption and security was 
provided and it is shown that the proposed IAKA 
authentication protocol could save up to 81.82% of 
the energy consumption for the IMS layer 
authentication with increased security. Future 
research work will focus on performance analysis. 
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Abstract—Long Term Evolution (LTE) is a 4th 
generation mobile network system technology. The 
core network is evolving towards a converged packet 
framework for all services and the Internet Protocol 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) provides multimedia 
services over packet switched networks. As defined by 
3rd Generation Partnership Projects (3GPP), in order 
to access the multimedia services, LTE users require 
authentication in the LTE network layer and the IMS 
service layer by using similar Authentication and Key 
Agreement protocol (AKA) transactions. The 
requirement for two AKA transactions increases 
authentication delay and the terminal’s energy 
consumption. This paper proposes an Improved AKA 
(IAKA) authentication protocol which binds the two 
layer’s authentication procedures by using the 
Internet Protocol Multimedia Private-User Identity as 
a link between the LTE network layer and the IMS 
service layer. The proposed algorithm significantly 
reduces the authentication process complexity. 
Simulations were carried out for the IAKA and the 
original 3GPP defined AKA authentication protocols. 
Results including security, performance and energy 
consumption are presented. The results showed that 
by using IAKA a reduction of up to 38% of the IMS 
layer authentication delay is possible, and a saving of 
39.13% of the terminal’s energy consumption occurs 
with increased security. 
 
Index Terms—4G; Authentication; IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS); Long Term Evolution (LTE); 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA); Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP); Call Session Control 
Function (CSCF) . 
 
I. Introduction 
Driven by the rapid growth in mobile broadband 
networks and the insatiable bandwidth 
requirements of new applications, mobile networks 
are evolving towards converged Internet Protocol 
(IP) based 4th generation (4G) mobile broadband 
networks. As a major 4G technology, Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) aims to provide a high data rate, 
low latency and all IP mobile networks. 
Correspondingly, the core network is evolving 
towards a converged packet-based framework for 
all services. As a part of the evolved core network 
the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) provides 
multimedia services (audio, video, text, image, and 
combinations) over Packet Switched Networks 
(PSN) for wired and wireless access networks.  
IMS was first specified by 3GPP (3rd Generation 
Partnership Projects) in 2003 for the 3rd generation 
(3G) network, and it was extended to fixed network 
by TISPAN (Telecommunication and Internet 
converged Services and Protocols for Advanced 
Networking) as a subsystem of NGNs (Next 
Generation Networks). As defined, a subscriber has 
to have different identities for different access 
networks and core network, i.e., IMSI 
(International Mobile Subscriber Identity) for 
mobile network and IMPI (IP Multimedia Private-
User Identity) for IP core network, therefore, a 
subscriber has to pass at least two layers 
authentication to access the data services. The 
reasons for this approache are (1) improve access-
network independent, (2) ensure the security and 
QoS (Quality of Service) of the IP packet layer. 
This approach is quite necessary in the 3G network 
since the voice service and data services are 
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separated, but it becomes quite redundant in the 4G 
network since all of the services (voice and data) 
are based on IP network. 
As defined by 3GPP, a LTE user has to be 
authenticated twice to access the service layer. The 
first authentication step is the LTE layer 
authentication which enables the user to access the 
LTE and packet data network by checking the 
user’s IMSI number; and the second authentication 
step is the IMS service layer authentication which 
authenticates the user by checking the user’s IMPI 
number to enable the user to access the services 
(voice and data). It was observed that the two 
authentication steps use the same Authentication 
and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol including 
requesting, generation and distribution of the 
Authentication Vectors (AV), and mutual 
authentication by using the received AVs which 
increases the system’s authentication delay and the 
terminal’s energy consumption. 
In order to reduce the overhead, an Improved 
AKA (IAKA) authentication protocol was 
proposed which binds the two authentication steps 
by using the user’s IMPI number without double 
execution of the AKA protocol. In the proposed 
IAKA, the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) 
generates the AV by using the IMPI number and 
distributes the AV to the User Equipment (UE), the 
Mobility Management Entity (MME), and the 
Proxy Call Session Control Function (PCSCF). In 
both of the network layer authentication and the 
service layer authentication, the terminal and the 
network entities authenticate each other by using 
the same AV generated by the HSS using the IMPI 
number. 
The security, performance and energy 
consumption of the proposed IAKA was analyzed 
and the results are presented in this paper. The 
results demonstrate that the IAKA provides 
adequate authentication, supports mutual 
authentication, and implements confidential and 
integrity message protection. Furthermore, two 
possible security attacks are discussed in this paper: 
(1) replay attack; and (2) Denial of Service (DOS) 
attack. The proposed IAKA algorithm protects the 
system from the malicious replay attack and 
provides stronger protection against the DOS attack 
than the legacy 3GPP approach. An OPNET 
simulation model was developed to simulate the 
proposed IAKA algorithm and the 3GPP 
authentication protocols under different scenarios. 
The simulation results showed that the proposed 
IAKA algorithm simplified the authentication 
protocol significantly and reduced the IMS layer 
authentication delay by up to 38%. The terminal 
energy consumption used in the authentication and 
security activities was calculated and the results 
showed the proposed IAKA algorithm could save 
up to 81.82% in the IMS service layer 
authentication and save up to 39.13% in the 
combined two layer authentication process. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section II is the related work found in the 
literature; Section III provides the background 
technologies and the 3GPP defined AKA 
authentication protocols; Section IV introduces the 
proposed IAKA authentication protocol; Section V 
provides a comprehensive comparison between the 
proposed IAKA and the legacy 3GPP approach for 
security, performance and energy consumption; and 
Section VI provides a summary, conclusion and 
discussion of future work. 
II. Related Work 
Due to the importance of authentication research 
has been carried out with the aim of improving 
authentication efficiency [1]-[9]. Related work 
found in the literature focused on the 3G network 
[1]-[7] or network layer authentication [1], [3], [6], 
[8]. Ntantogian et al. carried out research focused 
on reducing overhead in the network and service 
layer for 4th generation networks [9]; however, the 
approach suffers from security issues. 
Ntantogian et al. proposed a generic mechanism 
for efficient authentication in Beyond 3rd 
Generation (B3G) networks that attempted to 
reduce the execution of the 3GPP defined multi-
pass authentication steps by using a security 
binding mechanism [9]. The proposed mechanism 
authenticates a user in the second and third step of 
multi-pass authentication by using the user’s 
authentication credentials from the initial step. The 
proposed IMS service layer authentication used an 
(IMSI, IMPI) pair to authenticate the user without 
security protection between the UE and the PCSCF. 
However, this approach suffers the following 
vulnerabilities: (a) Lack of mutual authentication. 
In the proposed IMS layer authentication, the 
terminal doesn’t support the server authentication. 
Therefore, an adversary can pretend to be the 
PCSCF/ICSCF (Interrogating CSCF) /SCSCF 
(Serving CSCF) /HSS servers to get the user’s 
confidential information. (b) Lack of confidential 
and integrity protection. The proposed IMS layer 
authentication doesn’t support the confidential and 
integrity protection of the messages transmitted 
between the Packet Data Gateway (PDG) and the 
PCSCF which makes it very vulnerable to the 
eavesdropping or man in the middle attack. (c) 
Vulnerable to the replay attack. It is assumed the 
adversary is between the PDG and the PCSCF and 
captures packets transmitted between the two. The 
adversary can initiate a replay attack by using 
captured packets to send a SIP Register request 
with the (IMPI, IMSI) pair to the server. Since the 
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SCSCF only checks whether the IMSI received 
from the terminal equals the IMSI received from 
the HSS, with the captured correct (IMPI, IMSI) 
pair, the adversary will successfully pass the 
authentication step and gain access to the service 
layer. The adversary can pretend to be the IMS 
servers and send the captured SIP 200 OK response 
to the terminal. Without the right security 
protection, the terminal will create a trust session 
with fake server and send confidential information 
to it. The proposed IMS layer authentication is very 
vulnerable to replay attacks. (d) Vulnerable to 
Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks.  It is assumed 
that an adversary sends a SIP Register request with 
an IMPI number which belongs to a valid user to 
the PCSCF. The PCSCF would forward this packet 
to the ICSCF, the SCSCF, and the HSS.  Therefore, 
the adversary could flood the core network and 
jeopardize the whole system. 
III. Background 
A. Architecture 
 
Figure1 LTE and IMS integrated system architecture 
 
The LTE and IMS integrated system architecture 
is shown in Fig. 1 [10], [11] and the system 
component functionalities are briefly described 
here to provide a guide that will assist with 
understanding the proposed IAKA authentication 
protocol: (a) Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio 
Access Network (E-UTRAN) consists of Evolved 
Node B (eNB) and provides OSI reference model 
layer 1 and layer 2 features; (b) MME controls the 
Evolved Packet System (EPS) mobility 
management and EPS session management; (c) The 
Serving Gateway (SGW) which serves as a 
mobility anchor routing and forwarding packets 
between eNBs and between eNB and Packet Data 
Network Gateway (PGW); (d) The PGW provides 
access to the external packet data network; (e) The 
Proxy CSCF (PCSCF) is the first contact point in 
the IMS; (f) The Interrogating CSCF (ICSCF) is 
used to hide the network’s topology and its main 
task is to identify the relevant SCSCF; (g) The 
Serving CSCF (SCSCF) performs the session 
control services for the UE; and (h) The HSS is the 
central database for the whole system and contains 
subscription-related information. 
B. LTE EPS AKA authentication 
LTE EPS AKA is used to provide mutual 
authentication between the terminal and the 
network and agree on a key KASME which is 
stored in the MME and used to derive further keys 
for protection of different traffic flow types. The 
triggering of the LTE EPS AKA procedure could 
be due to tracking area updates. In most cases, the 
EPS AKA authentication is performed in the attach 
procedure when the user terminal is switched on 
and requests access to packet services. 
The EPS AKA procedure is shown in Fig. 2 [10], 
[12], [13] and includes: 
• E1: In order to register with the LTE 
network to receive services, the UE initiates an 
Attach Request to the MME with the IMSI number 
using the Non Access Stratum (NAS) protocol; 
• E2: If there aren’t valid AV in the MME, 
the MME will send Authentication Information 
Request (AIR) to the HSS to fetch AV by using the 
Diameter protocol; 
• E3: Upon receipt of the request, the HSS 
uses the IMSI number to fetch the user’s profile 
and generates AV (RAND, AUTN, XRES, 
KASME); then the HSS sends the AV back to the 
MME by using the Authentication Information 
Answer (AIA) command message. 
• E4: Upon AV receipt from the HSS, the 
MME initiates the authentication procedure by 
sending an Authentication Request to the UE which 
contains the parameter of RAND, AUTN and 
KSIASME. Key Set Identifier (KSI) is used to 
identify KASME. 
• E5: The UE checks the received 
authentication token AUTN first. If the AUTN can 
be accepted, the UE considers that the MME has 
passed the authentication correctly. After the 
successful AUTN verification, the UE will 
calculate the response (RES) number and send it 
back to the MME by using a Authentication 
Response message; 
• E6:  The MME checks whether the RES 
from the UE matches the XRES from the HSS, if 
they match, the MME considers that the 
authentication and key agreement exchange has 
successfully completed and sends back Attach 
Accept to the UE. 
IMS Core Network 
AS 
UE 
eNB 
MME HSS 
PGW PCSCF ICSCF SCSCF 
SGW 
EPC E-UTRAN 
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Figure 2.  LTE EPS AKA autentication procedure 
C. IMS AKA authentication 
After a successful LTE network layer 
authentication and the creation of the EPS bearer, 
the terminal is eligible to access the packet 
network. In order to access the IMS services, the 
user has to complete IMS layer authentication and 
the procedures are shown in Fig. 3 [11], [12], [14]. 
• I1: After the successful creation of the 
EPS bearer, the UE sends a REGISTER request to 
the PCSCF using the SIP protocol. The SIP 
REGISTER request incorporates parameters 
including IMPI and security-setup line in which the 
security–setup line is used to create security 
associations (SA) with PCSCF. 
• I2, I3: The PCSCF stores the security-
setup parameters; removes the security-setup line 
from the packet and forwards it to the ICSCF.  The 
ICSCF fetches the user and the SCSCF information 
from the HSS, locates the address of the next hop 
SCSCF and forwards the packet to the SCSCF. 
• I4: After receiving the SIP REGISTER 
request, the SCSCF checks whether it has a 
previously stored AV. If it hasn’t, the SCSCF sends 
a Multimedia Authentication Request to the HSS 
with the IMPI using the Diameter protocol. 
• I5: The HSS uses the IMPI number to 
fetch the user’s information and generate AVs 
(RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN); then sends the 
AVs back to the SCSCF. 
• I6, I7: The SCSCF stores the AVs, selects 
the next AV(i) and sends it back to the PCSCF 
through the ICSCF. 
• I8: The PCSCF keeps the received AV, 
selects parameters for creating the SAs and sends 
the packet with parameters including security-setup 
line, IMPI, RAND, and AUTN to the UE.  
• I9: After receiving the SIP REGISTER 
response, the UE checks the validity of the AUTN. 
If this is a valid AUTN, the UE generates RES, 
calculates the CK and the IK, and creates the IPSec 
security association to protect the following SIP 
messages, and then it sends a SIP REGISTER 
message to the PCSCF with parameters including 
security-setup and RES in the security channel.  
• I10, I11: After the received packet passes 
PCSCF validity checking, the PCSCF sends the 
SIP REGISTER packet to the SCSCF through the 
ICSCF with RES and integrity-
protection=successful. 
• I12: The SCSCF compares the received 
RES from the UE with the XRES received from the 
HSS. If RES and XRES match, the SCSCF 
considers the AKA is successfully completed and 
sends a Server Assignment Request to the HSS. 
• I13, I14, I15, and I16: After receiving a 
response from the HSS, the SCSCF sends a SIP 
REGISTER response 200 OK to the UE through 
the ICSCF and the PCSCF. 
 
Figure 3.  IMS AKA autentication procedure 
 
UE MME 
E1: NAS. Attach Request E2: Diameter. Authentication 
Information Request (IMSI) 
E3: Diameter. Authentication 
Information Answer   
E4: NAS. Authentication Request
(RAND, AUTN, KSIASME) 
Verify AUTN and Compute RES 
E5: NAS. Authentication 
Response, (RES) 
Compare RES and XRES 
E6: NAS. Attach Accept 
HSS 
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D. IMS AKA authentication requirement 
It is necessary to apply IMS AKA authentication 
in a LTE IMS system, although the AKA protocol 
used in the two authentication steps is identical. If 
the system just does LTE network layer 
authentication and bypasses the IMS service layer 
authentication it is possible to carry out fraudulent 
IMS usage which was analyzed by Lin et al. [2]. 
IV. Improved One-pass 
Authentication 
A. Outline 
The proposed IAKA authentication protocol 
binds the two AKA steps by using the unified IMPI 
number. As described in [11], IMPI is used to do 
registration, authorization, administration and 
accounting and its level is higher than the IMSI 
number, hence, it could be used as an index to 
generate AV in both the network and service 
layers. The AV generated by using the same IMPI 
number would be the same in the two layers and 
therefore the AV could be synchronized from the 
network layer to the service layer before the IMS 
layer authentication which could avoid the AKA 
protocol execution in the IMS layer. Furthermore, 
an IMS four layer key hierarchy was proposed in 
IAKA protocol to improve security and maintain 
LTE and IMS consistency. The proposed IAKA 
protocol significantly improves performance and 
security. 
B. The proposed IMS key hierarchy 
 
Figure4 proposed IMS key hierarchy 
In order to increase security and maintain LTE 
and IMS consistency, a layered IMS key hierarchy 
was proposed and is shown in Fig. 4. 
K is the pre-shared key between the UE and the 
HSS which is used to generate Cipher Key (CK) 
and Integrity Key (IK) and is kept in the Universal 
Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) of the UE and 
the Authentication Center (AuC) of the HSS. 
KASME is derived from CK and IK by HSS and is 
used to derive further keys for protection of 
different message flow types. 
KPCSCFenc is derived by the UE and the PCSCF 
from KASME, and used to protect the traffic between 
the UE and the PCSCF with a particular encryption 
algorithm. And KPCSCFint is derived by the UE and 
the PCSCF from KASME, and is used to protect the 
traffic between the UE and the PCSCF with a 
particular integrity algorithm. 
KPCSCFenc = KDF (KASME, S)  (1) 
KPCSCFint = KDF (KASME, S)  (2) 
Where Key Derivation Function (KDF) is 
described in [15] and S is the input string to the 
KDF which keeps the same definition as [13] 
except for P0. P0 is the algorithm type 
distinguisher which needs to be extended to support 
the key derivation of KPCSCFenc and KPCSCFint as:  
• Algorithm distinguisher = 
PCSCF_enc_alg and the value = 0x06. 
• Algorithm distinguisher = PCSCF_int_alg 
and the value = 0x07. 
 
C. The improved EPS AKA authentication 
In the improved LTE EPS AKA authentication, 
instead of sending the IMSI number, the UE sends 
the IMPI number to the HSS to obtain AV. 
Compared to the 3GPP defined EPS AKA 
authentication described in Fig. 2, the proposed 
EPS authentication has the following 
improvements: 
• In step E1: In order to access the LTE 
network, the UE sends an Attach Request to the 
MME with IMSI=imsi and IMPI=impi. IMPI=imsi 
if there is no impi available; 
• In step E2: If there isn’t a valid AV in the 
MME, the MME will send Authentication 
Information Request (AIR) to the HSS with the 
IMPI number; 
• In step E3: Upon receipt of the request, 
the HSS uses the IMPI number as an index to fetch 
the user’s profile and generate AV; the HSS then 
sends AV back to the MME. 
After a successful EPS authentication, both the 
UE and the MME have passed authentication and 
have the same KASME which is used to derive 
more keys for different security protection 
purposes. 
D. The improved IMS AKA authentication 
After a successful EPS AKA authentication and 
activation of the EPS bearer, the UE initiates a 
REGISTER request to login to the IMS network. 
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The procedure is shown in Fig. 5 in which step II1 
and II4 are used to negotiate SA parameters; II2 
and II3 are used to synchronize AV. After II4, all 
of the SIP messages are integrity and 
confidentiality protected by using the IPSec 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol 
[18]. 
• II1: After activation of the EPS bearer, the 
UE sends a SIP REGISTER request to the PCSCF 
to negotiate the parameters to be used to build SAs 
with the IMPI number, Global Unique Temporary 
Identity (GUTI) number and security-setup line. 
The security-setup line includes the Security 
Parameters Index (SPI) values, the protected ports 
selected by the UE and the integrity and encryption 
algorithm list that the UE supports. 
• II2: Upon receipt of II1, the PCSCF 
derives the MME address from the GUTI and sends 
a Context Request to the MME to fetch the AV 
with IMPI and GUTI. The protocol between the 
PCSCF and the MME is the GTP (General packet 
radio services Tunneling Protocol) [16] and the 
security is defined in [17]. 
• II3: The MME obtains the user’s AV by 
using the GUTI number and responds to the 
PCSCF. 
• II4: Upon receipt of the AV from the 
MME, the PCSCF chooses the SPIs, port numbers, 
supported integrity and encryption algorithms 
which are used to construct the security-setup line; 
and sends the security-setup line back to the UE by 
using SIP REGISTER response 401 Unauthorised. 
Meanwhile, the PCSCF derives the KPCSCFenc and 
the KPCSCFint for further message protection. 
 
Figure 5.  The improved IMS AKA autentication procedure 
• II5: Upon receipt at II4, the UE derives 
the KPCSCFenc and the KPCSCFint and builds the SAs 
by using KPCSCFenc, KPCSCFint, SPIs, ports and the 
integrity and encryption algorithms. The UE sends 
the SIP REGISTER request to the PCSCF using the 
IPSec SA. 
• II6: The PCSCF checks the received SIP 
packet by decrypting and calculating the integrity 
code. If there is a valid integrity code, the PCSCF 
forwards the packet to the ICSCF. 
• II7: The ICSCF fetches the user and the 
SCSCF information from the HSS, locates the next 
hop SCSCF address, and sends the packet to the 
SCSCF. 
• II8: The SCSCF sends a Server 
Assignment Request to the HSS with IMPI=impi 
using the Diameter protocol. 
• II9: The HSS fetches the user’s profile and 
assigns the user’s status using the IMPI number, 
and then the HSS sends the Server Assignment 
Answer back to the SCSCF. 
• II10 and II11: Upon receipt the II9, the 
SCSCF responds the ICSCF by using SIP 200 OK, 
and the ICSCF forwards the message to the 
PCSCF.  
• II12: The PCSCF protects the message 
using IPSec and sends the message to the UE. The 
UE checks the packet validity. If the packet is 
valid, the UE considers that it is working with a 
legal network entity and continues communicating 
with it. 
V. Analysis 
A. Security Analysis 
This section describes the proposed IAKA 
authentication protocol security mechanism, and 
shows that the proposed IAKA protocol carries out 
authentication correctly, supports mutual 
authentication, confidential and integrity message 
protection, and prevents possible malicious attacks. 
1) Authentication Accuracy 
This section describes the proposed IAKA 
authentication process in the network and service 
layers. The UE authenticates with network entities 
in the network layer and it is assumed there are a 
mobile terminal with a pre-shared key Kue and a 
network entity with the key Khss. The network 
entity initiates a NAS Authentication Request to 
the UE with the random number RAND and 
authentication code AUTN as shown in (3). 
AUTN = SQN  ⊕  AK || AMF || MAC (3) 
Where SQN is a sequence number, AK is 
anonymity key, AMF is authentication 
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management field and MAC is the message 
authentication code described in (4).   
MAC = f1K (SQN||RAND||AMF)  (4) 
Where f1 is the message authentication function 
and K is the key used. After receiving the 
Authentication Request with the RAND and the 
AUTN, the terminal computes the AK and the SQN 
first, then calculates XMAC by using (4). The 
terminal checks whether the received MAC 
calculated by the server is equal to the XMAC 
calculated by the terminal. If XMAC = MAC, the 
network entity is accepted and continues to 
communicate with the terminal. For a server with 
an invalid key identified by the IMPI number Kue ≠ 
Khss, the calculated MAC won’t be equal to the 
XMAC calculated by the terminal, and the terminal 
rejects the server connection and ceases the server 
connection and communication process. 
After receiving the RES from the UE, the MME 
checks the RES number. If the RES is equal to the 
XRES received from the HSS, the terminal 
authentication is accepted and the terminal can 
access the network. XRES and RES are calculated 
by using (5).  
XRES = f2K (RAND)  (5) 
Where f2 is a message authentication function 
and K is the key. If it is an invalid terminal without 
a valid key so that that Kue ≠ Khss, the RES 
wouldn’t be equal to XRES and the MME would 
reject the terminal attach attempt. Therefore, only 
the terminal with the correct key identified by the 
same IMPI number can pass authentication and 
successfully login to the LTE network. 
In the IMS service layer, the PCSCF performs 
authentication for the network by checking the 
Integrity Checking Value (ICV), described in (6), 
received in SIP Register Request using the IPSec 
ESP protocol.   
ICV = fintK (M)  (6) 
Where fint is the function used to generate the 
integrity code, M is the ESP packet minus the ICV 
and K is the key KPCSCFint. A valid UE, after a 
successful network layer authentication, can derive 
an intermediate key KASME which is equal to the 
KASME stored in the PCSCF and identified by the 
IMPI number. Using (2), both the terminal and the 
PCSCF derive KPCSCFint by using the same KASME, 
hence, the KPCSCFintUE = KPCSCFinthss. The PCSCF, 
after receiving the ESP packet, retrieves the ICV 
from the ESP packet and calculates XICV by using 
(6), and if the terminal and the PCSCF use the 
same key and the M wasn’t changed during 
transmission, the ICV would be equal to XICV. 
Without a valid pre-shared key to generate the 
correct KASME and KPCSCFint, ICV ≠ XICV, and the 
PCSCF rejects the register request. 
Finally, the UE authenticates the network in the 
IMS service layer by checking the ICV received in 
the SIP Register Response encapsulated by the 
IPSec ESP protocol packet. Using (6), when the UE 
and the PCSCF have the same key and the input 
string M, the received ICV will be equal to the 
calculated XICV. Any server without a correct key 
KASME can’t generate a valid ICV to pass 
authentication at the terminal, and the 
communication session is rejected. 
2) Mutual Authentication 
As described, the network and service layers 
authentication using the proposed IAKA protocol 
support mutual authentication. Only the terminals 
and the network entities with the correct keys and a 
valid IMPI number authenticate successfully and 
build a trust relationship with each other. Without 
the valid pre-shared key identified by the IMPI 
number, adversaries couldn’t pretend to be a legal 
terminal to access network and the service 
resources. Also, adversaries couldn’t pretend to be 
a valid network entity to get user’s private 
information. 
3) Confidential and integrity protection 
This section describes the confidential and 
integrity protection of the proposed IAKA IMS 
service layer authentication. The network layer is 
not discussed in this section because the 
confidential and integrity protection of the IAKA 
network layer is the same as the 3GPP definition. 
The proposed IAKA IMS layer authentication 
protocol creates a pair of IPSec security 
associations to protect the information transmitted 
between the terminal and the PCSCF. Before 
transmission, the sender encrypts the data by using 
the symmetric encryption algorithm and the key 
KPCSCFenc. Only a receiver with the same key 
KPCSCFenc can decrypt the message and obtain the 
correct plain text. 
The message between the terminal and the 
PCSCF are also integrity protected in the IPSec 
SAs. The receiver checks the message’s integrity 
by using the ICV number. If the received ICV 
doesn’t equal to the calculated XICV, the received 
message is incomplete and will be discarded. 
4) Possible attacks 
This section analyzed how the proposed IAKA 
prevented the possible replay attack and DOS 
attack. 
A replay attack can’t be achieved in the network 
and service layers because in the network layer, if 
an adversary was eavesdropping on the 
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conversation between the terminal and the MME 
and captured the NAS Authentication Request and 
NAS Authentication Response (RES), it might 
initiate a replay attack by sending the 
Authentication Request (RAND, AUTN and 
KSIASME) packet to the terminal; however, the 
adversary couldn’t pass a SQN number check 
which is a part of the AUTN. As defined in [13], 
the SQN should be different in the new session and 
the terminal should check the SQN number validity 
first. If the received SQN is the same as the 
previously accepted SQN number, the terminal 
would send an error response to the fake server. 
The adversary might do a replay attack by sending 
the Authentication Response packet to the server, 
however, a RES number check would identify this 
as a fake message. Using (5), RES is calculated by 
using the HSS randomly generated RAND which is 
different for each session. Therefore in a new 
session, the captured packet with the old RES 
number would be identified as a fake message and 
access to the services would be prevented. In the 
service layer, adversaries can’t get the user or the 
server’s information by sending the captured 
packets because the packets are protected by using 
IPSec ESP which includes a monotonically 
increasing sequence number. After receiving a 
packet, the receiver verifies the sequence number 
first to make sure this is not a duplicated packet; 
hence, the captured packet with the old sequence 
number would not be accepted. Therefore, the 
proposed IAKA authentication protocol can protect 
the system from the malicious replay attack. 
The proposed IAKA protocol has higher security 
against a DOS attack than the legacy 3GPP defined 
authentication protocol. With the legacy 3GPP 
defined authentication protocol the IMS core 
system is vulnerable to a DOS attack. Assume the 
adversary floods the PCSCF/ICSCF/SCSCF/HSS 
by sending SIP REGISTER requests with a valid 
IMPI number which belongs to a valid subscriber 
X. The PCSCF would forward the requests to the 
core network servers ICSCF/SCSCF/HSS. 
However, for IAKA authentication, the flood 
messages can only reach the PCSCF and the MME, 
leaving the core network fully protected. If the 
subscriber X hasn’t logged into the LTE network 
and the PCSCF is not able to retrieve the 
subscriber’s AV from the MME, the PCSCF 
considers this to be an invalid terminal and will 
reject the Register request. If the subscriber X has 
already registered with the LTE network, the 
adversary is required to transmit SIP Register 
requests in the IPSec security associations, and 
without the valid key, the messages transmitted to 
the PCSCF will not be validated and forwarded to 
the next hop. Therefore the adversaries cannot 
jeopardize the core ICSCF / SCSCF / HSS servers. 
B. Performance Analysis 
 
Figure 6.  The simulated LTE-IMS integrated system 
architecture 
In order to analyze system performance, a 
simulation of the LTE IMS integrated system was 
developed and the system architecture is shown in 
Fig. 6. The IMS layer authentication protocols were 
simulated based on [18]-[22]. The EPS AKA 
wasn’t simulated since it is quite similar in the two 
approaches. 
As shown in Fig. 6, the LTE-IMS system model 
includes the following entities and functions: (a) 7 
cells with 5 mobile terminals in each which are 
connected to the eNB located in the same cell. The 
terminals support SIP registration, the generation of 
AVs by using the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) algorithm, key derivation by using the 
authentication algorithm HMAC-SHA-256, and the 
IPSec ESP protocol by using AES and the 
authentication algorithm HMAC-SHA-1-96; (b) 7 
eNBs which are connected to the Evolved Packet 
Core (EPC) server; (c) An EPC server which is the 
integration of the MME, SGW, and PGW; (d) The 
PCSCF, ICSCF servers support SIP registration 
and SIP packet routing. The PCSCF also supports 
key derivation, and the IPSec ESP protocol; (e) The 
SCSCF supports SIP and the Diameter protocol and 
protocol translation; (f) The HSS server which 
supports the Diameter protocol, AV generation and 
key derivation; and (g) Two different 
authentication protocols were implemented in the 
simulation, the legacy 3GPP IMS AKA 
authentication protocol developed as shown in Fig. 
3, and the proposed improved IMS AKA 
authentication protocol developed as shown in Fig. 
5. The following activities were not implemented 
and were simulated as a network delay: 
• The request processing on the PCSCF, 
ICSCF, SCSCF and HSS which should be 
supported in the two approaches and is currently 
simulated as DELAYprocessing.  
• The ICSCF locating the next hop SCSCF 
address by checking the information from the HSS 
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which should be supported in the two approaches 
and is currently simulated as DELAYICSCFHSS. 
• The database operations on the HSS such 
as searching the user’s profile by using IMPI 
number should be supported in the two approaches 
and is currently simulated as DELAYHSS. 
• The PCSCF obtaining the AVs from the 
MME should be supported in the IAKA 
authentication protocol and is currently simulated 
as DELAYAVretrieval. 
 
Figure7. IMS layer Authentication Delay under fixed network 
delay configuration 
 
Figure 8.  IMS layer Authentication Delay Saving Rate under 
fixed network delay configuration 
 
Two configuration types were utilized for the 
assumed delays including a fixed network delay 
configuration and a varying network delay 
configuration. 
The fixed network delay configuration, after 
starting the simulation, includes all of the terminals 
initiating SIP register request repeatedly and 
simultaneously. Simultaneous rate Per Terminal 
(SPT) is used to describe the number of SIP 
registration procedures one terminal initiated 
simultaneously and the effect on system load. The 
statistics for the IMS layer authentication delay was 
collected from the UE and it is the time taken 
between sending the first SIP Register request and 
receiving the SIP Register response 200 OK. 
Referring to [23], it was assumed DELAYprocessing = 
0.025s, DELAYHSS = 0.055s, DELAYICSCFHSS = 
0.055s; and DELAYAVretrieval = 0.025s. Four 
different system loads were chosen with SPT = 1, 
SPT = 20, SPT = 30, and SPT = 40. Under the 
different SPT rates, the authentication delay of the 
3GPP and the IAKA approaches are shown in Fig. 
7, and the IMS layer Authentication Delay Saving 
Rate (ADSR) is shown in Fig. 8. 
It was identified that in non-loaded condition, 
the proposed IAKA protocol could save 33.34% of 
IMS layer authentication delay. When SPT = 1, no 
background system load is assumed. Under such 
conditions, the authentication delay is very stable. 
The average IMS layer authentication delay of the 
3GPP defined AKA protocol is 0.4s and the 
average delay of the proposed IAKA is 0.267s. 
Therefore, compared to the legacy 3GPP defined 
AKA protocol the proposed IAKA could save 
33.34% of the IMS layer authentication delay in a 
non-loaded environment. 
The authentication delay increased with 
increased system load as expected from Fig. 7. The 
effect of the average authentication delay under 
different system loads during the simulation period 
500 to 599 seconds is shown in Table I. 
 
In the loaded network condition, as system load 
increases the ADSR increases as expected from 
Fig. 8. As shown in Table I, the average ASDR is 
38.08% when SPT = 40 which is much higher than 
the ASDR for SPT = 20 and SPT = 30. 
Under low system load (SPT = 20), the IMS 
authentication delay of the IAKA protocol 
increased faster than the 3GPP AKA protocol. The 
main reason for this outcome was found at the eNB 
/ EPC which in the IAKA scenario processed more 
requests / responses during the same period which 
is shown in Table I. The wireless network is more 
sensitive than the wired network in low system load 
conditions. Therefore, the ASDR under low system 
load (SPT =20) is lower than the ASDR without 
system load (SPT = 1). 
Under a high system load, the IMS 
authentication delay of the 3GPP protocol 
increased faster than the IAKA protocol. Although 
the wireless network IAKA approach processed 
more packets, the entire authentication steps saved 
in the proposed IAKA authentication protocol 
occurred in the wired network. Under certain 
system loads, the wired network is very sensitive to 
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the packets processed. Therefore, the wired part of 
the authentication delay of the 3GPP approach 
increased faster than the proposed IAKA 
authentication approach and the ADSR of SPT =30 
and SPT = 40 is higher than the ADSR without 
system load (SPT = 1). 
 
Figure 9.  IMS layer Authentication Delay under increased 
network delay configuration 
For the varying network delay configuration the 
average network delay was used. It was assumed 
that DELAYprocessing = DELAYHSS = 
DELAYICSCFHSS = DELAYAVretrival = averageDelay. 
The average delay started from 1ms and the 
terminals carried out SIP registration procedures 
repeatedly and each procedure has a 1ms 
increment. In the non-loaded condition (SPT = 1), 
the statistics for the authentication delay and ADSR 
were collected from the UE and the results are 
shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 
show that the authentication delay and the ADSR 
increased with increasing network delay, and that 
under the non-loaded network environment, with 
increasing the network delay, the proposed IAKA 
authentication protocol could save up to 33% of the 
authentication delay. 
 
Figure 10.  IMS layer Authentication Delay Saving Rate under 
increased network delay configuration 
C. Energy Cost Analysis 
This section provides an energy cost analysis 
including calculation of the energy consumed by 
the terminal’s security activities during the 
authentication period, and a comparison between 
the legacy 3GPP approach and the proposed IAKA 
approach. It was found that the proposed IAKA 
protocol could reduce terminal energy consumption 
significantly. 
The terminal’s energy cost E for the 
authentication process is given in (7) and is made 
up of two components including the execution of 
the EPS AKA, and the execution of the IMS AKA. 
E = EEPS-AKA + EIMS-AKA  (7) 
Where E denotes the energy consumption, EEPS-
AKA denotes the energy consumption that occurs in 
the EPS network layer which is given in (8), and 
EIMS-AKA denotes the energy consumption that 
occurs in the IMS service layer. The energy 
consumed in LTE network layer is the same as in 
the 3GPP authentication approach and the proposed 
IAKA authentication approach and the security 
activities include: (a) checking the AUTN number 
which is made up of generating AK and MAC; (b) 
generating the RES number; and (c) generating CK, 
IK and deriving KASME. 
EEPS-AKA = EAK + EMAC + ERES + ECK + EIK + EKASME (8) 
The terminal’s energy consumption in the IMS 
layer for the legacy 3GPP authentication protocol 
derived in (9) includes generation of the AK, MAC, 
RES, CK, and IK. The energy consumption for the 
proposed IAKA protocol derived in (10) includes 
key derivation of KPCSCFint, and KPCSCFenc. The 
energy consumption of the IPSec ESP protocol 
wasn’t considered because IPSec is mainly used for 
message transmission and it is the same in the two 
approaches. 
E3GPP-IMS-AKA = EAK + EMAC + ERES + ECK + EIK (9) 
EIAKA-IMS-AKA = EKPCSCFENC + EKPCSCFINT  (10) 
Using the AV generation functions f1, f2, f3, f4, 
f5 defined in [20] to generate MAC, RES, CK, IK, 
and AK, the encryption energy consumption is 
considered. The combination bitwise exclusive-OR 
and bitwise rotation operations weren’t considered 
for these operations won’t affect the results 
significantly. Choosing AES as the kernel 
algorithm, refer to [24], the AES algorithm energy 
consumption EAES is made up of the energy 
consumption in the key setup phase EKEY-SETUP and 
in the encryption/decryption phase EENC/DEC. 
EENC/DEC = EPBAES * n where EPBAES is energy-per-
byte using the AES algorithm and n is the length of 
the input string. Although MAC, RES, CK, IK, and 
AK have different lengths, the values are generated 
by encrypting 16 byte data blocks which are 
executed 3 times. Therefore the energy 
consumption is shown in (11). 
EAK = EMAC = ERES = ECK = EIK = 3 * EAES (16) = 3 * (EKEY-
SETUP + EPBAES * 16) (11) 
To derive KASME, KPCSCFint, and KPCSCFenc, as 
shown in (12), the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm is 
chosen and the energy consumption EHMAC (n) = 
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EPBHMAC * n. The length of the data block size 
used in this algorithm is 32 bytes. 
EKASME = EKPCSCFENC = EKPCSCFINT = EHMAC (32) = EPBHMAC * 
32    (12) 
Using the research results found in [24], it is 
assumed EKEY-SETUP = 7.87 µJ, EPBAES = 1.21 µJ, 
and EPBHMAC = 1.16 µJ. Referring to (11) and (12), 
the energy consumption to generate MAC, RES, 
CK, IK, and AK is equal to 81.69 µJ; and the 
energy consumption to generate KASME, KPCSCFint, 
and KPCSCFenc is equal to 37.12 µJ. Put these results 
into (8), (9) and (10), the following results were 
found: (a) EEPS-AKA = 445.57 µJ, (b) E3GPP-IMS-AKA = 
408.45 µJ, and (c) EIAKA-IMS-AKA = 74.24 µJ. Using 
(13) and (14) to calculate Energy Saving Rate 
(ESR), and it was found that ESRIAKA-IMS-AKA = 
81.82%, and ESRIAKA = 39.13%. The results 
identified that through the execution of the 
proposed IAKA authentication protocol, the 
proposed IAKA protocol could save up to 81.82% 
of the terminal energy consumption for security 
activities including IMS service layer 
authentication; and save 39.13% for the 
combination of the network and service layers. 
ESRIAKA-IMS-AKA = (E3GPP-IMS-AKA - EIAKA-IMS-AKA) / E3GPP-IMS-AKA 
*100%    (13) 
ESRIAKA = (E3GPP - EIAKA) / E3GPP *100% (14) 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper presented an improved IMS 
authentication protocol for the 4th generation LTE 
network which combines the authentication for the 
network and service layers by using a binding of 
the IMSI and IMPI numbers. Compared to the 
legacy 3GPP defined AKA protocol, the proposed 
IAKA protocol simplified the authentication steps, 
reduced authentication delay, reduced the user 
terminal’s energy consumption significantly and 
provided advanced security. Future research work 
will focus on developing a generic improved IMS 
authentication protocol for next generation access 
networks. Currently work is being carried out in 
further development of the model and removing 
necessary assumptions that were made during this 
study. 
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